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This dissertation claims that Fénelon’s political theory is ontologically instead of 
epistemologically based. His political theory is a moral theory of civic virtue. The ontological focus 
places the emphasis of his theory on the question of why and how individuals relate and contribute to 
civic society.  This means that inner atonement of independency and dependency is a key to civic 
society and determination of free will, a connection Rousseau made at a later date. 
Fénelon does not approach this question from the standpoint of duty or obligation. He claims 
that the goodness of human nature has the potential of unselfish civic virtue. This goodness is 
perfected when the motives of action do not end in the self. It is the role of civic education, 
particularly through the example of words and deeds of those who hold political authority, to inculcate 
unselfishness. The viability and flourishing of civic society depend upon character development 
toward unselfishness.  Because unselfish members do what they should because they want to do it, 
there is harmony between the individual and his tendency toward association. There is personal 
ownership of consciousness and action toward the well being of others. 
Fénelon’s political theory is based on the principle of disinterestedness, a theological term with 
a rich history in Christian contemplative mysticism.  Disinterestedness refers to detachment from 
selfish interest in sense-based, emotional, or temporal acquisitiveness in favor seeking the welfare of 
 
 
others.  Indifference to a person’s actions stems from his motives. For Fénelon, love is the will’s 
determining motive toward action. Motives vary on a spectrum from interest that is mercenary, or 
selfish, to that which is purely unselfish.  All humans are capable of perfectibility toward unselfishness 
during temporal life, and social improvement is possible. Fénelon’s concept of love provides an 
alternative to the seventeenth- century Jansenist focus on human corruptibility, although Fénelon 
concedes the influences of social corruption. His concept of disinterestedness brought to a head the 
question of whether happiness has anything to do with interest.  Because he maintains that personal 
happiness, satisfaction of desire, and utility are not factors in the concept of interest, he detaches 
happiness from the motive of ethical action. Fénelon’s theory of property is a primary example of 
disinterestedness in his political theory. 
Fénelon’s voluntaristic theory of free will is also crucial to his moral and political thought.  
Unfettered will determines itself with the impressions of reason, senses, emotions, and experience with 
that which incorporates all being, Infinite Goodness.  Fénelon maintains the Cartesian distinction 
between the mind and the body.  He also maintains Descartes’s distinction between la pensée and la 
volonté.  However, Fénelon expands Descartes’s concept of will by incorporating influences of 
Christian contemplative mysticism.  Here, Fénelon shifts from epistemology to ontology.  The 
primary source of experience in the will is ontological and is not limited by what reason can ascertain 
about infinity.  Morality stems from the fact that experience is relational. Good will is what is most 
perfect in man, and the will can experience its goodness only when it is creative and free of 
encumbrance, including limits of reason. The basis of the morally good will is ontological.  The idea 
of union as Infinite Goodness is the basis of Fénelon’s system of ethics. 
One of the goals of this dissertation is to explain the role of language and rhetoric in 
Fénelon’s theology and politics of virtue. Because moral value and inspiration are integral parts of 
phenomenological being, persuasiveness has a role in inculcating the spirit of association. 
 
 
Through rhetoric, persuasiveness has a vital role in communication within the polis.  Rhetorical 
language is the means of communication among political beings. When moral value is identified as 
caring for others, rhetoric is the language of civic virtue and education. Civic education of 
disinterested virtue beckons individuals to bond unselfishly. 
This dissertation uniquely provides an ontological explanation that connects the dots 
between Fénelon’s metaphysics, theology, moral theory, and political theory. It also provides a 




Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................ ii 
Dedication ......................................................................................................................................... iv 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter 1:  Infinity, Free Will, and le moi ..................................................................................... 43 
Chapter 2: The Roots of Amour pur and Disintéressment in Philosophical Theology ................ 96 
Chapter 3: Fénelonean Amour Pur and Disintéressement .......................................................... 122 
Disinterestedness and Perfectibility through Contemplation and Meditation ............................... 122 
Misery and Dejection in the Depths of Amour propre ............................................................... 161 
Self Examination ........................................................................................................................ 166 
Humility ...................................................................................................................................... 168 
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 175 
Chapter 4: Mystical Contemplation, Discursive Meditation, and Civic Virtue ......................... 177 
 Illustration: Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake, Nicholas Poussin ............................. 205 
Chapter 5: Fénelon’s Political Theory of Disinterestedness ....................................................... 222 
Fénelon’s Theory of Property ..................................................................................................... 223 
Background ................................................................................................................................. 239 
Disinterested Virtue as Public Morality ..................................................................................... 250 
Chapter 6:  Fénelon and Rousseau ............................................................................................... 256 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 281 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 293 
Appendix: Carennac, France, Residence where Fénelon is said to have written Les Aventures  








I would like to express gratitude to: 
 
David Johnston, one of the most superb lecturers I have ever heard. His vibrant lectures 
bring political theory alive, and his lecture on Thucydides is unforgettable. As a scholar and 
advisor, his astute critique can be few in words, yet profound in guidance and detail of meaning. 
His detail and acuity offer a profound base of knowledge. His ability to discern the nuances as 
well as generality of theory have inspired me to follow and to excel. He has supported my 
project through thick and thin. 
Julian Franklin, who introduced me to Fénelon in a seminar to explore republicanism in 
French political theory. He encouraged my interest in Fénelon, helped me develop my thesis, 
and steadfastly supported my efforts. 
Patrick Riley, whose knowledge, counsel, and writings on writing on Fénelon have 
inspired me strive to be a budding scholar of Fénelonean and late seventeenth century political 
thought. Meeting with Professor Riley during his tenure at the University of Wisconsin and in 
subsequent correspondence has provided invaluable direction and insight. 
Raymond Geuss, although his counsel was brief, who helped me sort through the 
methods of approaching political theory. His advice, “Research is like mining and digging,” will 
always be with me. 
Herbert Deane, who encouraged me to study the relationship between political theory and 
the history of theology. 
Francis Jackman. As the scholar who first introduced me to the disciplines of political 
theory and philosophy, he melded the relationship between these disciplines in my mind. His 
iii 
 
lectures were magnetic. Sigmund Diamond who encouraged my confidence in my intellectual 
abilities. 
Seth Apter, Steven Flanagan, Neera Kapoor, Jane Seskin, Elena Levine, Lynne 
Stevens, Lori McKenna, Tara Wilhelm, Laura Richter, Debra Wool, Colleen Lewis, Elisabeth 
Jondahl, and Richard Gottlieb for their support and help. 
My father, who, as a professor of visual and fine arts, instilled in me the love of discovery 
through learning. 
Most of all, I thank my husband, Teodoro Mennite, who provides the patience and 












This work is dedicated to my 
Brother, Gregory Louis Falgoust 
Mother, Juanita Elizabeth Jones Falgoust 














Homer, The Illiad, Book IX, line 443 
2  
 
The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of 
 






The strong movement of Fénelonean studies for the past five decades at least supports the 
link between his theology, moral, and political ideas based on his theological concept of 
disinterestedness.  In 2000 François-Xavier Cuche documented some of the significant studies to 
support this claim in his contribution to Nouvel état présent des travaux sur Fénelon. 1The 
journey Fénelon outlines is one that follows the path of Christian contemplative mysticism. The 
path of his moral ideas involves the individual’s navigation between amour propre and amour 
pur.  The former refers to selfish love while the latter refers to love that is devoid of selfishness. 
This moral path includes the spiritually purgative step of purifying oneself from selfish desire, 
the illuminative step of practicing unselfishness in civic society, and the unitive step of realizing 
the fulfillment of human existence as a matter of relating outside of oneself toward others. This 
is the path of perfectibility, to which all have access and potential. 
This dissertation moves beyond the claim that Rousseau probably coined the term, 
                                                            
1 François-Xavier Cuche, “La morale dans les ouvrages pédagogiques de Fénelon,” Nouvel état présent des 
travaux sur Fénelon (Amsterdam: Rodopi B. V., 2000), 73; François-Xavier Cuche, Une pensée sociale catholique. 
Fleury, La Bruyèrre, Fénelon (Paris: CERF, thesis, 1991); Jacques Le Brun, “Télémaque. Fable et spiritualité,” 
Litteraturwissenschaftlisches Jahrbuch, vol. 37  (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1995), 139-145; Volker Kapp, 
Télémaque de Fénelon. La signification d’un evre littéraire à la fin de siècle classique (Paris: Jean-Michel Place, 
1982); Marguerite Haillant, Culture et imagination dans les œevres de Fénelon ‘ad usum Delphini’, (Paris: , 1982); 
Henk Hillenaar, Le secret du Télémaque; (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995); Philip Wolfe, “La notion de 
vertu dans le Télémaque,” Papers on French Seventeenth Century Litterature, 25 (1986), 386-94. Robert Spaemann, 
Reflexion und Spontaneität. Studien über Fénelon (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962) and “Fénelon et l’argument du pari,” 
Archives de philosophie, April-June (1966) 
. 
3  
perfectibilité. Matthew Mendham mentions this claim that Robert Wolker made in 1978.2 Both 
Fénelon and Descartes before him claim that perfectibility sets humans apart from beasts and is 
the most excellent human quality.  Fénelon and Descartes reflect the idea of Cardinal Berulle, 
Descartes’s Oratian friend.  But, Fénelon’s idea of perfectibility, like Berulle’s, is rooted is 
ontology instead of epistemology.  Fénelon’s idea of perfectibility stems from a history of 
centuries of contemplative mysticism, of which Berulle was only one contributor to mysticism in 
seventeenth century France. 
One major claim of this dissertation is that Fénelon lays an ontological groundwork for 
his metaphysical, spiritual, moral, and political ideas. This is a shift away from Descartes’ 
epistemology.  Fénelon’s emphasis on human existence on this basis allows him to focus on the 
relationship between the individual and civic society from a moral point of view. 
Another important claim of this dissertation is that Fénelon’s ideas of disinterestedness 
and perfectibility lay the groundwork for focus on the question of how the integrity of individual 
autonomy can be maintained in civic association. This would be a major issue for Rousseau, 
who “preferred Fénelon above all.” Both Fénelon and Rousseau maintained the idea of innate 
human goodness.  Both focused on luxury as a source of human corruptibility. When the ideas 
of innate goodness, the potential for disinterestedness, and perfectibility are combined, the 
possibility exists for social improvement exists. Both thinkers made this combination, and both 
provided recipes for reform. 
Historical philosopher Henri Gouhier acclaimed of Fénelon as the most original 
seventeenth century theologian with respect to the convergence of Augustinian and Cartesian 
                                                            
2 Matthew Mendham, “Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens against Civilization: Unraveling Rousseau’s 
Paradoxes”, Journal of the American Political Science Association, 1 (2011): 185. 
 
4  
ideas.3 Laurence Devillairs of the Catholic Institute of Paris points to the concept of infinity as 
the key to Fénelon’s system of thought.4 Here, Fénelon, one of the most rigorous and 
innovative philosophers of his time, gave a coherent and unexpected, although overlooked, 
metaphysical reading of the Meditations as movement toward the infinite love of God.  This 
dissertation establishes that Fénelon justly refers repeatedly to “the whole system of his 
thought” as a complete system of thought in the context of God’s infinity. Particularly with 
respect to his system of political thought, the concept of free will is what makes the idea of 
infinity relevant to the human experience. In Fénelon’s system, free will taps into innate 
spiritual and aesthetic experiences that inform the moral person, and these voluntaristic 
experiences are not contrary to universal truths that can be reached through reason. Fénelon 
sidesteps Descartes’ epistemological efforts regarding the ability of reason to understand 
eternity. 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to explain how this concept of the freedom of 
the will is the source of significance, consistency, and relevancy in all of Fénelon’s work, 
including his political thought.  The emphasis of his political ideas differs from the Anglo- 
American tradition of liberal theory based on self-interest, individual liberty, the protection of 
rights of the individual against the state by contract, and elected government. Personal 
happiness, satisfaction of desire, and utility are not factors in Fénelon’s concept of interest. 
Fénelon detaches happiness from the motive of ethical action.5 His ideas contrast to 
understandings of Platonic eros and Aristotelian appetite that associated love and happiness 
                                                            
3 Henri Gouhier, Fénelon Philosophe (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1977), 64. 
 
4 Laurence Devillairs, Fénelon: une philosophie de l’infini (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2007). 
 
5 Robert Spaemann describes the similarity between Kant and Fénelon in this respect. See: Happiness and 
Benevolence, trans. Jeremiah Alberg, S.J. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 78. 
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throughout the Middle Ages.  His political ideas emphasize the concept of equal dignity of 
human life in the context of government for the common good of the people under rule by a 
single person, particularly a king who provides moral example. This equality does not, however, 
mean equal social and legal status.  Perfecting the potential of other-orientation in the self is the 
key determinant in the effectiveness of such a government. 
Individual free will is the means of perfectibility, an interior journey that determines the 
moral, public person. Free will defines perfectibility as an experience of abiding inner 
responsibility.  Fénelon combines his ideas on contemplative Christian perfection and ancient 
civic education to develop other-oriented civic virtue on the parts of both the ruler and ruled. 
Virtuous moral character can be inculcated through the habits of contemplative concentration 
and civic education, because human nature is innately good. However, free will is necessary to 
perfect that goodness. 
This dissertation marks Fénelon’s concept of free will as central to what it means to be a 
person.  The free will is the locus of consistency in his theological, philosophical, literary, and 
political works, and being a person involves being civic.  Fénelon weaves his concept of the will 
together with the ideas of interest and infinity as well as Catholic mysticism to explain why the 
individual relates beyond the isolated self.  In terms of political theory, the issue is why and how 
the individual associates himself as part of a civil society. The key to association for Fénelon is 
civic virtue.  While the will is the source of all virtue, civic education is necessary to maximize 
civic virtue in the wills of the ruler and the ruled. Language and rhetoric in civic education serve 
the purpose of relating the interior and exterior worlds, the finite and infinite, and the part and the 
whole. 
For Fénelon, self-interest cannot theologically substitute for virtue in human motivation. He 
6  
does not dismiss excellence or hope in the possibility of inculcating virtue, i. e. action without self-
interest. The imperfect ability to achieve does not indicate the depravity of possibility. In other 
words, the absence of perfection does not indicate depravity.6 Fénelon’s mysticism focuses on 
detachment from rather than being saved from sin. This is one of his main arguments against 
Bossuet and the Jansenists.  Also, self-interest does not metaphysically or theologically require 
resignation to pride, as it does in the Pascal’s Jansenist interpretation of Descartes. Fénelon focuses 
on the isolation of amour propre (prideful selfism) and maximal integration of amour pur (unselfish 
love).  Although the particularity of individuation is not the object as an end or goal, the inner life is 
the crucible of this process of isolation and integration. For this reason, Fénelon’s political thought 
is relevant for addressing the problem of the integrity of personhood and association in 
seventeenth- century contemporary context and in the next century as an alternative to self-interest. 
The ideas of infinite possibility and perfectibility are also crucial to Fénelon’s 
understanding of human behavior. In La refutation du système du Père Malebranche sur la 
nature et la grâce, he expressed his idea of the volonté particulière in contrast to Malebranche’s 
idea of the volonté générale.  For Fénelon, there can be no occasionalist determinism of the 
volonté générale because of God’s liberium arbitrium. He shares both the scholastic thesis of: 
ens et bonum convertuntur, being and good are interchangeable and the Augustinian voluntarist 
tradition with Duns Scotus, who explained the universality of being as ens in commun. As 
Augustine explained, “Inasmuch as God is good, we are; inasmuch as we are, we are good.”7  
Both Scotus and Fénelon maintain that man has the same creative capacity as God.8 Man 
                                                            
6 François Fénelon, “Réfutation du système du Père Malebranche,” Œuvres, vol. 2 (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 
1997), 340. 
 
7 Augustine of Hippo, De Doctrina Christiana 1, 32. 
 
8 Fénelon, Mystique et Politique (1699-1999): actes du colloque international de Strasbourg pour le troisième 
7  
is created with free will in the image of God and can, accordingly, envision possibility. Goodness 
is the movement of the creative will in concert with ultimate Being. The emphasis on free will as 
creative possibility as the means of perfectibility differs from both Thomist reliance on rational 
intellect as an aspect of the vegetative soul and Cartesian reliance on the distinction between 
cogitatio and the vegetative soul. Subjective free will allows a continuum of perfectibility in 
which pride can be mitigated. Sense- based and rational experience are transcended. A person’s 
“glory and his perfection consist in going out of himself, in forgetting himself, in losing himself, 
in being swallowed up in the simple love of infinite beauty.”9 There is a human affinity for 
infinity. 
One approach to the history of ideas is that they remain relatively unchanged over time 
and are expressed in different forms and combinations in different historical eras.  Lovejoy 
defined this approach in The Great Chain of Being. 10Another approach argues that the value of 
analyzing ideas is achieved best when they are examined in a contemporary context. Skinner 
made the case for this approach in his article, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas.”11 Here I think of Raymond Geuess’s counsel, “Research is like mining and digging.” The 
approaches are not mutually exclusive.  My approach is that examining the development of ideas 
in historical context creates pieces of a pattern which leads to understanding their expressions 
over time.  Like the experience of appreciating aesthetic painting, examining nuances contributes 
to understanding the whole representation of a work. In the case of Fénelon and late 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
centenaire de la publication du Télémaque et de la condemnation des Maximes des Saints, eds. F. X. Cuche and 
Jacques Le Brun (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004), 569-70. 
 
9 Fénelon, Telemachus, trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xxi-xxii. 
 
10 For example, see Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936). 
 




seventeenth- century French ideas, it is necessary to integrate ideas with context to avoid 
overarching generalizations that lack rudimentary substance. This is especially true in English- 
speaking scholarship, because the developments of this era are still not known well enough. The 
representation of Fénelon’s political theory on the bases of free will, the human affinity for 
infinity, and civic virtue provides a path to substantive context for the import of his system of 
ideas at a critical junction in the development of modern political thought.  Fénelon maintains 
that historical causality arises from the character and disposition of a nation as it derives from 
whether its individuals, especially its leaders, tend toward self-interest or the interest of others.12 
As Desjardins pointed out, Fénelon understood the causes of the French Revolution nearly a 
century before they unfolded:  “François Fénelon avait écrit nôtre histoire avant qu'ils se fussent 
accomplis.”13  
Following this approach achieves several purposes. During my personal conversation 
with Johnson Kent Wright at the “Rousseau and Republicanism” Conference on Political 
Thought at Columbia University in 2012, he supported the idea that study of Fénelon according 
to these considerations regarding the history of intellectual thought is worthy and  much 
needed.14 First, this approach will establish that Fénelon was one of the most important thinkers 
in an important time during the zenith and then waning years of French absolutism. He became 
a critic of Louis XIV’s absolutism while he was influential in the inner-most circle of the Sun 
King’s Court. Fénelon was also involved with his contemporaries in the major philosophical, 
                                                            
12 Fénelon, Telemachus, ed. Tobias Smollett, 3rd ed. (Dublin: 1777), 25; as referred to in Roger Boesche “Why 
Could Tocqueville Predict So Well?” Political Theory 11, no. 1 (1983): 91.  
 
13 Cited in Arthur Desjardins, “Réforme du droit public français d'après les écrits de Fénelon," Questions 
sociales et politiques (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1893), 432. 
 
14 My personal conversation with Johnson Kent Wright at the “Rousseau and Republicanism” Conference for 
the Study of Political Thought, Columbia University, New York, September 21, 2012. 
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theological, political, cultural, economic, educational, linguistic, and literary debates of his era. 
Establishing his position in the forefront of thinking in his time will bring attention to the state 
of discourse on issues that bear on the understanding of political thought during the time that 
Fénelon wrote until his death in 1715.  Second, considering what Fénelon writes with 
hermeneutical consistency will contribute to a fuller understanding of his piece of the tapestry of 
early modern French political thought. Third, it will contribute to a fuller understanding of the 
time in which he made his contribution.  A consistent understanding of the importance of 
Fénelon’s thought will provide parameters for fuller recognition not only of his role but also of 
the role that thought of this period played in subsequent French political thought. Before, during, 
and after the French Revolution, Fénelon’s ideas influenced the frame of mind of thinkers such 
as Rousseau. Next, this approach will provide a basis for further Fénelonean studies because it 
will integrate seemingly disjointed aspects of Fénelon’s political, theological, and philosophical 
ideas. Finally, understanding the development of Fénelon’s ideas in their historical context is the 
most honest means of seeking any undistorted light that his ideas throw on the present.15  
As A. O.Hirschman explained in The Passions and the Interests, there were no social 
science disciplines or interdisciplinary boundaries when Fénelon wrote.16 The development of 
thought was multidisciplinary then and can be best appreciated now in this manner. For example, 
Louis XIV recognized the instrumentality of theology and church institutions to bolster 
absolutism and mercantilism, because the church and state remained intertwined in Gallican 
France.  This dissertation will present the main themes in the disciplines of theology; economics; 
                                                            
15 This approach to the study of history reflects that of Henle’s in “Why Study the History of Psychology?” 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 270 (1976): 14-20. 
 
16 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 1. 
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politics; linguistics; literature, and socio-cultural history; philosophy; and, particularly, moral 
philosophy that bear on the importance of Fénelon’s political thought as well as his era. 
Fénelon’s thought and era are not well understood in English-speaking academia. Without 
understanding them, the importance of Fénelon’s thought cannot be appreciated either. In this 
regard, Paul Hazard identified the waning years of Louis XIV’s reign, 1680 to 1715, as a tract of 
time where critical discoveries and adventures await the explorer.17 Another of Hirschman’s 
observations remains true.  The historical and psychological reasons for the astounding and 
sudden transformation of the moral and ideological scene in the seventeenth century are still not 
wholly understood.18 A. J. Krailsheimer admitted the exclusion of Fénelon from his Studies in 
Self-Interest without conclusive reason.19 The structure of Nannerl Keohane’s argument in 
Philosophy and the State in France is that the “seventeenth century, far from being a wasteland in 
French political thought, was a pivotal and exciting period.”20 This is a neglected period that 
provided roots for familiar writers of the next century, including Montesquieu and Rousseau.21 
David Lewis Schaefer’s review of Keohane’s important book provides a case in point for further 
study.  He noted her surprising near silence on the religious issue, the leading problem faced by the 
more profound political theorists at that time.  He suggested that the centrality of the religious 
issue might explain developments noted by Keohane, particularly the rise of individualism and the 
                                                            
17 Paul Hazard, The European Mind: The Critical Years 1680-1715, trans. J. Lewis May (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1953), xv. 
 
18 Hirschman, The Passions, 11. 
 
19 Alban J. Krailsheimer, Studies in Self Interest: from Descartes to La Bruyère (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1962), 3. 
 





use of the concept of interest as a substitute for virtue and human excellence.22 Astute scholars 
made these observations over 32 years ago. Aside from the more recent 2004 article by Niderst, “le 
quiétisme de Télémaque,” much work remains to be done, especially within anglophone 
scholarship, to realize the wealth of insight that is to be gained from this period, especially in terms 
of philosophical theology, for understanding eighteenth- century French political thought.23 This 
dissertation lays a historical, philosophical, and theological groundwork for doing so. 
As part of his study on Self-Interest before Adam Smith, Pierre Force integrates Fénelon’s 
disagreement with Jansenists, Calvinists, and contemporary Epicureans about the roles of 
happiness and pleasure in motive and self-interest.24 In their 2011 article, Benjamin Thompson 
and Robert Lamb confirmed that the compelling Fénelonean inheritance of disinterestedness and 
virtue remains only partially unpacked in Rousseau studies.25 David Lay Williams, in Rousseau’s 
Platonic Enlightenment, also points to the need to redress the lack of study regarding the 
Fénelonean heritage in Rousseau’s thought.26 In 1969 Judith Shklar recognized Rousseau’s 
Fénelonean love of antiquity.27 Her pupil, Patrick Riley, followed with The General Will before 
Rousseau; his introduction to Telemachus; “Shklar on Rousseau on Fénelon”; and “Rousseau, 
                                                            
22 David Lewis Schaefer, “Review of Philosophy and the State in France,” The Review of Politics 44, no. 3 
(July, 1982): 463. 
 
23Alain Niderst, “le quiétisme de Télémaque,” Fénelon: mystique et politique (1699-1999) – Actes du colloque 
international de Strasbourg pour le troisième centenaire de la publication du ‘Télémaque’ et de la condamnation des 
‘Maximes des Saints’,” eds. François-Xavier Cuche and Jacques le Brun (Paris: Champion, 2004). See: Peter Bayley, 
“Review of Fénelon: mystique et politique (1699-1999)”, French Studies 50, no. 1 (2006): 209-110.  
 
24 Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 184-88. 
 
25 Benjamin Thompson and Robert Lamb, “Disinterestedness and Virtue: ‘Pure Love’ in Fénelon, Rousseau 
and Godwin,” The History of Political Thought 32, no. 5 (2011): 819. 
 
26 David Lay Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2007), 37. 
 




Fénelon, and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns” in the Cambridge Companion 
to Rousseau.28 He furthered Shklar’s work and has established the relationship of Malebranche’s 
idea of the general will to Rousseau.  In doing so, he introduced Fénelon and Malebranche’s 
disagreement on the ideas of a general or particular will of God. Riley discussed the relationship 
between the ideas of disinterestedness and civic virtue in Fénelon and Rousseau.  The ideas of 
late seventeenth century France are accessible to anglophone scholars, because of his 
authoritative works, including the translations of Fénelon’s Télemaque and Bossuet’s Politique 
tirée des propres paroles de l’Écriture sainte.  It is an honor to continue in their footsteps by 
addressing in this study how the metaphysical idea of free will connects the theological idea of 
disinterestedness and the political idea of civic virtue. This dissertation will establish the 
connecting thread of Fénelon’s idea of free will and weave his theological and political ideas 
further.  This dissertation will also establish the significances of this connection: It impacts 
concepts of personhood in the next century, especially the public person, and the purpose of 
government.  Moreover, the dissertation will further explain Riley’s position that Rousseau’s 
thought can be understood from the perspectives of late seventeenth century thinkers, including 
Malebranche, Bossuet, and Fénelon. 
Fénelon’s ideas regarding other-orientation emanate from the theological concern about 
the nature of existing.  God is Being ultimately and perfectly, and the main purpose of being 
human is to unite, by unfettered will, with what is ultimate rather than to remain segregated as 
partial fulfillment of the destiny and meaning of being.  The words of Mounier come to mind: 
“[T]he essential act in a world of personal is not isolated self-perception (as in the cogito), nor 
                                                            
28 Bernard Yack, ed., Liberalism without Illusions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 124-137. 
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egocentric self-care, but…existence with others.”29 The essence of being human lies in the 
perfectible yearning for balance, harmony, order, and union. This yearning stems from 
disposition and affinity rather than the finite limits of reason. 
One of the most unique aspects of Fénelon’s thought stems from his regard of the will in 
terms of ontology (being) rather than epistemology (knowledge). According to this view, 
individuation of the self is not defined as an object that is determined by anything other than 
itself. As Rahner explained, “union and distinction are not opposites, but correlates, which 
increase together.”30 The ipso facto understanding of infinitude indicates a priori participation in 
it as well as the possibility of embracing union and relationship. Fénelon’s extreme use of 
Descartes’s method of doubt indicates that the imperfect recognizes the perfect and thereby 
participates in it. “Nothing cannot be perfect or render imperfect natures perfect.”31 Fénelon 
combines and moves beyond Descartes’s ideas on sentiment and Leibniz’s on infinity to provide 
a moral context of the self other than self-interest.  The mystical language of contemplation 
rather than discursive meditation reflects the ontological orientation of free will that opens the 
door to sortir de soi. This orientation manifests being in relationship not in singularity or reason. 
Fénelon develops the metaphysical concept of a free will that is capable of acting with 
theological and civic virtue.  The basis of moral action is innately a priori, not empirical 
experience. The result is that an abstract metaphysical idea of the freedom of the will becomes 
the foundation of and provides hermeneutical consistency to all of the genres of his thought, 
                                                            
29 Emmanuel Mounier, “Qu´est-ce que le personnalisme?” Œuvres, 3, 288; cf. Emmanuel Mounier, 
Personalism, ch. 2, Œuvres vol. 4, 451-461, as cited in John Cowburn, Love and the Person (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1967), 169. 
 
30 Karl Rahner, de Gratia, 3rd ed., (Innsbruck, Austria:  Oeniponte, 1961), 196, as cited in Cowburn, Love and 
the Person, 127 and 250. 
 
31 “Il faut qu’elle soit quelque chose de réal, car le néant ne peut être parfait, ni perfectionner les natures 
imparfaites,” in Fénelon, “Demonstration de l’ existence de Dieu,” Œuvres (Gallimard, 1997), vol. 2, n. 60, 565. 
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including literary, scholarly, educational, ecclesiastical, theological, and political. 
The philosophy of both Descartes and Fénelon was voluntaristic.  Descartes understood 
the will epistemologically in terms of cognition and reason. Fénelon focused on the will as a 
matter of the disposition of individual character that incorporates reason, conation, and action.32 
So, while the foundation of Descartes’s voluntarism leads to an epistemological basis of political 
and moral theory, Fénelon’s voluntarism leads to an ontological basis.  While Fénelon follows 
Descartes in moving beyond the Aristotelian connection of reason with the vegetative soul, 
Fénelon emphasizes the aspect of being in the soul that moves beyond reason, particularly as it is 
experienced in mystical contemplation. 
This emphasis on free will returns Fénelon to the early-Augustinian orbit in which he 
placed himself and counters the Quietist reading of Fénelon as a land of demi-Buddhists hoping 
for nirvana and the simple cancellation of “the self.” The mystical sortir de soi that takes place 
as the soul yearns for union with God does not negate the essential core of what it means to exist 
as self.  It does involve letting go of all forms of happiness and beatitude based upon pride with 
                                                            
32 Plato and Aristotle acknowledged the three human characteristics of thinking, feeling, and acting. 
Augustine suggests the same three-fold division of knowing, feeling, and willing. For a discussion of the ways in which 
ancients thinkers considered these characteristics, see:  George Brett, A History of Psychology: Medieval and Early 
Modern Period, vol. 2 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921), 139. To consider this trilogy in the history of 
psychology, see: Ernest R. Hilgard, “The Trilogy of Mind: Cognition, Affection, and Conation,” Journal of the History 
of Behavioral Sciences 16, no. 2 (1980): 107–117. Hilgard includes a discussion of the following.  In 1755 Moses 
Mendelssohn wrote about understanding, feeling, and willing in “Letters of Sensation.” Afterward, Johann Tetens 
introduced in his 1776 work, Human Nature and Its Development, empirical methods of analyzing introspection and 
maintained that the three faculties of the mind not only existed but were an expression of an underlying "respective 
spontaneity of the mind."  [my note: Like Fénelon, both Mendelssohn and Tetens focused  the idea of common sense to 
encompass conative experience, but Fénelon did so ontologically.]  Kant explained these parts transcendentally rather 
than empirically. Pure reason corresponds to intellect or cognition; judgment to feeling, emotions, pleasure, or pain and 
consequently affection; and practical reason to will, action, or conation. "There are three absolutely irreducible faculties 
of the mind, namely, knowledge, feeling, and desire. The laws which govern the theoretical knowledge of nature as a 
phenomenon, understanding supplies in its pure a priori conceptions. The laws to which desire must conform, are 
prescribed a priori by reason in the conception of freedom. Between knowledge and desire stands the feeling of 
pleasure or pain, just as judgment mediates between understanding and reason. We must, therefore, suppose that 
judgment has an a priori principle of its own, which is distinct from the principles of understanding and reason."  
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, as cited in Kant, The Philosophy of Kant. as Contained in Extracts from His 
Own Writings, trans. J. Watson, new ed. (Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson, 1888), 311. 
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disinterestedness.  What remains of the self in this process is the realization of the ultimate 
concern of existence:  union with what is eternal and sustaining. Christian perfection is this 
union.  Love is the movement toward perfection in the same sense that Augustine expressed, 
“my love is my weight.”  Fénelon, like Plotinus and Augustine, maintained that knowledge of 
everything universally important comes from a source of illumination outside of time and is 
accessible through contemplation.  The meaning of existence is co-existence. 
To remain fettered by pride and its consequences can allow a partial but not a complete 
fulfillment of the meaning of being.  Partial fulfillment is realized when prideful concerns, such 
as fearful or insatiable concerns about financial or social status, serve as a mirror to cause a 
change of focus.  Moral teaching and practice serve in Fénelon’s political thought as guides for 
the individual to distinguish intéressé and désintéressé.  The interest of the individual is peace in 
union with ultimate things.  It is achieved through disinterest in the anxious concerns of pride. 
The role of the state is to inculcate civic virtue by the example of personal leadership in kingship. 
“Example alone is capable of reforming the manners of a whole nation.”33 The wisdom of 
Minerva, as revealed in Mentor’s tutorship of Telemachus, is the example of other-oriented 
rulership for the well-being of the ruled.34 Kingship is the form of government that personally 
manifests the wisdom of Minerva to civic society. Kingship provides a reflective mirror, as in 
the Platonic Simile of the Sun, that curtails self interest.  This is the path to the inner peace and 
social harmony of the age of gold. The precepts of the path are pastoral. 
If the self forgoes prideful concerns and even beatitude, as Fénelon proposes 
hypothetically [emphasis added] in Response to the Maxims of Saints, what is left of the self?  At 
                                                            
33 Fénelon, Proper Heads of Self Examination for a King, Drawn Up for the Use of the Late Dauphin of 
France, Father to his Present Majesty Louis XV, Whilst Duke of Burgundy, trans. A. Short (London: n.p., 1747), 12, 21. 
 
34 Fenelon, Telemachus, trans. Patrick Riley, xx. 
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every moment of existence, there is not a continuous, perpetual, non-interrupted state of the 
ability to forgo these concerns.  Although the individual soul is both pure spirit and good, there 
remains some residue of self-ownership even in the few who experience pure love.  This residue 
is a substance like rust that soils again that which is otherwise pure.  The stains of self-love prompt 
reflection and lead to repeated acts of disinterestedness and virtue.35 The core of the soul remains 
good.  It is the residue of amour propre that stains. This clarification during the Quietist 
controversy precludes nihilist and chimerical interpretations of the mystical death of propriété 
volontaire in Fénelon’s thought.  The involvement of self is, therefore, one critical factor in the 
ability to experience union with God. 
The other factor is grace.  One of Fénelon’s strongest theological positions is that the will 
can refuse the influence of sufficient grace, notwithstanding a divine miracle.36 Amour pur 
cannot be achieved without the acceptance of grace, although varying degrees of it can be. This 
latitude of achievement leaves room for human and civic virtue, as in the case of the pagan 
ancients. 
There is a metaphysical actualization of the self in relation to union with the ultimate 
order of eternity. The spatial and spiritual self are eternal, and there is no need for reincarnation 
for perfection.  Fénelon’s thought is distinct from the demi-Buddhist hope for nirvana that 
involves cancellation of the self in samsaric rebirth.  There is one spatial human existence per 
soul, the purpose of which is to experience the logos in terms of unity of spirit and action. Each 
soul is created with the ability to participate in this ultimate unity of goodness. What matters in 
                                                            
35 Fénelon, “29. Interested and Disinterested Love Have Each Its Appropriate Season,” Spiritual Progress: or 
Instructions in the Divine Life of the Soul from the French of Fénelon and Madame Guyon. Intended for such as are 
Desirous to Count All Things But Loss That They May Win Christ, ed. James W. Metcalf (New York: M. W. Dodd, 
1864). http://www.ccel.org/ccel/Fénelon/progress.html, 57. 
 
36 Fénelon, Œuvres de Fénelon, Sur le promotion des Thomistes, vol. 15 (Paris: J. A. Lebel, 1823), 592-94. 
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human existence is the degree to which the soul as a self partakes in this unity by forgoing 
egoistic concerns and behaviors.  Self-failure in reaching nirvana does not necessitate starting 
over again in another form. The result is a personal transformation in and responsibility for the 
moral behavior of the self in the spatial context of the here and now. The effective locus of 
spiritual as well as moral behavior is the perfection toward the whole, not the self as part of the 
whole. The Ultimate in Fénelon’s thought is not a matter of static mysticism or stoic detachment 
from the world.  The Ultimate is political with respect to the claim that moral perfectibility is 
manifested in civil society. 
Here Tillich’s article, “Vertical and Horizontal Thinking,” comes to mind.37 On the one 
hand, religion is a living experience and in relationship with what is, relationship in every time and 
culture. This experience is expressed in many terms, including theological, poetical, philosophical, 
or political.  These expressions provide the interpretation of what ultimately gives meaning to life.  
In regard to the religious interpretation of history, vertical and horizontal are two forms of spatial 
metaphor that describe the relationship between the eternal and temporal. 
The vertical form points to both the eternal as the core of our being and ultimate meaning 
in life and to the ability to elevate oneself over the imperfections and difficulties of finitude. 
This element is expressed in religion by means of aesthetic intuition, philosophical eros, prayer, 
mediation, and mystical contemplation and union.  The vertical focuses on what is. On the other 
hand, the horizontal form focuses on what ought to be and points to the transforming power of 
the eternal whenever it manifests itself.  The concern here about ultimate being is what is 
ultimately good for those who participate in being as a community.  This form manifests itself in 
ethics, education, and politics. 
                                                            
37 Paul Tillich, “Vertical and Horizontal Thinking,” The American Scholar Forum 15,  no. 1 (1945): 102-105. 
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For Tillich, an exclusive focus on being results in a world-defying and static mysticism 
that is void of ethical and transformative dynamics in the world. On the other hand, when eternal 
reality is degraded to a boundary-concept and when focus is only on what ought to be, the result 
is a world-controlling technical activism without substance. According to him, the two forms 
oscillate in history, and the future of religion as the concern with Ultimate Being is dependent on 
a new, creative union of the two elements. 
Tillich’s “Vertical and Horizontal Thinking” provides a pertinent map for understanding 
the importance of Fénelon’s thought, wherein the present and future are also dependent on the 
union of transformation and substance.  As a reformative critic of the absolutism of Louis XIV, 
Fénelon could have come to the same conclusion about the need for this union in his own day. 
For him, the monarchy of Louis XIV lacked imperatives of substance about what ought to be. 
Absolutism, power, mercantilism, war, European hegemony, and grandeur manifested no 
transformative power with respect to what was ultimately good for those who participated in 
being, namely the impoverished French populace. From this came Fénelon’s many reform 
proposals with respect to trade, agrarianism, administration, education, morals, luxury, and 
monarchical purpose. 
For Fénelon, a sustaining way of being horizontally requires a foundation vertically. His 
life constituted both elements profoundly and fluidly.  He was a Duke, scholar, writer, member of 
the Académie française, a participant in the salons, member of the inner circle of Louis XIV’s 
Court, and tutor to the second in line to the throne. He was intently shaping the course of the 
Duke of Burgundy’s future reign.  He was also a mystic, priest, archbishop, and Prince of the 
Catholic Church.  His concern about vertical substance was at the foundation of everything he 
wrote in religion, language, rhetoric, literature, politics, and philosophy. Fénelon would have 
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agreed with Tillich that the meaning of life can become far removed from the realm of real 
existence when prescriptive rational application to control nature and society degrades the 
vertical element to a background concept.  Fénelon could have applied this concern about the 
lack of vertical substance to France under the rule of Louis XIV, as Tillich did to the Western 
civilization of post-World War II. 
This dissertation asserts that disinterestedness is the link of hermeneutical consistency in 
Fénelon’s parallel between the disinterested love of God and disinterested civic virtue.38  In 
contrast, Riley claims that there is an almost schizophrenic split in Fénelon’s thought:  on the one 
hand, Fénelon was active in the affairs of the world as an archbishop and tutor to the heir to the 
French throne. On the other hand, “he was also an extreme ascetic advocating ‘disinterested’ love 
to the point of self-annihilation.”39 With the greatest respect for Professor Riley, this dissertation 
counters his line of reasoning that disinterestedness evaporates the will to the point that there 
remains no will to love another with civic caritas.40 
There are two supports for this counter-claim.  First, Fénelon ‘talked the talk, and walked 
the walk.”  His earliest aspiration for priesthood was to be a missionary in newly discovered lands, 
and he actively helped others in the hospitals of his war torn archbishopric of Cambrai until the 
time of his death.  His early interests in education and rhetoric remained concurrent with his 
contemplative mysticism that began, not with the Quietism of Madame Guyon, but with his 
seminary training in the Suplcian Order, a French outgrowth of the Oration School.  He advocated 
for peace and tolerance; promoted economic ideas to generate a flourishing economy; tutored 
                                                            
38 This statement is based upon the words of Patrick Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 146. 
 





converts, young women and the heir to the throne; was aware of salon circles; exerted influence in 
the Germigny Circle to plan a reformed monarchy upon the coronation of the Duke of Burgundy; 
wrote literary works; was a scholar and member of the Académie française; and so on.  The quiet 
activity of disinterested contemplation was not inconsistent with active life in the world.  Fénelon’s 
actions in the world were not disdainful of God’s creation as goodness.  Yes, he was a critic, 
reformer, and perhaps an “odd duck” due to his combination of mysticism and advocacy, but no, 
he did not advocate against contributing goodness to the world with one’s free will that was created 
in the likeness of God’s infinite goodness.  In addition to Fénelon’s actions, here a few quotes to 
support that his thought was not ascetic in terms of people relating and contributing goodness in 
world.  Quite the contrary: 
“There is nothing…so precious in man as the good will, benevolence, or volition to good.  
It is this which sets a value upon all his other faculties. It is, as it were, ‘the whole man.’”41    
“Perfect virtue detaches a man from himself, and makes him unweary in bearing the 
weaknesses of others…Virtue which has come the length of aiming at nothing but good is 
equal, kind, affable, compassionate…it entirely denies itself, and thinks of doing nothing 
but good.”42   “I never would make use of anything but persuasion and good example.  
These are the arms of virtue.”43  “There will always be reason and virtue implanted by 
nature in the hearts of men; if they make a wrong use of their liberty, so much the worse for 
them…yet it is certain that by nature they are free.”44  “Compassionate and self-denied 
virtue…is the true bond of society.”45 
 
Yes, his criticisms and reforms were expressed strongly.  He strongly criticized the ill 
effects of pride and greed concomitant of luxury.  He expresses his position in strong mystical 
                                                            
41 “Hoc est enim omnis homo; so the vulgate renders those words Ecclesiastes 12:13 which in  our translation, 
we read 'This is the whole duty of man.'"). “Good Will Cannot Proceed But from a Superior Being," Fénelon, 
Demonstration of the Existence, section 64, 163. 
 
42 Fénelon, “Timon and Socrates,” Dialogues of the Dead, vol. 1 (London:  E. and C. Dilly, 1776), 105. 
 
43 Fénelon, “Solon and Pisistratus,” Dialogues (1776), 55.  
 
44 Fénelon, “Camillus and Coriolanus,” Dialogues, (1776), 188. 
 




language and meaning.  On this note, here follows a summary, according to Fénelon’s writings, of 
the counter-argument in this dissertation to Riley’s.  Support for this summary is expanded in 
chapters one, two, and three. 
A point to keep in the forefront is Fénelon’s admission that he does not follow orthodox 
Thomism with respect to the idea of motive.  Fénelon’s argument does not stem from Thomistic 
orthodoxy that associates happiness and beatitude.  Applying the Thomistic concept of the will that 
associates caritas intellectually with the hope for personal Beatitude does not helpfully lead to 
appreciating goodness and disinterestedness in Fénelon’s concept of the will.  Evaluating 
Fénelon’s concept of will in terms of the Thomistic intellectual association of happiness and 
beatitude steers off course in terms of discovering the importance as well as consistency of 
Fénelon’s theology of the disinterested will. 
Mystical annihilation for Fénelon and mystics before him involved ontological 
transformation of the will.  Fénelon explained moment by moment involvement of the will in the 
disinterested yearning for death (of mercenary selfishness), transformation of the will from selfish 
toward unselfish determination, and resurrection.  This language parallels the biblical description 
of Jesus’ death by crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension.  Fénelon refers to 2 Corinthians 5:17, 
“Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, the new creation has come: The old has gone, the new is here!” 
This transformation is not a one-time event.  At all times the will remains self-determining and the 
transformation enables, nourishes, and enhances the will to act in favor of others rather than the 
self, beyond the means of habit and reason.   
The heart of the will is a vessel, the contents of which vary each moment with degrees of 
pride or disinterestedness.  The contents of the will are self-determined.  For Fénelon, a self-
determining will that relates outside of itself according to the faculties of finitude only is limited in 
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potential.  By relating to infinity, the will is more fully able to relate to finitude, which is part of 
infinitude.  The spiritual death of avarice and aggrandizement precedes transformation and 
resurrection as a new man.  The will must constantly renew this process of replacing the old with 
the new.  This transformation actually places the well-being of the community in the will of each 
participant to respond unselfishly.   
Fénelon’s Demonstration of the Existence, Wisdom and Omnipotence of God argues that 
nature proves the goodness of God’s creation from an anthropological perspective.  Fénelon’s 
Platonically inspired On the Immortality of the Soul presents the ideas of union and infinity as the 
unchangeable essence of goodness in all times and in all things, including the good will of man.  
This union permeates temporal and non-temporal existence. Loving is the purpose of being, and for 
Fénelon all are capable of some good in the temporal world.  Perfectibility is Fénelon’s key to the 
question of theodicy regarding what is and why there is evil.  Evil is due to the misuse of man’s 
free will.  While Fénelon bemoans this misuse, he never fails to provide guidance on loving 
unselfishly.    Although his bemoaning might be pessimistic, he optimistically encourages 
perfectibility toward unselfishness.  Fénelon’s theory encourages the development and contribution 
of unselfish determination of the will in the world.  Riley is correct that Fénelon’s concept of 
reality is akin to Platonism.  Fénelon adds to Plato’s ideas the concept of a self-determining will 
and substitutes out intellect in favor of mystical contemplation as the means for the will to unite 
with infinite beauty, justice and virtue itself.46 
Riley supports a pessimistic reading of Fénelon’s concept of the will on the basis of the 
latter’s description of the world as falling in ruins.47  However, it is important to provide the 
                                                            
46 Fénelon, Sur le pur amour,” in either 1 Œuvres (1835), 308 or Œuvres 1 (Gallimard, 1983), 616-671; also 
consider Riley’s comments, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, 146. 
 
47 Fénelon, “Bonheur d’ l’Âme qui se donne entièrement à Dieu.  Combien l’amour de Dieu adoucit tous les 
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context for Fénelon’s description.   Fénelon wrote the “Happiness of the Soul which Gives Itself 
Entirely to God” to explain the peace that comes from the relinquishing slavery of the will that 
pride and vanity cause.  Here he also warns of the destruction caused by failure to relinquish 
pride.48  This writing is an indictment against vanity as the cause of the world falling in ruins.49  
“The root of our ill is that we love ourselves to the point of idolatry.”50  Acts of spiritual 
aggrandizement and avarice are the sources of the ills of the world, not the goodness of man’s free 
will.  The issue at hand is whether the free will turns toward the peace and goodness of 
unselfishness or toward self-serving “‘things which enchanted our hearts’” and ruin the world.51  
Prideful aggrandizement toward things is the problem, not the things of creation themselves. 
As Riley acknowledges, a deep root of Fénelon’s thought is the idea Platonic Beauty, as 
well as the Christian idea of God’s eternal and infinite omnipresence.   Fénelon’s thought provides 
a self-determining will to experience Platonic Beauty. As Fénelon would describe according to 
Socrates, there is no difference between life and death from this perspective of reality.  Both are 
meaningful, albeit beyond the ability of reason to understand.  
Virtuous action is the world springs most easily and genuinely from disinterested 
contemplation. The language of annihilation or emptying the will does not negate its existence.  
Instead, the activity of the will of being silent, reposed, and receptive allows the will to actively 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
sacrifices.  Aveuglement des hommes qui préferent les biens du temps du temps à ceux de l’éternité,” Œuvres 1 (Paris: 
Lefèvre, 1835), 331; as interpreted by Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, 148-49. 
 
48 Fénelon, “Bonheur d’ l’Âme qui se donne entièrement à Dieu.  Combien l’amour de Dieu adoucit tous les 
sacrifices.  Aveuglement des hommes qui préferent les biens du temps du temps à ceux de l’éternité,” Œuvres 1 (Paris: 
Lefèvre, 1835) 328-330. 
 
49 Ibid., 329. 
 
50 Fénelon, “Prière d’une âme qui desire se donner à Dieu sans réserve,” Œuvres 1 (1835) 332. 
 
51 Riley’s translation in Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, 148, is from Fénelon. “Bonheur d’ l’Âme,” vol. 1 
Œuvres (1835), 331. 
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displace mercenary with disinterested love in the heart, and thereby, to exercise disinterested love 
in the world toward others through acts of virtue.  Virtue flows from silence and displacement.  As 
Fénelon states, the more pride is purged, the more there is room for disinterested love.  Silence and 
receptiveness are prerequisites for the will to love another, as one loves oneself.  For Fénelon, there 
is a requisite order commandments in Mathew 22:37-39, “Love the Lord you God with all your 
heart and with all of your soul and with your entire mind….And the second is like it.  Love your 
neighbor as yourself.”  The Fénelonean interpretation of this scripture reconciles spiritual and 
worldly activity on the basis unselfishness is the vital essence of being able to fulfill either of these 
commandments.  It is important to remember that the word heart indicates will.  A person must 
first move his heart to replace the love of mercenary interests in favor of the love of goodness as 
unselfish love.  A person must will to empty his heart of pride to make room for love.  This is an 
active, continuous process of the free will, even in the moments of silently receiving the love of 
God.  The will remains while it determines its movements.  When a person loves God unselfishly, 
he loves God with all of his heart and soul and mind.  To the degree that this happens, a person 
loves himself because he is fulfilling himself in God’s intent for creation: loving others.  Loving 
others, including God unselfishly is what it means to love oneself.  Only when one loves the 
infinite goodness of God, and thereby, himself unselfishly will he be able to love others. 
Thus, free will and love are the keys to spiritual and moral perfectibility in Fénelon’s 
thought. It explains why he decried luxury and became an opponent of Louis XIV, whose form 
of absolutism he held as selfishly responsible for impoverishing and neglecting much of the 
populace due to wars and in the face of famines.  For Fénelon, mercantilism was the hand-
maiden of aggrandizement and power.  His thought brings to the forefront the relationship 
between the self and others as a matter of natural order.  Freer market principles grounded in 
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agriculture and the commerce of basic goods were consistent with this order. Fénelon preferred 
the individual form of a monarchical rulership to provide the ruled with a personal exemplar of 
other-orientation on the basis of free will.  The crucible in his political thought was how to 
inculcate this orientation through civic education to teach the ruler and the ruled. 
The use of language and rhetoric in civic education parallels Fénelon’s understanding of 
the inner life of mysticism as the individual free will seeks unity with the whole. Fénelon follows 
the distinction that de Sales makes in the juxtaposition of imagination with the understanding and 
the will.  In their philosophical and theological ideas, the idea of union is expressed in the 
language of will and understanding of abstraction. To convey these ideas in the secular language 
of virtue, Fénelon employs the language of imagination with careful distinction of how to use it 
properly with the purpose of the ancient l’ậge de l’or and how to avoid the dangers of Stoic self-
reliance and Epicurean pleasure.52 Fénelon’s understanding of language is best explained in his 
Réflexions sur la grammaire, la rhétorque, la poétique et l’ histoire.53 This work is more 
familiarly knows by the name of Lettre à l’Académie.  In Fénelon’s rhetorical theory of civic 
virtue, the wisdom of the purposeful communicator is revealed to the listener or reader.  
Persuasion is the means by which a rhetor such as Mentor can inculcate the Wisdom of Minerva 
in readers and listeners.  It is the inner exchange of communication through introspection and 
reflection that encourages the individual to reach beyond himself. The contemplative experience 
of mystical union is supra-sensible and beyond the self- reflection of meditative prayer.  Mystics 
such as Teresa of Avila describe the experience with expressive, metaphorical language. Fénelon 
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53 Fénelon, Réflexions sur la grammaire, la rhétorque, la poétique et l’ histoire, Œuvres, ed. Jacques le Brun, 
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recognized that he could similarly use the pastoral and purposeful style of the ancient rhetoricians 
to explain the unifying nature of civic virtue.54 Fénelon’s understanding of language and rhetoric 
is particularly important in rendering his theological principles of free will and amour pur to a 
psychological philosophy of virtue in Bétique.55 The same use is important in relating the reality 
of amour propre to the subjective challenges of perfectibility in Salente.56 In between the 
challenges of pride and the ideal lies the possibility of perfection through civic education. 
There is substance in Fénelon’s thought that, especially in English-language scholarship, 
extends beyond the usual and somewhat disjointed associations of him with quietism and as a 
reformer of absolutism.  According to the moral theologian Auguste Gratry of the Sorbonne, 
Fénelon was the most exacting of all the philosophers of the seventeenth century and was even 
more complete and explicit on the idea of the infinite than the inventor of calculus, Leibniz.57 Also 
according to Gratry, Fénelon set forth the most orthodox expression of Christian mysticism for 
many to follow for centuries.58 Fénelon carried forth the Cartesian ideas of perception, sentiment, 
and illumination, as he gave further meaning to the role of doubt in the human experience with his 
examinations of finitude and infinity. He spoke, as did Descartes before him and Rousseau after 
him, of eyes closed to the light by the disease of pride. Placing L’explication des maximes des 
saints sur la vie intérieure on the papal index marked the first time in ecclesiastical history that the 
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motive of prayer, the center of personal religion, became a matter of ecclesiastical decision.59 
Nonetheless, Fénelon had clarified the preeminence of the free will in the inner life. 
According to Howell, Fénelon’s theory of rhetoric became the dominant modern 
approach in the dispute between the ancients and moderns because he applied insights from the 
ancients that never lost modernity.60 Warnick acclaimed Fénelon’s Letter to the French 
Academy as a visionary, key work in the transition from seventeenth century classicism to the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment that presaged the writings of Voltaire, d’Alembert, and 
Rousseau.61 The French literary historian Jean-Claude Bonnet regards Télemaque as “the true 
key to the museum of the eighteenth century imagination.”62  
Evidence of the significance of Fénelon’s works will be realized merely by considering 
the significance of Télémaque, the most well known part of his system of thought, though it is 
only one facet of it.  Télémaque was first published incompletely and without Fénelon’s consent 
in 1699 at The Hague.63 In the first year there were 16 editions, and it was reprinted 50 times.  It 
was the only book that Rousseau recommended for adult reading for the education of Émile and 
was the most widely read book in the French-speaking world in the eighteenth century, except 
the Bible.64 Important factions in the French Revolution, pro and con, acclaimed some aspect of 
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Fénelon’s thought.  At least 200 editions of Télémaque were printed by the Revolution.65 There 
are over 80 translations, and, as of 1966, there were over 516 editions and reprints of Télémaque 
in the French language alone in the catalog of the Bibliothèque Nationale.66 The most important 
recent French editions are those of Haillant and Éditions Gallimard (Pléiade).67 Riley’s 
translation is the most important English language edition.68 
This dissertation will elucidate why these acclamations affirm Fénelon as a thinker of 
major importance to the development of ideas in late seventeenth- and eighteenth- century French 
thought.  He did not substitute virtue for self-interest or explain association in terms of the latter. 
Rather, he maintained that free will explains individual relationship and responsibility. He did 
provide a theory about the contemporary issue of individual motivation, but he was not caught by 
the waves that gave primacy to the passions or self-interest in the development of his political 
ideas.  In turning against the seventeenth century tide to explain action in terms of reasoned self 
interest, Fénelon offered a voluntaristic explanation of conation in terms not only of the free 
will’s but also the innately good will’s yearning for perfection.  His ideas did not limit the scope 
of individuation to the self as the end.  He expanded the scope and possibility of individuation to 
include relationship and responsibility, ends beyond the self.  The voluntaristic approach allowed 
him to explain association in terms of virtue rather than develop contractarian or absolutist ideas.  
His political thought emphasizes the moral idea of otherness as the basis for institutional ideas.  
He incorporated reason; will; and aesthetic regard for passions that inspire and transform through 
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spirituality, rhetoric, and civic example.  His idea of free will emphasized the liberty to interact 
with regard for others rather than a liberty from interference. To him, other considerations were 
unsurpassable in sustaining a thriving civil society. As the reception of his Letter to the French 
Academy has continuously proven, Fénelon was a major arbiter in the battle between the ancients 
and moderns. 
The corpus of English-language studies on Fénelon remains meager in comparison to that 
of French-language studies.  Most of the English-language translations of Fénelon’s works date 
from the nineteenth century, because Fénelon was influential in early America. New England 
transcendentalists as well as the religious leaders and theologians of the Great Awakening, 
particularly the Quakers, incorporated his ideas. Furthermore, most English-language studies are 
bibliographical in approach.69 Fénelon is most often represented as a reformer who criticized the 
absolutism of Louis XIV and as a Quietist sympathizer whose explanation of its principles was 
condemned by the Pope under pressure from Jacques-Begnine Bossuet, Fénelon’s mentor who 
turned into his adversary. Scholars associate Fénelon’s ideas of amour pur and désintéressment 
with the Quietist movement of seventeenth century Spain and France and particularly of Madame 
Guyon. 
These ideas are, however, much more deeply extensions of the traditions of many 
centuries of Catholic Christian mysticism, the popular pietism of counter-reformation France, and 
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the revival of Augustine’s neo- Platonism. Voices of the inner life that influenced Fénelon 
included the Rheno-Flemish movement; Teresa of Avila; the Bégards; John of the Cross; Francis 
de Sales; Cardinal Berulle; and the Oratory and its outgrowth, the Sulpicians, to whom Fénelon 
was indebted for his seminary training.  Fénelon’s theological ideas are steeped in and justified 
according to the traditions of mystical Catholic Christian theology. Notwithstanding, the 
message of these ideas transcends mysticism, Catholicism, Christianity, and even religion per se 
The abstract and universal nature of his message contributes to the modernity of and sustained 
interest in his ideas. The task at hand is to explain that the mystical foundation of Fénelon’s ideas 
extends far beyond esoteric theology and has sustained the relevancy of his thought for over 300 
years. 
The piety of mysticism presented an impenetrable threat to political and ecclesiastical 
absolutism.  The personally sacrosanct and universally accessible egalitarianism of abstract 
contemplation accounts for Fénelon’s contribution to the idea of fraternité. Fénelon’s mystical 
pietism carries egalitarianism implications for natural republicanism.  Fénelon’s concept of unity 
opened the door to an egalitarian type of natural republicanism of virtue where a harmonious 
society is modeled on nature, where laws could serve a minimal role.  Civil institutions minimize 
the role of positive law and the force of government. This natural republicanism appealed to 
Mably, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the Physiocrats.70 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is not so much to explain Fénelon’s reform proposals, 
such as his anti-mercantilist ideas that interested the Physiocrats, but to explain what is 
significant and consistent about them from an abstract and universal perspective. Explaining 
significance and consistency are separate endeavors. Yet, there is substantial benefit to pursuing 
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both in this dissertation, because the endeavors have a common meeting ground in Fénelon’s 
concept of the free will. His philosophical ideas on the theory of knowledge and ontology 
provide the foundation of his Christian mysticism as well as his moral and political ideas.  His 
theology is much more than a variation of quietism.  With respect to human existence, he focuses 
on how the finite relates to the infinite, how the particulière relates to the génerale in human 
existence, and why the individual relates to others. For Fénelon, le moi is a matter of 
individuation, while it participates in the image of the whole. This theological foundation and 
moral meaning explains why people relate in a communal way and why they relate to political 
leadership. 
Fénelon’s writing was at the heart of defining what it meant to be an individual from a 
metaphysical standpoint in late seventeenth century France. His synthesis of seventeenth century 
metaphysical debates and centuries of mysticism presents an understanding of le moi for 
eighteenth century France.  Although the 1872-77 Dictionnaire de la langue française indicates 
that there was no distinction between the concepts of amour de soi and amour propre in 
seventeenth century France, Fénelon clearly made this distinction at the end of that century. 
Egoism was not part of French vocabulary at the time Fénelon wrote.  Amour propre 
(pride) was used instead.  It was a theological term that took on moral meaning. Fénelon was 
one of many important French thinkers of the seventeenth century who dealt with the concept of 
amour propre.  Others, including Arnauld, Abbadie, LaRouchefoucauld, Nicôle, and Pascale, 
assumed that it was the basis of human motivation.  Prominent interpretations of amour propre 
were consistent with the definitions of interest that entailed acquisition of happiness, satisfaction, 
and desire. Fénelon acknowledged amour propre as a factor in motivation but did not capitulate 
to its determinacy in the capacity of the individual.  In terms of the concept of interest, Fénelon 
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focused on how the interior perceptions and dispositions work toward self-determination and 
personal responsibility rather than why inner psychological or external concerns delineate 
personal ownership as satisfactions of happiness, desire, or utility. For Fénelon, the public good 
is dependent upon inner responsibility toward others rather than a marriage between pride and a 
concept of interest that ends in the individual rather than others. The lack of determinism 
regarding the role of pride in human motivation leaves room for the path to the freedom to 
choose as a community, one that regards the well-being of the whole. Human motivation 
includes varying degrees of pride and humility.  Fénelon’s view is very different from the 
mainstream of his time that was replacing the ancient values of virtue and human excellence with 
self-interest as the basis of political, economic, and social interaction. 
Two qualities in Fénelon’s political theory contribute to early modern political thought. 
First, Fénelon’s principles of reality in free will stem primarily from Christian mysticism, the 
interior life of the individual in non-discursive, supra-sensible transcendence of selfism, 
particularly in the form of egoism.  Fénelon knew the Phaedrus and Symposium well, although 
transcendence is not a matter of the rational intellect in his system.  His understanding of reality 
is similar to illumination in the cosmos of neo-Platonism.  Transcendence involves awareness 
and interpretation of reality that is beyond reason and the senses.  Fénelon affirmed the existence 
of the individual soul as it was defined by the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century. 
Denying selfism did not deny selfhood. In the language of Christian mysticism, interior life 
indicates prayer that entails absolute intellectual freedom from the passions and scruples of the 
self as prideful. 
Second, reality in the free will is eternal, abstract, and supra-natural as well as temporal, 
cognitive, and physical. This reality is manifested in the Incarnation of the Logos. The humanity 
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of God is the ultimate example of the means to perfectibility. From a theological point of view, 
Fénelon’s thought expresses the redemptive hope for the individual that is realized in the 
incarnation of the word of God made flesh. Man’s pride turned creation upside down. The 
incarnation turned it right side up again.  Fénelon’s understanding of the incarnation from his 
Suplician seminary training reflected the mystical theologies of John of the Cross and Francis de 
Sales, the early writings of Augustine of Hippo on free will, and neo-Platonic illumination. 
The Incarnation is for the here and now in Fénelon’s thought, not only for eternal 
salvation after physical death.  God wanted reconciled union with man after Adam and Eve 
turned away from His perfect goodness due to pride.  So, He humbled himself to suffer 
humiliation, torture, and death in human form by the foibles of human hands. The physical death 
and resurrection of Jesus was the means by which God manifested to the individual how free will 
crucifies personal pride with the same humility that enabled Jesus to carry all human effects of 
pride to the cross on the via dolorosa.  The path and consequences of human pride that 
contributed to Jesus’s death manifested the spiritual sacrifice of pride in sortir de soi that each 
individual must follow to experience spiritual perfectibility, redemption, and resurrection of his 
own true nature. 
Fénelon’s message is that inner pride brings each to his own spiritual suffering and death 
in the same manner that the effects of human pride brought Jesus to the cross of crucifixion. Jesus 
did not take away pride on the cross.  God left the individual, by example, the free will and 
autonomous dignity to annihilate pride by spiritual death in every time and instance. A person 
will experience redemption in union with Infinite Being only by the death of his personal pride. 
Otherwise, he remains “stopped in himself.”71 Sortir de soi, the phrase that Fénelon so often uses 
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in the tradition of Christian mysticism, means going outside of pride. Anéantissement refers to the 
inner crucifixion of pride that enables each person to realize the reconciliation and unification of 
his true nature in the likeness of Infinite Goodness: 
Pure love has renounced everything and left everything; the soul feeds in silence 
on the cross of her oneness with the crucified Christ, without any aversion to 
suffering. She has only one desire: to let herself be seen by God as she actually 
is, without thinking of herself. A will which, when everything else has been taken 
away, is filled with the will of God is the purest love of all.72  
 
In contrast, Jansenism focused on the prideful depravity of man in the Garden of Eden and 
hopelessness of his redemption without grace and ordained predestination.  Catholic Jansenism, 
like Protestant Calvinism, interpreted human nature and salvation by focusing on the later 
writings of Augustine. 
One purpose of this dissertation is elementally pedagogic, especially regarding mysticism 
and theology as they relate to Fénelon’s idea of free will.  There will be many direct quotes from 
Fénelon’s writings because primary texts, particularly in the areas of theology and philosophy, 
are not sufficiently known by scholars to an extent that allows systematic analysis or critique of 
his thought. The often-referenced Gosselin edition (1820-29) shows some partiality toward 
Fénelon and omits the Explications des maximes des saints. The Versailles edition of 1832 was 
thirty-five volumes.  The most current authoritative compilation of his literary, theological, 
political, and philosophical work is the two-volume Bibliothèque de la Pléiade éditions (1983, 
1997), although it is abbreviated.  In addition to the argument in this dissertation that will connect 
Fénelon’s theological and philosophical ideas of free will with his political ideas, providing a 
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representation of texts will help substantiate this claim to an extent that has otherwise not been 
explained in the English language. This provision will help ground and guide further research. 
Writings that have been translated into English are, not surprisingly, the most often 
referenced in English-language scholarship. There are accurate translations of Les aventures de 
Télémaque; Réflections sur la grammaire, la rhétorique, la poétique et l’ De l’éducation des 
filles; Dialogues sur l’éloquence; and La Lettre à Louis XIV. Some antiquated translations from 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries either do not convey accurate meaning at the time of the 
writing because they fail to translate French with respect to linguistic meaning or they reflect 
biased interpretation at the time of translation.  Theological and philosophical writings such as 
La Réfutation du système du Père Malebranche sur la nature et la grậce that are crucial to 
understanding Fénelon’s thought remain to be translated.  Many English-language Fénelonean 
studies refer to what other scholars have written about him rather that assessing what Fénelon 
wrote himself.  Thus, it will add significantly to the understanding of his ideas to support them 
with primary text. 
While the purpose of this dissertation is not to create parallels in the ideas of Fénelon and 
Rousseau, it will conclude by indicating that significant parallels exist. It will be possible to 
understand with deeper insight why the French Republican Convention of October 1792 
considered placing the remains of Fénelon and Rousseau side by side in the Panthéon. They are 
both honored on its facade, despite the fact that Fénelon was an archbishop who wrote for a 
prince.  Consciousness and perfectibility, not self-interest, are the foundations of civic virtue in 
the state. In Fénelon’s political thought, the mitigation of pride is sought by civic education in 
favor of the needs of the ruled being provided for by the ruling.  Fénelon’s understanding of the 
free will, as volonté particulère in relation to the ontology of union, provides a metaphysical basis 
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for Rousseau’s psychology of the self. It provides context for understanding the total alienation 
of the ideal citizen to the general will. This places Rousseau in the context of the late seventeenth 
century theological debate about the particular and general will of God beyond the work of Riley 
in The General Will before Rousseau. 
Rousseau’s writings can be seen within the Fénelonean framework of philosophical 
psychology of consciousness regarding why the innately good individual yearns for relationship. 
Both authors understand why the metaphysical issues of individuality and union are important to 
political thought.  Fénelon provides a framework from an early Augustinian orbit of free will that 
contributes to the understanding of the non-social contract aspects of Rousseau’s thought as the 
struggle of pride between isolation and relationship. Both thinkers consider the possibility of 
relationship by civil virtue in civil society according to principles of disinterestedness in the state 
of nature and the virtue of antiquity. 
Fénelon and Rousseau share the central Platonic ontological doctrine of transcendence 
and its attendant virtues.73 They also share the idea of practical education that makes these 
virtues relevant for the everyday person.74 This is precisely why Rousseau sent his character 
Émile in Émile ou de l’Education on his journey with the book, Télémaque in hand. Telemachus 
here is an intended double meaning.  Both Émile and Télémaque were individuals on a journey 
to discover how to reconcile uniqueness with association.  Rousseau, in his book, Émile, and 
Fénelon in his book, Télémaque, represented mentors who guided their respective pupils, Émile 
and Télémaque, to self-discovery. Finally, Fénelon and Rousseau are committed to the idea that 
the purpose of government is the well-being of the people, and they have common ideas about 
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what achieves this purpose. 
For both, amour propre in civic society beyond the state of nature leads to isolation and 
inner emptiness.  Both thinkers similarly understood luxury in this regard.  Fénelon and later 
Rousseau address the themes of identity and dissociation by regarding contingency and 
dependency as attributes of individual existence where there is a need for interaction. Greek 
agrarianism, civic education, and the value of perception and language made sense to them.They 
appreciated the interaction of work and sharing of the distribution of good for the whole. The 
yearning for relationship instead of isolation is understandable as a struggle between amour 
propre and amour pur, as disinterestedness, when one considers what happens to goodness in 
human existence after the state of nature in the Discourse sur l’ orgine et les fondements de 
l’inégalité. The same can be said of the role of luxury in the question si le rétablissement des 
sciences et des arts a contribué  à épurer les moeurs, the inner journeys in Les rêveries du 
promeneur solitaire.  This likewise applies to self-reflection in Les confessions, and education in 
Ểmile and La nouvelle Héloïse. 
Moral leadership according to the principle of disinterestedness is exemplified in the case 
of the monarch for Fénelon and the Legislator for Rousseau. Fénelon’s tutorship of the duc de 
Bourgogne and Mentor’s tutorship of Telemachus plays the same role as Rousseau’s Legislator’s. 
Both philosophers reconcile freedom and authority with the education of civic virtue and 
education that inculcates collective identity and thwarts the existentialism of despair. Fénelon 
combined the theological and philosophical ideas of désintéressément and amour propre with the 
virtues of l’âge d’or ancien to provide a way to understand the role of the individual in the polis 
of his day. Fénelon’s metaphysical understanding of the movements between la volonté 
particulière and la volonté générale adds substantial depth to the thought of Rousseau, who is 
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said to have preferred Fénelon above all, according to his biographer Jacques-Heni Bernardin de 
St. Pierre.75  
Free will integrates Fénelon’s idea of political authority as personal leadership in his 
political writings, which include Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté, Mémoires 
politiques, Plans de gouvernement dis Tables de Chaulnes, and Lettre à Louis XIV. His most 
well-known writings on personal rulership, including Télémaque and Dialogues des morts, were 
written particularly for the attention of le petit prince, when Fénelon tutored the future heir to the 
throne of Louis XIV. Fénelon’s concept of individuation provides a universal explanation of the 
other-orientation of all human beings, rulers and ruled alike. His concept of the individual 
includes the ability to act on the basis of abstractly separating unselfish from unselfish motives. 
Le moi is the citadel of disposition as the power of action. But, the purpose of being an individual 
does not include creating a circular movement where a person is the direct object or end of his 
own actions. Fénelon’s focus on the orientation of individual action toward others places his 
political ideas within the scope of one aspect of liberalism. Government exists for the welfare of 
the governed. 
Fénelon’s understanding of the idea of individuation has further universal significance. The 
language and meaning of free will prefers no gender. Also, the individual is more a member of a 
world family than of a nation or birth family.  For example, abolitionists in early America regarded 
Fénelon as a standard-bearer of tolerance.76 He is a forerunner of universal human rights: 
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A people is no less a member of the human race, which is society as a whole, than 
a family is a member of a particular nation. Each individual owes incomparably 
more to the human race, which is the great fatherland, than to the particular 
country in which he was born. As a family is to the nation, so is the nation to the 
universal commonweal; wherefore it is infinitely more harmful for nation to 
wrong nation, than for family to wrong family. To abandon the sentiment of 
humanity is not merely to renounce civilization and to relapse into barbarism, it is 
to share in the blindness of the most brutish brigands and savages; it is to be a 
man no longer, but a cannibal.77  
 
Finally, Fénelon’s concept of free will is a metaphysical source of eighteenth-century 
French receptivity to the idea of the dignity and capacity of the human person vis-à-vis others. 
This foundation adds to the understanding of the French roots of the ideas of the French 
Revolution. Fénelon maintains that there is no liberty where there is spiritual fear. If there is no 
fear of death, then none of the fear, desire, utility, or pride that is associated with mortality has 
power over the individual either. In his political ideas, he refers to Lucretius to point out the 
parallel in political freedom that fear is an invention of tyrants to keep people in servitude.78 
Lack of spiritual fear impedes the possibility of political servitude. 
In his notable eulogy of Fénelon, D’Alembert cited the unpublished Lettre à Louis XIV. In 
this letter, Fénelon scathingly criticized the roles of flattery, fear, and the good pleasure of the 
king rather than his regard for the state and its laws.79 One of D’Alembert’s two types of ethics 
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reflected the Fénelonean concern about what men owe each other and what society owes its 
members.80 This concern became and remains a primary concern of liberalism.  Fénelon realized 
that few individuals could achieve the state of amour pur. However, it was the responsibility of 
the institution of monarchy to approximate it as closely as possible with respect to the purpose of 
rulership. After the ascension of Henri IV to the French throne, the Holy League furthered the 
cause of divinization of the person of the king to consolidate Catholic divinity and political 
sovereignty. Fénelon instead favored divinization of the purpose but not the imperfect person of 
a ruler.  Moreover, the divine purpose was embedded in the rule of ancient law.  It was for these 
reasons that his idea of government for the good of the people swelled to a wave that crested with 
the Revolution.81 His thought was part of the breaking asunder of Louis XIV’s absolutism by 
translating the ancient Gaulish meaning of rulership in a way that moved into the future. This 
underlies why Larmartine hailed Fénelon as the “the first apostle of liberty.”82 Here is 
Larmartine’s explanation: 
When we follow the chain attentively, link by link, from the most fanatic tribunes 
of the convention to the Girondins, from the Girondins to Mirabeau, from 
Mirabeau  to  Bernardin  de  St-Pierre,  from  Bernardin  de  St-Pierre  to  J..  
J.Rousseau, from J. J. Rousseau to Turgot, from Turgot to Vauban, from Vauban to 
the preceptor of the Duke of Burgundy [i.e., Fenelon] we shall discover in 
Fénelon the first revolutionist, the first tribune of the people, the first reformer of 
kings, the first apostle of liberty, and in Telemachus we shall acknowledge the 
evangelist of the truths and errors of modern revolutions.”83  
 
The structure of this dissertation includes an introduction and six chapters.  This 
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introduction explains the fundamental principles of François Salignac de la Motte-Fénelon’s 
thought.  Chapter 1 will present the first of three connecting threads in Fénelon’s political theory. 
This thread is Fenelon’s concept of free will, which will be explained by contrast to and 
comparison with other significant thinkers of his era. Bayley has pointed out the need to explain 
the historical context that is crucial for understanding the relationship between Fénelon’s theology 
and political ideas.84 The next chapter will introduce the second connecting thread, mystical love.  
This chapter will provide a historical explanation of the roots of Fénelon’s mystical concept of 
love, amour pur, in philosophical theology.  This foundation is important for understanding the 
roots of seventeenth- century Catholic mysticism in the concepts of doubt, the self, and the 
representation of language. These roots will establish their relevancy as a unique approach to the 
issues of Fénelon’s era, especially the ideas amour, intérệt, infinité, and volonté. The third chapter 
pedagogically arranges primary texts that present Fénelon’s concept of love to a degree that is not 
now available to English-language scholars.  His primary theological works present the crucial 
foundations of philosophical theology in his political thought. This chapter will further the 
understanding of Fénelon’s theology beyond the Quietist controversy. By retaining the essence of 
Fénelon’s own words, the link between his theology and moral and political philosophy is 
presented authentically for newcomers to this area of study. This chapter will also provide a needed 
resource for further studies. The fourth chapter will explain the third connecting thread: virtue.  
This chapter explains Fénelon’s moral theory. Representational language and rhetoric make sense 
of the supra-sensible experience of mystical union of temporal and ultimate being.  His methods of 
language, rhetoric, and education inculcate disinterested virtue, by which he connects his 
theological and political ideas.  The sensible experience of language is used to modernize ancient 
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civic virtue through civic education.  The fifth chapter highlights Fénelon’s property theory as a 
primary example of disinterested civic virtue. Fénelon places ancient virtues as a contemporary 
alternative to the developing ideas of human motivation, political association, and economy that 
are based on self interest. Fénelon’s property theory will be explained in light of historical issues 
of his day that influenced his positions and also in light of civic education that helps inculcate 
disinterested civic virture.  The final chapter introduces the relationship between Fénelon and 
Rousseau. They share the common quest of finding a form of association that allows a person to 




Chapter 1:  Infinity, Free Will, and le moi 
 
"C'est de la réalité du libre arbitre...que dépend toute la regle des moeurs."1  
 
This dissertation claims that, according to Fénelon,  the ontological link of individual 
free will with infinity is the foundation of theological, moral, and civic virtue beyond the 
limitations of pride.  Moreover, this link with infinity forms the foundation of civic association. 
Fénelon’s concept of free will is a cornerstone of his system of thought, although it is not well-
known outside of French scholarship.  This chapter will serve two purposes.  It will explain his 
idea of free will. It will also consider the subject within a contemporary context to provide 
more familiar reference points from which to understand the basis of his thinking on this 
matter.  The chapter will also include contrasts to and comparisons with other thinkers, because 
his ideas on the free will emerged partly from the issues that were important during his time.  
From a contemporary perspective, the impact of his ideas on free will takes on meaning with 
respect to his moral and political philosophy. Fénelon considers the will metaphysically 
distinct from the theological concept of the soul. 
Many developments paved the way for the inquiry regarding human will in the mid- 
seventeenth century. The scientific revolution had put a wedge between reason and revelation. 
Copernicus and Galileo led the way; Bacon, Descartes, and Newton followed. French 
mathematical theories of probability stimulated consideration of the scope of creative possibility 
in human endeavors. Consequently, different modes of inquiry germinated, and Humanism 
flourished in the nascent Académie française.  There was keen interest in individual man, his   
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consciousness, and the powers of his mind.2 In the political arena, the emerging nation-state of 
France under the centralization of Louis XIV challenged the social and political structure of the 
ancien régime. The reformation had loosened the domination of the Catholic Church on the 
consciences of people and the loyalty of monarchs.  Catholic theologians, including Fénelon, 
were placed in the position of responding. For example, the Protestant Reformation prompted 
the Jansenists to address the Calvinist ideas about whether the human will is free or pre-destined. 
It had become possible for men to think more freely. In 1518, at the beginning of the Protestant 
Reformation, the Fifth Lateran Council defined the Catholic doctrine on the individuality of the 
human soul in each person.  Those who claimed that the intellectual soul is mortal or that there is 
a single soul for all men were condemned. 
[T]he soul is not only truly, of its own nature and essentially, the form of the 
human body...but also it is immortal and, corresponding to the number of bodies 
in which it is infused, is capable of being multiplied in individuals, is actually 
multiplied, and must be multiplied.3  
 
This doctrine affirmed Aquinas's anti-Averroist position in Summa Contra Gentiles in 1257. 
According to The Catholic Catechism, this doctrine creates room for personal immortality, 
personal liberty, and personal responsibility.4  
One of the most frequently debated issues of the seventeenth century was the 
relationship between determinism and human freedom, and Fénelon’s ideas were part of the 
debate. The idea of freedom is that whatever happens is brought about by no causes other than 
the person experiencing it.  The idea of determinism is that whatever happens is brought about 
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by causes other than the person causing it.  A compatibilist position is that being free is logically 
compatible with being causally determined.  In other words, one can be both free and 
determined.  Most seventeenth century writers were compatibalists.  An incompatibalist position 
is that an action logically cannot both be causally determined and be free. There are two 
options, both theological in nature, for an incompatibalist. The first is to adhere to 
determination and deny that anything or anyone is free. There are currently no known 
followers of this position in seventeenth century France.  The second option for an 
incompatibalist is to admit to the existence of free actions and claim that these are 
undetermined.  There were advocates of this position, including the Spanish Jesuit Luis Molina 
(1535-1600), whose ideas were influential in France.5  
Molina held that an action logically cannot both be causally determined and be free. 
Free actions are undetermined.6 This position is a rejection of determinism.  Molina attempted 
to reconcile the efficacy of God's grace with the freedom of the human will. He made the 
condition of grace dependent upon the free consent of the will.7 This position detaches the 
agent from any causal necessity, be it concupiscence, God, church, or king. This 
incompatibalist position regarding freedom singularizes the individual as an agent exempt from 
necessity. This claim not only undermines external authority; it emphasizes individual 
freedom. It is no wonder that the powers of the church felt threatened, accused Molina of 
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Pelagianism, and anathematized Molinism. 
From another point of view, Fénelon’s ideas on free will can be understood as an 
outgrowth of philosophical interest in Augustine that began in the sixteenth century with 
Renaissance neo-Stoics such as Montaigne, Charron, and de Balzac.  They quoted Augustine, 
although their references deviated from the attitude and language of Augustine and the early 
Latin Stoics.8 The result was an interpretation of Christian Stoicism that became the ideal ethical 
system of the honnête homme during the reign of Louis XIII. Fénelon would respond against 
this ethical system.  Moreover, his Christian mysticism was contrary to any interpretation of 
Stoicism that leads to ascetic renunciation of participation in the world. Arnauld’s and 
Descartes’s ideas also represent outgrowths of the interest in Augustine. In turn, the ideas of 
many succeeding seventeenth- century French thinkers, including Pascal, Malebranche, Bossuet, 
and Fénelon, are based on Augustinian themes. 
One focus of seventeenth century inquiry was to establish a rationale for human conduct, 
and the concept of free will was part of this inquiry. Fénelon recognized the emphasis that had 
been placed by the Catholic movement of Jansenism and the Protestant movement of Calvinism 
upon eros (defined as depraved egoism) as the principal source of human conduct. Their source 
was Augustine, who, they interpreted, had traced the movements of the soul to the designs of 
interest.  Fénelon did not deny the role of egoism in human conduct. Four of his five types of 
love involve self-interested motives.  However, Fénelon sought a relationship with God which 
escapes the selfish motives of such interest.9  
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From another perspective Fénelon’s philosophy of the will imports into the ruins of the 
ancient cosmos the Cartesian destiny of modernity, in which the individual is the center and 
measure of all.10 Like Descartes, Fénelon situates the moral source within the individual.  The 
loving and knowing self is the center of the moral cosmos. Freedom is doing what one ought to 
do without any constraint of necessity, because one loves to do it. “The more the soul is passive 
towards God, the more active is it in that which she ought to do.”11 Desire and duty coincide in 
freedom. 
“If our lives be already moral and well ordered, we have only to change the secret 
motive of our actions into love, and we may continue almost the same course of life….Instead 
of being harassed by pride,…we shall act with liberty…”12There is a parallel between the 
absolute subjectivity of the self to love God unconditionally without being determined to do so 
by any order of Providence and the subjectivity of the self to love the political state and, 
consequently, fellow citizens in the same manner.  In other words, the individual, as the motor 
of virtue, has the independent and self-sufficient will to experience le moi commun 
notwithstanding any authority of the church or state.  The free will is the foundation of political 
association and obligation. 
The development of the theory of le moi is one of the most important developments, if 
not the most important one, in the political thought of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth- 
century France.  Fénelon translated the concepts of the free will and of virtue from the context 
of contemporary theological and philosophical debates into a social and political context. He 
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was one of the key figures in these debates.  The arguments that he made against his 
opponents clearly distinguish his position.  He argued against various positions of Bossuet, the 
Jansenists, Addadie, Spinoza, and Malebranche. 
Studies of Fénelon’s writings often focus on a controversy about the mystical 
movement of quietism and its influences on his thought. His writings were associated with 
this movement, which swept the Catholic world under the influence of the Spanish bishop, 
Miguel de Molinos (1640-1697?).13 Molinos’s ideas centered upon the will as an agent free to 
act without any necessity to love God. The free will must turn inward to exclude all judgment 
in order to reach the spiritual life.  Here a person empties his mind and awaits direction from 
God.  The term quietist refers to passive reception of God's will and the freedom from hope 
and fear that this reception provides.  Quietism requires turning inward to recognize God's 
will.  A person is to will or desire only what God wills and be indifferent to everything else.  
To live in the present is to conform oneself to eternal order.14 To contemplate in such a 
manner educes love, and Quietists maintained that it is possible to love God with pure love 
(amour pur). The schismatic teachings of Molinos recommended the complete quiet and 
passivity of soul so that it no longer even desires salvation but remains entirely and receptively 
at rest in God without any activity, viz. egoistic concerns. 
For Quietists the disposition of the heart is not the inferior slave of concupiscent 
pleasure. It is a complement to reason, and both are moral characteristics. Moreover, the 
inclination of the heart is primary. If the heart does not motivate action, discernment and 
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rational choice are of no consequence, because they cannot alone lead to the fulfillment of 
human nature.15 According to Quietists, pur amour is the most important motivation of human 
behavior because it is the only source of ultimate human fulfillment.  Fénelon expanded some 
Quietist tenets; for example, he held that the human will is free of all exterior influences, and 
he asserted that the will can even be free of the influence of God, if an individual so chooses. 
Molinos’s teachings were formally condemned in 1687.  Fénelon became acquainted 
with quietism through his friendship with Madame Jeanne de la Mothe Guyon, a Quietist who 
at one time was among the inner circle of Madame de Maintenon. Her most characteristic 
work is Le moyen court et très facile de faire oraison.16 Her works were subjected to an 
inquisition in which Fénelon was one of four prelates commissioned to examine her work.  He 
defended her. The examination resulted in the imprisonment of Madame Guyon and the 
banishment of Archbishop Fénelon from the Court of Louis XIV. 
Why were the tenets of quietism so volatile?  They were construed by critics to be 
consistent with deism.  These critics were alarmed that the state of quiet contemplation could 
even exclude recognition of Christ and the Trinity. Quietism undermined any value that 
church activities, confession, and the church itself, since, if one quieted the emotions and 
reason, God Himself was the only source of one’s ideas or beliefs.17 In short, quietism 
undermined the authority of the church. This concern was compounded by the implications of 
extant deistic writings that claimed a conspiracy of priests and princes existed to keep 
mankind subjugated by fear and force.18 Quietism implied an independent, autonomous agent 
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who relates directly to God. 
Fénelon’s dispute with Jacques Benigne Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, emanates directly 
from the Quietist controversy.  Both served on the commission that examined Madame Guyon. 
After the commission issued the Articles of Issy in judgment of her teachings, Fénelon 
responded by writing the Maxims of the Saints on the Interior Life to clarify his position. 
Bossuet accused Fénelon of maintaining Quietist doctrines in this work.  In fact, Fénelon did 
defend certain Quietist tenets but rejected others. A lengthy, polemical dispute ensued when 
Bossuet attempted to refute Fénelon.  Fénelon’s mentor turned adversarial, and Bossuet 
summoned the full force of his authority in Rome and with Louis XIV against Fénelon. As a 
result, the Pope declared certain arguments in the Maxims of the Saints to be in error, but not 
heretical. There were three main points of theological contention between Fénelon and 
Bossuet. 
Fénelon maintained that he clearly distinguished himself from the movement of quietism 
with the claim that it is not possible to maintain a continuous state of disinterestedness. 
Fluctuations between the states of discursive meditation and spiritual contemplation take place 
and occur in the actions of daily life (especially virtuous actions) as well. There could be no 
temporal moral action without these fluctuations. Bossuet did not accept Fénelon’s distinction 
and regarded him as an extremist who would ascetically remove individual actions from the 
world. Bossuet was mistaken, because, in every genre of Fénelon’s writing: political, 
theological, philosophical, and literary, a primary theme is the fluid integration of temporal and 
spiritual action.  For example, Bernard Dupriez’s study, Fénelon et la Bible, substantially 
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correlates the ideas of civic virtue in Télémaque with interpretations of Biblical references.19  
Fénelon’s position is not ascetic. In his self-defense to the Pope regarding accusations of 
Molinist quietism, Fénelon explained: 
I have condemned the permanent act, which has never any occasion, as being 
poisoned [by the] spring of idleness and inward lethargy. In the next place, I have 
established the indispensable necessity of a distinct exercise of every virtue. 
Thirdly, I have resisted a perpetual and uninterrupted contemplation…Fourthly, I 
have rejected passive prayer, which would exclude the real cooperation of free- 
will for the formation of meritorious actions. Fifthly, I have allowed of no other 
rest whereby pure souls frame their actions, but a simple and permanent unity 
with God.20 
 
In the same letter to the Pope, Fénelon explained his position on the second point of 
contention between Bossuet and him.  This point regards the understanding of motive. For 
Fénelon, one’s hope for beatitude is not the motive for loving God. But he wanted the Pope to 
understand his emphasis: One must nevertheless always maintain the hope of salvation, not for 
the sake of one’s own satisfaction but because it is God’s will that it should be so. Fénelon’s 
position was consistent with his interpretation of the enjoyment of God according to Augustine 
as a result of seeking union.  Bossuet interpreted Augustine differently; the hope for beatitude 
and salvation were inseparable, primary motives for loving God.  This was a traditional 
Thomistic argument.  Bossuet accused Fénelon of deviating from established theological doctrine. 
Bossuet recognized that Fénelon brought to a head the consideration of whether will has 
anything at all to do with eros as appetite. Fénelon admitted that he did not exactly follow the 
schoolmen. 
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The final disagreement between Fénelon and Bossuet regarded the relationship between 
actions and sins. For Fénelon, there are imperfect, self-interested actions that are not sins. 
These actions are based on natural (interested), rather than on supernatural (disinterested) self 
love.21  
Here, natural interest is an inclination to act with selfish motives.22 It is an affection that 
signifies a complacency in and natural love of oneself.23 Fénelon describes this natural self-love 
as morally indifferent, neither good nor bad in itself, only imperfect.24 The important point for 
Fénelon is that natural love is a human imperfection, although it is not a sin.25 Fénelon retorted 
in one of his responses to Bossuet, “Interest is an imperfection to diminish.  It is a natural, 
innocent, and only imperfect affection by comparison to the perfection of supernatural 
affections…I recognize imperfections which are not sins…You, Bossuet, make sins all the 
affections which are imperfect and which are not elevated to the supernatural order.”26 
Fénelon’s definition of interest reveals his understanding that virtue is the source of action.  In 
his counter-argument to Bossuet’s attack on him in his Réponses à la relation sur le quietism, 
Fénelon explains that Bossuet altered his meaning:27 He clarifies that Bossuet changed his 
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word interêt propre (commodum proprium) to include mercenary desire and appetite 
(appetiitonis mercenariae). Fénelon asserts, “interêt propre” is not a desire. 
Fénelon claimed that Bossuet incorrectly interpreted Augustine by correlating sin, evil, 
natural, and self-love “Interested love is not a sin, and we are free…to call it impurity, only 
because we wish thus to distinguish it from that disinterested love which we call pure.”28 This 
natural love is an imperfection involving possessive aims; interest is not a vice per se. It is an 
affection that aids in leading to perfection by helping a person to recognize and thereby correct 
his faults.29 Fénelon’s explanation can be compared to the Stoics’ doctrine of oikeiosis.  Self-
love is a natural dynamism in animal life which operates to protect and defend the integrity of 
the subject.30 Its tone is basically neutral but can fluctuate morally depending on whether the 
dispositional motive for an action is mercenary or disinterested. 
The way Fénelon distinguished himself from Bossuet is critical for understanding his 
thought because he meant to distance himself emphatically from contemporary arguments that 
would primarily relegate the basis of human action to amour propre.  The same distinction 
distances Fénelon from the Stoic style honnête homme and the emphasis of Protestant 
Calvinism on sin and grace. Interested love is not an end in itself but a means to 
perfectibility. 
The disagreements between Fénelon and Bossuet extended beyond theology.  They 
were about liberty and authority as well as inspiration and reason.31 Both prelates were 
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involved in the debate over Louis XIV's raison d'état.  Fénelon was among a small circle of 
critics in the entourage of the King's court.  Albeit small, the powerful Germigny Circle was 
poising itself to assume dominance of the court and government upon the death of Louis XIV.  
Fénelon opposed Louis XIV's war efforts as well as those to centralize the French nation-state 
and to disfranchise the ancient nobility through the venality of offices. Bossuet's political 
theory outlined the most thorough statement of the divine right of absolute kingship in French 
thought. Bossuet's theory complemented Louis XIV's raison d'état.  To the contrary, Fénelon’s 
theory of monarchy was non-egoistic in the sense that the monarch exists to serve the needs of 
the people. He maintained that a monarch is subject to the ancient fundamental laws of the 
state. The purpose of kingship, but not the person of the king, was divine. He descended 
from a family that held this position since Henri IV ascended to the throne.  The reign of St. 
Louis was Fénelon’s model. In the Languedoc region he favored decentralized administrative 
practices that were inherited from Roman antiquity. 
Fénelon warned of the consequences of violating these laws. "Absolute power degrades 
every subject to a slave."32 "When sovereigns accustom themselves to know no laws but their 
absolute wills, they sap the foundation of their authority.  There will come a sudden and violent 
revolution, which, far from moderating their excessive authority, will destroy it without 
resource."33 In this regard, Fénelon’s ideas were prescient.  However, the monarch is only 
accountable to the ultimate consequences of revolution or to God for these violations.  "You will 
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be judged according to the Gospel like the least of your subjects."34 Like Aquinas, Fénelon 
maintained that the monarch is bound only by the directive power which human law derives 
from eternal law. There is no coercive power to compel his obedience by punitive sanctions.35 
Fénelon had no theory of passive or active resistance.  He offered no guarantee of personal rights 
against the state, but he appreciated that revolution would be ultimately the earthly consequence 
of excessive power. 
Fénelon focused instead upon the stark contrast between the opulent decadence 
surrounding Louis XIV and his court, on the one hand, and the destitution of the population 
foraging on roots, on the other.  He decried what he considered to be political oppression on the 
part of the monarch as a violation of the human dignity of his subjects. Fénelon maintained that 
social, economic, and political reforms rather than personal or community rights against the 
state were the means to rectify oppression.  Some of his more distinctive reform proposals 
were the right to the basic necessities of subsistence; trade policies which were freer than 
mercantilist policies; agrarian development; decentralized state administration; religious 
tolerance and broader education, including women.  He justified his reforms on the basis of 
the sanctity and worth of each human life and civic virtue.  Fénelon's defense of the 
autonomous integrity and worth of the individual accounted for much of his appeal in the 
following century. 
One of the most dynamic debates in seventeenth century France centered upon the 
question of human motivation.  The Jansenist controversy about the doctrine of grace was one 
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catalyst for this debate. The doctrine of grace pertains to the relationship between grace and 
will. Debates about this relationship are as old as Augustine and Pelagius. The issue has two 
components. First, if God is omniscient, omnipresent, and infinite, how can man act freely?36 
Secondly, can an individual act in a manner that will affect personal salvation?  The Jansenist 
controversy expanded the issue of individual will to include moral as well as free will. 
The movement of Jansenism was very influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, although it was declared heretical in 1653 by Pope Innocent X. Its primary opponent 
was the Jesuit order.  The movement stems from the writings of Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of 
Ypres (1585-1638).  Jansenius was influenced by Michel Baius (1513-1589), who responded to 
Calvinist ideas on will, grace, and predestination. The movement was initially spread by Jean 
Duvergier de Hauranne (1581-1643, also known as St. Cyran), who introduced Jansenius’s 
writings at the Sorbonne and to the family of Arnauld of Andilly. One member of the Arnauld 
family was Mère Angelique, Abbess of the convent at Port Royal, which became the center of 
activity for Janensists.  As a result, Jansensim also became known as the Port Royal Movement. 
After the death of Duvergier, another family member, Doctor Antoine Arnauld became the 
standard bearer of the movement. 
Jansenius’s primary writing was Augustinus.  Jansenius claimed to have read the whole 
of Augustine’s works ten times and his treatise against the Pelagians thirty times.  According to 
Jansenius, he aimed to bring proper honor to Augustine’s doctrine of grace. Jansenius claimed 
to have discovered astonishing opinions on grace and predestination that were little known 
among the learned. Augustinius was not published until after his death, because he dared not 
reveal his ideas, "lest like so many others I be tripped up by Rome before everything is ripe and 
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Jansenism maintains that, after the fall of Adam, man found himself between two 
opposing attractions, one of heaven towards virtue and the other of earth towards vice, so that it 
is necessary for the will to follow at each moment whichever of these attractions proves 
stronger.38 Man’s nature, stripped of elements essential to its integrity, is radically corrupt and 
depraved as a result of Adam's original sin.  Mastered by concupiscence, the will is powerless to 
resist; it has become purely passive. It cannot escape the attraction of evil unless it is aided by a 
movement of grace that is superior to and triumphant over the force of concupiscence. The soul 
is inevitably and irresistibly at the mercy of delectation. The two delectations, says Jansenius, 
are like the two arms of a balance; one cannot rise unless the other is lowered. The will is swept 
by the preponderant impulse. Thus, man irresistibly does either good or evil, according to 
whether he is dominated by grace or by concupiscence.39 He never resists either the one or the 
other. Jansenius drew something very like a denial of free will from St. Augustine. The elect, 
according to him, were saved by the choice of God without any choice of their own. All might 
have the power to turn to God, but only the chosen have the will to do so.40  
Jansenius held that efficacious grace is a created entity that functions causally as an 
intermediary between the divine will and the will of the created agent. Whatever happens is no 
accident.  Grace competes with concupiscence. Both are delectationes that move the will when 
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a choice is made.  In this situation, efficacious grace always prevails due to the virtue of its 
intrinsic nature.41 The Jansenists interpreted the writings of Augustine in such a manner that the 
fallen human will is necessarily subjected to and is therefore motivated by concupiscence.  The 
will is not free. Human nature is also not innately good. Therefore, it is not capable of moral 
goodness without infused grace.  There are passages in Jansen’s Augustinius that suggest moral 
responsibility requires freedom from coercion but not freedom from necessity.42  
Fénelon’s later writings and correspondence focused on his disagreement with Jansenist 
teachings, by which many of his contemporaries were influenced.  Jansenists focused on the 
later writing of Augustine on the grace and predestination.  Fénelon focused on the earlier 
writings of Augustine regarding libre arbitre. According to Fénelon, the Jansenists had 
misconstrued Augustine. Fénelon's interpretation of Augustine is that the will is free in the 
sense that it is not necessarily subject to concupiscence.  It is created good and free in the 
image and likeness of God. 
Discovery and transformation are keys to Fénelon’s concept of the free will. The 
transformative response to grace is where freedom lies, as Augustine experienced his own 
transformation in the Confessions.  In other words, Fénelon reflects the relationship of grace 
and free will as an authentic experience of temporal journey time and space not as an external 
outcome of providence known by omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent God.  Fénelon 
emphasized not so much the prevalent concern with predestination as the determining factor 
that separates the wheat of the elect from the chaff, but rather he placed importance on 
transformation as a response of the free will to the call of grace. The response of the 
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individual to that call counts in his destiny.  From this point of view, Fénelon moved beyond 
the Jansensit interpretation of Augustine that pitted corporeal cupiditas against spiritual caritas.  
Fénelon interpreted Augustine’s principle, “my weight is my love,” to mean that both 
cupiditas and caritas have a transformational role in perfectibility. 
The will is also good and can therefore seek moral goodness. To the extent that God 
and humans share the same qualities, man is good and just. The thrust of Fénelon's position in 
relation to Jansenism is twofold.  First, his position rescues the nature of humankind from 
ineptness and depravity. It reinstates the capacity of people to act morally on the basis of the 
disposition of free will as good.  Will is the foundation of virtue.  Also, morality presupposes 
free choice on the basis of free will. Fénelon assumes that each person is an independent agent 
who can act morally because human will and understanding have goodness.  Fénelon correlates 
moral action, good, love, and liberty. 
Good actions are based on morals and will, not concupiscent pleasure and will.  
Pleasures are objects, not determinants of will and choice. Pleasures can be corruptive 
influences; however, the will is entirely free to reject their influences. Furthermore, people can 
act morally on the bases of habit and reason, even if they do not choose to accept God's grace 
and even if they are not among the elect whom God favors by bestowing more grace on them 
than He does on others.43 Grace is necessary for pietous action, but not for moral action.44 
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Moral action is based on free will.  To understand Fénelon’s objection to Jansenism, one needs 
only to recognize that a motive, for him, is not an object that attracts or determines the will. 
According to Fénelon, “Jansenius a inventé, selon son pressant besoin, un ridicule fantôme de 
libre arbitre, pour l’acommoder, comme Calvin, à sa délectation nécessitante.”45  
Another explanation of human motivation in the seventeenth century was self-interest. 
Jacques Abbadie, a Swiss protestant theologian, was one of the most prominent proponents of 
this position.  Abbadie’s writing, L’art de se connaitre soi-même, was an influential attempt to 
describe an alternative to Jansenist moral theory.  Abbadie drew upon Descartes’s theory of 
passions in order to arrive at an Epicurean moral theory which was based on the pursuit of 
happiness as pleasure but which avoided the materialism of Epicurean physics.46 He was 
among the first to present the notion of two different kinds of self-love. Amour de soi is 
distinguished from amour propre. The former refers to love of self and the latter to 
selfishness and craving for self-esteem and praise from an external source. The former 
connotes virtue and the latter vice. 
Examples of amour de soi are happiness and self-preservation.  Amour propre produces 
a sense of false pride.  He offered this definition:  "Amour de soi is...love insofar as it is 
legitimate and natural. Amour propre is that same love, insofar as it is vicious and 
corrupted."47 With this distinction, he argued that genuine moral behavior and even human 
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moral perfection could arise from amour de soi. 
Abbadie presented an explanation of how self-love could result in both desirable (moral) 
and undesirable (immoral) consequences for the individual or for others. He insisted on the 
pervasiveness of self-love as natural, primary, and necessary. God designed it to direct 
intelligence, the function of which is, in turn, to rule feeling. It "is the general principle of all 
our movement."48 Love of others is only love of ourselves. Virtue is attractive only when it 
flatters amour propre, according to Abbadie.  There is no love of virtue that does not entail self-
interest. Amour propre and happiness are the same thing. In other words, there is no 
disinterested (non- egoistic) love of virtue. Amour de soi, amour propre, and the desire for 
happiness are all based in self-interest.49  Self-love receives moral qualification only in its use;50 
it acquires the name of virtue or vice depending upon the nature of the objects to which it is 
applied.51  
Abbadie's phrase, "love of ourselves is the only source of all our other loves," started a 
controversy. It was a popular subject of debate in the salons and schools,52 and Fénelon did 
not fail to state his position on the matter.  Such a position as Abbadie's doctrine of amour 
propre had the same consequence as the Jansenist position.  It subjects the will to objects of 
concupiscence.  For Fénelon, however, the will is free and therefore not limited by the 
influence of self-interest. His position in Maximes des Saints is that the will is capable of 
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choosing to love God without reference to self and without expectation of anything in return, 
be it reward or punishment.  Beyond an agreement that there is a distinction between amour 
de soi and amour propre, there is little else about which Fénelon would agree with Abbadie, 
even the meaning of that distinction.  For example, Fénelon regarded flattery and virtue as 
diametrical opposites. This opposition was a primary theme in his political theory of civic 
virtue based on voluntary participation. 
Fénelon participated in contemporary metaphysical debates about the will to further 
define his idea of the extent to which the will is free.  First, Fénelon regarded Malebranche's 
occasionalism as subjection of the free will to rational determinism. Malebranche's thesis is 
that God’s will is the only true cause, and hence, that the will of His creatures are occasional 
causes. This emphasizes a God of fixed reason, order, and law.53 The premises of this thesis 
are that God is perfect and that acts of perfection are uniform and consistent.  Accordingly, 
God can create nothing short of perfection. God cannot change his nature, and His perfect 
wisdom necessitates perfectly uniform works according to general laws.  So, God must be the 
primary source of all action in order to be perfect.  God's omnipotence necessitates a 
connection between His will and the execution of it.  It must be that God is the cause or 
occasion, to use Malebranche's word choice, of all thought and action. “God acts by volontés 
générales when he acts as a consequence of general laws which he has established.”54 Nature 
“is nothing but the general laws which God has established in order to construct or to preserve 
his work by the simplest means, by an action always uniform, constant, perfectly worthy of an 
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infinite wisdom and of a universal cause.”55 God is an intermediary in the process of thought 
and action. Consequently, the human mind lacks true power over the body and the material 
world. The will is dependent in this respect.56 Fénelon disagreed with this conclusion. 
Here is how Fénelon stated Malebranche’s argument: 
Dieu étant un être infiniment parfait, ne doit rien faire qui ne porte le caractère de son 
infinie perfection: ainsi, parmi tous les ouvrages qu’il peut faire, sa sagesse le 
détermine toujours a produire le plus parfait…[I]l faut qu’il produise tout ce qu’il y a 
de plus parfait parmi les être possibles; l’ordre l’y détermine invinciblement; il seroit 
indigne de lui de ne s’y conformer pas.57  
According to Fénelon, Malebranche’s position excludes the ability of God to interact by will 
that is absolutely free of necessity, libre arbitre.  God as infinite cannot be limited.  The 
essence of libre arbitre also applies to man, created in His likeness. 
Fénelon held that man is dependent upon God for his creation. Except for this 
dependency, man is completely free of necessity in the likeness and image of the will of God. 
Each person is an agent from whom actions emanate independently. Fénelon and Malebranche 
shared a common concern about order and harmony in creation. Also, they affirmed the 
continuity and eternity of divine action and the concept of an infinitely perfect being.58 They 
affirmed, but did not share the same concept of perfection. For Malebranche, 
perfect can only indicate superlative singularity.59  
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Fénelon also maintained that God is perfect. But, for Fénelon, the postulate that perfect 
wisdom necessitates the most perfectly generalized work is tantamount to determinism based 
on rationalism.  Perfection does not necessitate rational uniformity according to general laws. 
To the contrary, he asserted that the distinct essences of perfection are creativity, possibility, 
and will.  God’s actions are not limited to generality because there is not necessarily one 
expression of perfection.  God "chooses only among possible plans, and all possible plans are 
equally perfect."60 “[I]l est plus parfait à Dieu de mêler des volontés particulières dans son 
dessein général, que de se borner absolument à ses volontés générales.”61 Perfection lies in the 
creative act in the realm of infinite possibilities.  Volonté particulière in this context represents 
God’s capacity to act in creation to achieve good on a case by case basis. If perfection is 
infinite, it includes limitless acts. Fénelon’s refutation of Malebranche is a key to 
understanding his concept of free will, because people are created in the image of God. To the 
degree that God acts freely and in favor of good, so can man act.  If there is no particular will 
in God, there can be none in man.  Here is how Fénelon sums up his position: 
I could never conceive of more than a single infinite; that is to say, other than the being 
infinitely perfect, or infinite in every kind.  Any infinite which was infinite in but one 
kind would not be a true infinite. To speak of a genus or species is plainly to speak of 
limitation, and to exclude all ulterior reality, - which establishes the fact of a finite and 
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limited being.  To restrict the idea of the infinite to the limits of a genus shows that we 
have not considered it with sufficient simplicity. It is clear that it can only be found in 
the universality of being, which is the being infinitely perfect in every kind, and 
infinitely simple.62  
 
In this statement Fénelon avoids the conclusion of Malebranche that natural reason is the actual 
vision of God; the bitterness of Pascal, who disdains nature; and the emphasis of Descartes on 
reason and ideas.  He places exactness to Leibniz’s theory of infinite.63 This effect of Fénelon’s 
position is to establish the authentic integrity of the individual to participate in infinity without 
conflating that autonomy with infinity, which is Being omnipotent, omnipresent, and 
omniscient. 
Fénelon was in agreement with Malebranche that God evinces volontés générales. The 
main point of contention is whether they are necessarily more perfect than volontés 
particulières. According to Fénelon, Malebranche held simplicity (indivisibility) and 
uniformity as the measures of perfection. Fénelon held creativity and possibility as the 
standards.  Infinite possibility is more perfect than finite regularity. Volontés générales and 
particulières do not preclude the existence of one another.  Fénelon’s connotation of volonté 
générale is, therefore, subtly different from Malebranche’s. For Fénelon, it is what God 
communicates universally and what people are capable of discerning universally, not what has 
been determined universally and immutably.64 Fénelon elucidates this point about 
communication by referring to the scripture, “God speaks in us without ceasing.”65 God, in 
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creating the universe, did not simply and deistically set in motion a mechanistic plan to 
maintain the operation of all particulars and then refrain from participation while the plan 
unfolds toward its end.  He did set a plan in motion, but he can participate in its development at 
any time, in any way, and for any reason.66 If God can act in this manner, so can the individual. 
At issue is whether such a plan has any order. For Fénelon, order is not most meaningfully 
understood in terms of eschatology.  Order is eternal from the viewpoint that it encompasses all 
successively creative acts on the basis of possibility, choice, and particularity as well as 
generality.  Order is best explained in the moment. The uniformity of order comes from the 
common yearning for union and relationship. 
Fénelon’s concept of libre arbitre connotes the autonomous free agency of the 
individual and of the Creator to act morally in a universe of infinite possibilities.  The volonté 
individuelle is the expression of the person's libre arbitre. The volonté particulière of God is 
the expression of the Creator's libre arbitre.  The sacrosanctity of the libre arbitre of both God 
and people was the crucial element of Fénelon's argument against Malebranche in the 
theological debate about the general and particular wills of God. 
The distinction between Fénelon and Malebranche can be understood from their points 
of initial reference.  They focused on two different questions.67 Malebranche, like thinkers 
who were influenced by Jansensism, was concerned with how free will could be reconciled 
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with an order of necessary divine grace and predestination.  This question was considered by 
thinkers influenced by Calvin and Jansen.  The answers of these thinkers focused on the order 
of general necessity over arbitrary freedom.68 Fénelon bypassed Augustinian interpretations of 
predestination that others attempted to explain. He accepted the omniscience, omnipresence, 
and omnipotence of God to know the outcome of His arbitrary free will and the temporal free 
will of each individual.  God’s providence and human free will did not preclude one another. 
The former would occur from the perspective of eternity that includes all time. The latter 
would occur in the temporal moment of each successive act of will. This acceptance allowed 
Fénelon to focus on the meaning of free will in the human action in the present, not how it 
would turn out in eternity. This gave his idea of free will a substantial impact on the meaning 
of individual human action outside of the theology of predestination and eschatology. 
Eschatology deals with predestination.  For Fénelon, free will deals with acts in 
successive moments.  The totality of time as eternity of past, present, and future does not 
preclude finite moments.  Only God knows the composite or final outcome of all acts of wills, 
because He alone is Infinity.  This clarification allows Fénelon to define individual moral will 
as completely free.  This metaphysical distinction underlies his intent to situate moral will 
outside of the current trends to consider, especially according to Augustine’s later writings, 
the problem of will in relation to the order of grace and predestination.  Fénelon refers instead 
to the idea of liberium arbitrium in Augustine’s earlier writings to define free will in God and 
man. 
Two points follow from Fénelon's concept of libre arbitre. Each point contrasts with the 
position of Malebranche. First, free will places the self in control of choice. Free will is the 
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motive force behind actions.  The faculty of choice is free from any material and rational 
constraint and necessity.  So is the disposition to move in one way or another.  Fénelon believed 
that man is dependent upon God for his existence, but not his actions.69 There is no necessary 
intermediary in the process of thought and action. There is no limit to possible choices. The 
individual is in control of his actions, and he is morally responsible for them.  Fénelon 
incorporated into his metaphysics of the will the Neo-platonic allegory of light from Augustine. 
“The sun of intelligence lights all minds. The substance of a man’s eye is not the light; on the 
contrary, the eye borrows…light from the rays of the sun.”70 The mind is not universal and 
immutable truth.  The lens of the eye analogously serves as a filter in the mind as the navigation 
device to sort and use, according to free will, what is interpreted from the light. The mind is 
absolutely free to ascertain and apply whatever insight it gains through its lens.  To safeguard 
the free will of man from occasionalism, Fénelon here distinctly separates the light of God 
from the way the will is disposed to experience it.  This distinction is the key to individuated 
will in Fénelon’s thought.  This distinction is the basis of individual spiritual and moral action. 
In Fenelon’s thought, God and the sun are analogous.  The mind and the lens of the eye 
are analogous.  God produces light. Light is the medium of communication that maintains the 
distinctions between God and the mind.  Light is, at the same time, the medium that connects 
them in common.  By maintaining the distinction between God and the mind, Fénelon preserves 
the free will of both and avoids interpretations of occasionalism.  As Sorbonne theologian 
Auguste Gratry explained, “The soul…does not see God directly, it sees itself, and it sees its 
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ideas in the light of God, as the eye sees objects in the light of day; but to see daylight is not the 
same as to see the sun itself directly, although the daylight proceeds from the sun.”71 According 
to Gratry, Fénelon’s distinction here explains the source of Malebranche’s imprecision that our 
natural reason is the very vision of God. In Fenelon’s words, the mind participates in 
contemplation of Ultimate Being, although the mind is distinct from its source. There is a self 
with free will that is unfettered, except in its creation. 
There is a sun of spirits…As the natural sun lights all bodies, so the son of 
intelligence lights all minds.  The substance of a man’s eye is not the light; on the 
contrary, the eye borrows, every moment, the light from the rays of the sun. Just 
so, my mind is not the primitive reason, the universal and immutable truth, - it is 
only the organ through which that original light passes, and which is lighted by 
it….That universal light discovers and represents all objects to our eyes; and we 
cannot judge of anything save by it, even as we cannot discern any body save by 
the rays of the sun.72  
 
Fénelon’s second point about libre arbitre is that he considered it as function of 
spirituality. Libre arbitre is at the same time a mark of both human perfection and imperfection. 
The idea that free will is a mark of imperfection is Augustinian.  The rationale is that failure to 
choose good is a result of sin, i.e., straying from the path of good. The will ignores its proper 
vocation.73 However, Fénelon also maintained that the free will is the primary manner in which 
man reflects the image of the Creator.74 The virtuous choice ennobles its perfection; the contrary 
choice reveals the lack thereof. 
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According to Fénelon, Malebranche claimed that the grace of God's volonté générale 
inclines the will irresistibly.  Grace is the subject and will is the predicate.75 Fénelon claimed 
that this was confused.  Grace can only pose itself in juxtaposition to other objects that the will 
desires. There is independence in the power of the will in its movement.76 In sum, 
Malebranche and Fénelon approached the metaphysics of will from different points of 
concern. Malebranche was concerned with the order of providence in terms of divine will and 
predestination, a concern similar to Jansenist interpretations of the later writings of Augustine. 
Fénelon focused on a different metaphysical concern about will.  He was concerned with how 
the will could be free and good in the likeness of God in harmony with creation. 
Fénelon's defense of free will also targeted Spinoza's idea of will.  He referred to 
Spinoza as "the Philosopher" and to his ideas as "Epicurean." Fénelon attacked what he 
deemed to be material determinism in Spinoza's philosophy. Refuting "the Philosopher's" tenets 
of mechanistic pantheism, he challenged Spinoza's concepts of God, freedom, and morality. 
Spinoza held that mind and matter, thought and extension (to use his terminology) were not 
distinct, but different attributes of one infinite substance. For example, the pinching of one's 
skin and the feeling of pain are modes of the same substance, expressed through the different 
attributes of extension and thought. The infinite substance which defines all attributes is God. 
God and nature are one substance: deus sive natura.  There is no transcendent supernatural 
order.  God is not a personal God, but rather nature in process, a fixed rational order. There is 
no good or evil, as Nature is amoral.  Also, God is perfect and cannot, therefore, choose to be 
otherwise, because choice is defective.  Man is a manifestation or mode of God. A mode is an 
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imperfect rendering, and free will is not a matter of choice, but of seeing the cosmic system as it 
really is and relating to one's place in it.  "Everything is determined by the necessity of the 
divine nature.”77 “Everything is determined by universal laws of nature both to exist and to act 
in a certain and determinate way."78 Free will is acting within the sphere of one's mode, and 
within this mode there is an endeavor (conatus) to preserve one's being as far as possible. 
Spinoza's idea of self-sufficiency, similar to that of Stoicism, is independence.  Self-
preservation is the key to virtue,79 which requires a certain type of intellectual cultivation--sub 
specie æternitas [under the view or aspect of eternity].  This is the attempt to see all things at 
once in one thought—one without any past or future—as a species of eternity just as God might 
grasp them. Man can know because of the union of mind and nature.80  
Fénelon believed that the necessary conclusion of the concept of deus sive natura was 
material determinism of the divine and human wills.  He maintained that a universe ordered by 
nature is tantamount to a universe ordered by random chance. Fénelon associated what he 
called Epicurean compulsivity with random chance in nature and material determinism. God 
and man, not the random forces of nature, are the primary creative forces in the universe 
because of their moral capacities.  Pantheistic necessity does not move the will of man.  The 
brand of determinism of the man whom he called The Philosopher carries two ill effects:81 First, 
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it relegates the place of man in the universe to a being whose mind and matter are subjected to 
mechanistic laws of physics.  This, in turn, circumscribes the ability of the self to act as a 
creative, perfectible, and moral agent.  Intellect, especially as Spinoza understood it, cannot 
fully account for morality, as the reminiscent Stoic ideas of independent self-sufficiency and 
the recognition of a necessarily ordered cosmos did not leave a place for the expression of free 
will as an active (and inter-active) moral agent.  According to Fénelon, the intellectual 
cultivation sub specie aeternitas cannot lead to morality because it does not require the choice 
between good and evil within the context of human association and interaction. 
Liberty is indifferent, a scholastic and Cartesian term.  It signifies that the free will is 
not indeclinable, an Augustinian term, viz. it is not irresistibly inclined in a certain direction 
but has the power to incline itself to one side or the other.82 Indeclinability indicates a 
capacity of the free will, but it does not indicate whether an action is moral in nature. The will 
is distinct from objects of choice as the Cartesian concept of mind is distinct from the body. 
Free agency is expressed by rational choice (thought) and through interaction (extension) in the 
external world, while indifference relates to the process of reflection in reason. This involves 
the cognitive ability to perceive, set aside, and consider possibilities from different points of 
view.  For Descartes and Fénelon, rational reflection can lead to moral action. 
Descartes and Fénelon followed the Oration tradition of Cardinal Berulle in maintaining 
that there are things within the realm of existence that are beyond understanding.83 This position 
moved them away from Scholastic thinking.  Scholastics understood will in terms of the 
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vegetative soul, and reason could only lead to what human understanding could comprehend 
according nature.  This view essentially limited the possibility of discussing either the free will 
of God or man (created in His likeness) in terms of infinity as unlimited creativity and 
possibility. Fénelon clarified that infinite possibility (as volonté particulière) is not inconsistent 
with eternal truth because God has no limits in possibility. What He creates is eternal truth, and 
certainty to Him is that all things are possible. To be outside of the realm of understanding 
leaves room for possibility, and therefore, perfection.  The human inability to comprehend all, 
doubt something, or perceive inconsistency does not correlate necessarily to a limit on the 
possibility of God’s creating anything.  In other words, a subsequent inability to understand 
something does not negate its prior existence.  This perspective allows human reason also to 
have a corresponding libre arbitre to discern what it can and to doubt otherwise. Furthermore, it 
circumvents the restriction in Scholastic philosophy that logic correlates what God creates to 
what man understands, thus limiting God’s ability to the scope of natural reason.  This view sets 
human understanding free from nature and – most importantly for Fénelon – appetite. 
Fénelon has been acclaimed as the most original seventeenth century theologian with 
respect to the convergence of Cartesian indifference and Augustinian indeclinability.84 The 
uniqueness of Fénelon's convergence of these ideas stems from the way he applies the Cartesian 
idea of the separation of mind and body to the theological concepts of indifference and 
indeclinability.  This application establishes the autonomous self-sufficiency of the will with 
respect to the world external to it and to philosophies of determinism.85 As voluntarists, Fénelon 
and Descartes agreed that the free will is the locus of human action. For both of them, the key 
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qualities of the soul consist of will and understanding. Indifference in Descartes’s thought 
indicates a discursive capacity of the will to act reflectively. In Fénelon’s matrix, rational 
reflexivity does not fully explain what motivates the will in the process of indeclinability to act 
morally, although rational reflection can be part of the motivation. Descartes emphasized the 
soul as discursive reflexivity, whereas Fénelon emphasized it as character of disposition. In 
other words, Descartes emphasized understanding in the soul, whereas Fénelon emphasized 
will. 
To be indifferent, i.e., disinterested, indicates that the will acts morally without 
consideration or interference from appetites or a sort of reason that considers the self as an end. 
These exclusions stem from the claim that moral action relates to relationships with people, not 
goods. There is a sustained moral foundation for a relationship only when an individual does 
what ought to be done because that person wants to do it. Reason can account for why someone 
ought to act, but it does not account for the character that leads to the desire to act. The 
distinction between Descartes and Fénelon lies in the moral role of the free will.  This 
distinction leads Fénelon to emphasize moral free will as the disinterest in, viz. dispossession 
from, appetites and reason that seek the self as an end. Rationally setting aside possible actions 
as they are perceived, considered, and weighed is not the same as disinterestedness as a moral 
value of selflessness.  Without the addition of disinterestedness, cogitatio as indeclinability or 
indifference can be interpreted in terms of Stoic individualism or Skepticism. It could be 
interpreted egoistically rather than unselfishly. Such interpretations of the will are what Fénelon 
wanted to avoid, so Fénelon went beyond the Cartesian idea of perfectibility primarily through 
reason.  Fénelon’s shift reflects moral considerations about perfectibility that Descartes began to 
consider in the thinking that he shared with Princess Elisabeth and Queen Christina in his late 
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writings.  As Fénelon states: 
[C]’est un mérite que de suspendre son jugement pour rapeller les principes qui 
découvrent le plus grand bien, je veux dire le spirituel, et qui échappent à tout 
moment, à cause que les pensées de l’âme son assujetties aux mouvements et aux 
images du corps….[L]a vertu consiste à suspendre son jugement pour éviter ces 
opinions légères et précipitées, dans lesquelles consiste l’ amour vain des biens 
périssable.86  
 
[L]a bonté est l’ objet de la volonté.87  
La liberté de l’homme n’est que sa volonté.88  
Moreover, reason leads to the infinite but cannot define it, according to Fénelon. The 
experience of doubt leaves reason radically contingent in the end, and only the metaphysical 
certainty of self as part of infinite can lead to a definition of infinite.  Exodus 3:14 defines all 
existence as “I am who am.”  This is an ontological rather than epistemological definition of 
being.  Fénelon also defines Infinite Being as Ultimate Goodness or Union. The link between 
being and goodness defines the self in terms of moral ontology rather than in terms of 
epistemologically contingent reason. It lays the groundwork for certidude, responsibility, and 
accountability in individual moral action of the finite will as part of the infinite whole of 
Goodness.  It defines moral action as a relationship rather than as a duty. 
Fénelon goes beyond Descartes due to his emphasis on the moral perfectibility of the 
will.  For Fénelon, the idea of disposition is what primarily moves the will in one way or 
another, thus he returns to the Augustinian idea of will as love. He provides his interpretation 
of Augustinian indeclinability: Disposition and indeclinability work in tandem to move morally 
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when the will does not see itself as the end of an action. The essential role of disinterested 
disposition is more manifest than reflective indifference in individuals who experience closeness 
to infinity. The reason for this is that they are more naturally disposed to act beyond themselves 
without scruples of deliberation.  For Fénelon, moral action of otherness is much more difficult 
when the natural primacy of disposition toward infinity is not cultivated in experience. 
Descartes was indeed concerned with the idea of the infinite, but Fénelon made a 
distinction with respect to Cartesian thought:  The infinite is definable. He disagreed with 
Descartes’s proof of the impossibility of a vacuum and with his idea of an indefinite world, 
unless, as Fénelon clarifies, “it means a real infinite substance.”89 Fénelon is also very careful 
to distinguish his understanding of mastery of wisdom by good use of judgment in his Lettres 
sur les sujets divers concerning religion and metaphysics.  The focus of mastery is not the self 
as a unit. He would agree with Descartes that there is something called self-mastery but their 
focus is different. 
According to Fénelon, infinite outweighs finite. He asserted that Augustine knew far 
more about self mastery as union with the infinite than Aristotle or Descartes, although 
Augustine never specifically wrote about metaphysics.  Fénelon identified the self, but did so 
without any interpretations of the Stoics’ exhortion to forsake the temporal world or a Cartesian 
sense that the rational subject is the end of mastery. As he explained, “Our knowledge stands 
in the way of becoming wise.”90 Reason is finite and restrictive. Fénelon’s metaphysics of the 
self is one of intentional dispossession of selfishness as an end. Dispossession of selfishness 
by the free will of the individual very much relates to the problem of association in voluntarist 
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philosophy. It is not a process that is reached through rational doubt that points toward higher 
ground. “Pure love is in the will alone.”91 As Fénelon presented it, dispossession is an 
alternative to social contract theory from late seventeenth century France and onward. 
Fénelon aligns himself with Descartes regarding certain issues about the relationship 
between human self-sufficiency and the cosmos.92 Fénelon agreed with Descartes that eternal 
truths that are inborn in our minds are laid down by and are dependent upon God.  He would 
also agree that the greatness of God is estimable precisely because it is inexplicable, although 
we know enough about it not to doubt its existence.93 For both Descartes and Fénelon, “clear 
and distinct ideas” make the cosmos understandable. The defining characteristic of Fénelon is 
his stronger focus on how humans relate to the inexplicable that is beyond understanding. 
There is a difference for Fénelon between discursive meditation and non-discursive 
contemplation, two levels of successive experience involved in perfecting mystical union.  
Contemplation, in the tradition of mysticism, transcends “clear and distinct ideas” as the 
primary means of experience. 
Addressing the incomprehensible brings up the question of the capacity of the mind to 
relate rather than to understand.  Fénelon does not deny the roles of the understandable or 
incomprehensible in human existence.  There is no law of contrariety here. There is, however, a 
limit on the mind in terms being fully human.  Here is the implication for modern thinking in 
general terms.  Interpretations of Descartes's thought have led to the emphasis of cosmological 
experience as matters of reason and science.  Although Fénelon indeed echoed this 
interpretation, his thought has led to the emphasis of cosmological experience as a matter of 
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relationship rather than mastery according to cognition.  Here is the Fénelonian argument:  If 
one esteems something beyond the solely sufficient self, then being human incorporates to 
some degree that which is beyond self.  Therefore, cosmological experience cannot be limited 
to what is known by reason.  Fénelon instantiates the contemplative and unitive experience of 
man and Infinite Being with the meditative and relational experience of man and cosmos.  
Being is a matter of “je pense” and the “divers degrés d’être et de perfection” of this “je.”94 This 
instantiation allows Fénelon to communicate the incomprehensible through the discursive 
language of ancient values in his political writings. 
Here enters the question of sufficiency and dependency.  The problem of self-
sufficiency explains many philosophical arguments in seventeenth-century France. Fénelon 
was among those who turned to Augustine to address this problem. Theologians turned to 
Augustine to provide an alternative to the cosmological understanding of reason that led to the 
placement of Descartes’s ideas on the Papal index. They turned to him to counter the self-
sufficiency of Stoic thinking that followed Montaigne.  Augustine was also a basis for 
countering Pierre Charron’s resurrected Epicurean idea that reason is suspicious and the 
pyrrhonist ideas that desire governs reason and judgment. 
Fénelon’s thought reflects the Neo-Platonic aspects of Augustine. Neo-Platonic 
emanation from first unitary principle to lesser degrees gives man a role for partnership with 
God through illumination.  According to Fénelon, man is created in the likeness of God with 
possibility and libre arbitre.  The lesser degrees are due to the temporal aspects of natural 
existence and the limitations on the possibility of fulfillment during it due to pride. Nonetheless, 
human independence is necessary for the anéantissement of pride, or sortir de soi that creates 
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reunification and partnership.  According to the mystic traditions that were brought to France by 
Berulle, Francis de Sales, and John of the Cross, the Incarnation of the Logos in Jesus manifests 
the intended partnership. Fénelon’s ideas of sufficiency and dependency are based on 
transcendence, not on cognitive reason, Pyrrhonist passions, or Stoic sufficiency. 
Transformation in human experience is sentient, cognitive, and conative, as well as spiritually 
contemplative. 
Now that Fénelon’s idea of free will has been placed in historical context from several 
different perspectives, it is possible to introduce it in relationship to his moral and political 
theory.  Moral agency is in itself a proof of the freedom of the will. Active rather than passive 
moral agency is a key to Fénelon's theory of the self as well as to his political theory. Free will 
is the source of order within the individual and society. It is also the source of morality because 
moral choice is the key to order.  Social and political aspects of life are moral endeavors 
because, without free will, there would be no vice or virtue and no punishment or reward. There 
would be no accountability and only compulsiveness in the universe without free will.  Consider 
his emphatic proclamation: 
’Tis this exemption not only from all manner of constraint or compulsion, but also 
from all necessity, and this command over my own actions, that render me inexcusable 
when I will evil, and praiseworthy when I will good. In this lies Merit and Demerit; 
Praise and Blame. ’Tis this that makes either punishments or rewards just....This is 
the foundation of all government [police], instruction, and rules of morality. The 
upshot of the Merit and Demerit of human actions, rests upon this basis, That 
nothing is so much in the power of our own will, as our will itself; and that we have 
the FREE WILL.95 
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Deprived of this liberty, all human life would be thrown into confusion, and there 
would be no longer a trace of order in society. If men are not free, in what they do of 
good or evil, good is no longer good, and evil no longer evil.96  
 
According to Fénelon, it was Bossuet, Louis XIV, the Jansenists, the proponents of 
amour propre, Malebranche, Spinoza, and the Pyrrhonists who all violated the autonomous 
integrity of the individual's libre arbitre.  Fénelon maintained against these positions that the 
individual stands unequivocally alone at the command of his actions. The will is free to act or 
not act, and, in the case that it moves to act, it can move toward any specific act over another.97 
Free will primarily as well as intentional choice constitute the essences of human existence. 
These essences situate the source of morality in individual character. Descartes's mind/body 
dualism had separated the cognitive self from its material and external environment. Fénelon 
had done the same.  He had even gone a step further in maintaining the mystical position that 
the deliberated surrender of the self to God is the only means to find one's true self, which is 
innately good.  The Cartesian well-ordered mind does not fully account for moral character. 
Descartes and Fénelon extracted the self from the material cosmos in order to give it 
dignity and esteem as an autonomous moral agent.  Descartes ontologically separated the mind 
from a mechanistic universe of matter. By objectifying materiality, the Cartesian self is freed 
from material necessity. The objectification of material existence renders it a functional object 
of potential control by the self.  This separation of mind from a mechanistic universe of matter 
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places the will in a position to be creative and active. The will is in a position to achieve self- 
mastery. According to Descartes, “Now free will is in itself the noblest thing we can have 
because it makes us in a certain manner equal to God and exempts us from being his subjects; 
and so its rightful use is the greatest of all the goods we possess, and further there is nothing 
that 
is more our own or that matters more to us.”98  
 
Cartesian dualism situated the moral sources within the self.  If free will expresses itself 
as the rational control of mind over matter, then the sense of superiority of the good life must 
come from the agent's sense of his own dignity as a rational being. The dignity of the person 
arises from turning inward and away from materiality. The dignity and integrity of the 
thinking being becomes the motor of virtue. 
[H]e knows that there is nothing that truly pertains to him but this free 
disposition of his will, and that there is no reason why he should be praised 
or blamed unless it is because he uses it well or ill.... [N]ever to fail of his own 
will to undertake...the things which he judges to be the best...is to follow 
perfectly after virtue.99  
 
Fénelon followed Descartes's line of thinking closely.  Both connect free will with praise and 
blame.  The free will is the noblest human attribute.  According to Fénelon, "I am free in my 
will, as God is in his.  It is in this principally, that I am in his image, and resemble him."100 Its 
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right use is also the greatest of all goods that we possess, for moral action is the source of 
dignity and esteem. 
[G]ood will is the good or right use of the will itself, which cannot be but good. There 
is nothing therefore, so precious in man as the good will, benevolence, or volition to 
good. It is this which sets a value upon all his other faculties. It is, as it were, “the 
whole man,” [emphasis added]...101  
 
Descartes separated mind from appetitive reason as they were understood by Aquinas 
and the Scholastics.  He situated indifference in the realm of cogitatio. Fénelon concurred with 
Descartes about this separation but then went beyond him to situate indifference most 
fundamentally in the realm of non-discursive contemplation rather than reason. Both of them 
valued human perfectibility.   But, for Fénelon, reason, doubt, and judgment had limited ability 
to explain spiritual, conative, and moral experience of disposition as character. Cognition is 
finite.  Moral disposition is not only a movement inwardly and way from materiality. It is a 
descent into humility that precedes an assent, yearning, and transformation, in accordance with 
Augustine’s description in his Confessions. 
Fénelon's theories of the will and self are based upon his understanding of certain 
aspects of mysticism as well as his synthesis of Cartesian and Augustinian themes with respect 
to the nature of grace and to the will of God.  Platonic and Aristotelian notions are also present. 
These theories are also based upon five assumptions about human nature: (1) Human nature is 
innately good; (2) the liberty of the will is inalienable; (3) the end of political life is moral 
development; (4) choice is moral in relation to other people in a social environment; finally, (5) 
the essential purpose of the state is ethical: it is the expression of moral will. 
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The question for political theory is how can such an ontologically separate libre arbitre 
associate itself socially and politically as a moral agent?  More specifically, how can this self so 
associate without sacrificing its innate goodness?  The answer to this question lies in the fact 
that both Descartes and Fénelon reunited the self with the material world.  Descartes's model of 
association resembles the Stoic cosmos wherein the self sees a certain world vision in which 
everything happens as a result of the providence of God and wherein the wise person accepts 
whatever happens and is thereby cured from the false opinion that events relate to individual 
needs or desires.  Here, wisdom, res cogitans, is the guide.  Fénelon's model resembles the 
Platonic cosmos of Augustine wherein the self realizes its true nature when it freely turns 
toward eternal, immutable, supersensible truths.  For Augustine, belief leads to understanding 
(credo ut intelligam). The source for Augustine and Fénelon is Isaiah 7:9, “If you do not stand 
firm in your faith, you will not stand at all.” 
A sketch of Fénelon's answer is that civic education and virtue must not only inculcate 
the individual to associate socially and politically, but also to make the moral choices to 
preserve innate goodness.  The state and society rest upon a moral foundation and have a moral 
purpose. At this point, the ideas of Descartes and Augustine are influential.  The Augustinian 
ascent of the soul to God places the soul in the order of the universe in the Stoic tradition of 
cosmic necessity. The Cartesian separation of the mind and body removes the soul from this 
tradition of necessity, because the soul ascends to accept the providence of God on the basis of 
a choice made by a distinct cognitive self, not by necessity of divine order. Fénelon justified 
and redefined the Cartesian metaphysics in terms of Augustinian theology without Stoic 
necessity or Jansenist depravity. He used the theories of assent and ascent to establish the 
relationship of the autonomous individual to the cosmos of the community and state on the 
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basis of civic virtue. Plato's concepts of the philosopher-king and education are evident in 
Fénelon's concepts of political theory to a greater extent than are Augustine’s City of God and 
the City of Babylon. 
Notwithstanding, Fénelon follows certain fundamental Augustinian tenets.  First, the 
self is in contact with a perfection which is beyond it.102 In other words, the self can only 
experience itself in the light of a perfection that goes far beyond its powers. The Augustinian 
proof of the existence of God is that reason recognizes a standard on which it regulates itself 
but which is not of its own making and which is beyond reason and is common to all.103 Both 
Fénelon and Augustine speak Platonically when the former states that "there is a spiritual sun 
that enlightens the soul more fully than the material sun does the body" and the latter that 
"there is one light which we perceive through the eye, another by which the eye itself is 
enabled to perceive."104 Turning inward to the self is crucial to access this higher condition. 
To reach this perfection the soul must turn away from the sensible external manifestations of 
the higher reality. Augustine's path is one leading from the exterior to the interior and from 
the interior to the superior, viz. 
God.105  
Fénelon adds that the path to the superior then leads to reconciliation and harmony with 
the exterior. This extension leads to the fundamental difference in the theories of Fénelon and 
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Augustine about the relationship between the individual and the state. To Augustine, the City 
of Babylon is a necessary evil in which fallen man must participate.  To Fénelon, on the other 
hand, his states of Salenté and Betique, as he describes them in Télémaque, are manifestations 
of the higher perfection in the sensible world through which the good in human nature is 
morally perfected. In addition to the quest for God, civil society and the state are avenues 
through which the self participates in the perfection which is beyond it.  In contrast to Jansenist 
Augustinianism, neither the state nor the individual is depraved. 
Fénelon's concept of the will incorporates two ideas that emerged from Augustinian 
thought. The first had been brought about by Stoic thinkers. They gave a central place to the 
human capacity to give or withhold assent or to choose.  Humans have impulses, but they are 
not forced to act on them. They are capable of giving or withholding assent. Human will 
moves rational intention and moral choice according to the indeclinability of disposition.  
Second, Fénelon followed the Augustinian understanding of will as a disposition. Humans are 
capable of radically different moral dispositions.  This position corresponds to the teleological 
theory of human nature which underlies Greek moral philosophy.  Everyone is motivated by a 
love of the good, which can be sidetracked to evil.  In the case of Plato ignorance is the cause 
of the diversion.  In the case of Aristotle the cause is distorted training and bad habits. Inner 
reflexivity is central to moral being.106  
Fénelon adopts Augustine’s position as well as Aristotle's.  Augustine's doctrine of the 
two loves of either charity or concupiscence allows for the possibility that disposition may be 
perverse, driving a person to reject good.  The problem in Greek terminology is that of akrasia, 
weakness of the will.  This was the central crisis of moral experience. Both Fénelon and 
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Augustine lament the Pauline scripture: "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I 
would not, that I do."107 The two ideas disposition of character and choice combine in Fénelon's 
thought as the power to act with respect to good. 
Fénelon purposefully defended the libre arbitre from all external constraint and 
necessity, except the authorities of the state and the church. The reason that he emancipated 
the free will ontologically but not from the authority of these institutions is that they facilitate 
the achievement of moral goodness in the self.108 There is a parallel between the perfection of 
the spiritual and moral public person.  Fénelon adheres to the "higher self" doctrine which is 
associated with the positive notion of liberty.109 The church and the state have prescriptive 
roles as moral agents.  They help the individual to turn inward and then upward and outward 
to participate in the higher perfection which surpasses the self.  In the state, this aid comes in 
the form of education in matters of civic virtue. For Fénelon, "The sole end of government is 
to render mankind virtuous and happy."110 His concept of happiness is inner peace with 
respect being part of a whole. 
Three paradoxes in Fénelon's thought about the relationship between free will and 
political association further explain why he defends the libre arbitre against all external 
necessity, except the state and the church. First, libre arbitre can reflect human imperfection; 
and yet, it is also the means of perfection. The second paradox is that society is necessary to 
satisfy mutual need and moral development, but it is also a source of dissension among people 
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and of corruptibility of human nature.  The final paradox is that one must lose oneself to find 
oneself. A person must grow beyond selfish intérêts particulièrs in order to find oneself. 
The first paradox is due to the autonomous self-sufficiency of the will with respect 
to externalities and to the concomitant indeclinability of the will toward perfection or 
imperfection. The will is innately good and has the ability to develop moral perfection, but it 
may not necessarily do so. Hence: the guiding role of the state according to Fénelon. "[God] 
only keeps us in the pilgrimage of this life to lead us to perfection."111 The end of temporal life 
is moral perfection.  Humans have the quality of perfectibility in terms of moral improvement.  
Free will is the source of virtue and vice. Free will qualifies the value of perfection. Fénelon 
stated, "As to will is a greater perfection than barely to be: so to will good is more perfect than 
to will.."112 When man wills good, he is a moral being.  His purpose is to be a morally good 
being.  Temporal life is a constant process towards the perfection of himself and his genre.113 
Fénelon specifically meant perfection toward moral goodness. Four corollaries relate to the 
faculty of perfectibility. 
The first corollary is that will based on free agency is the source of morality. Fénelon 
understood the difference between being innately good and acting morally.114 To Fénelon, free 
will is "the foundation of all government, of all instruction, and of all rules of conduct."115 
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"Deprived of this liberty, all human life would be thrown into confusion, and there would be no 
longer a trace of order in society. If men are not free, in what they do of good or evil, good is 
no longer good, and evil no longer evil."116  
The second corollary is that moral perfectibility includes intentional choice.  This is 
related to Aristotle's concept of proairesis, which means to choose one thing before another.117 
For Aristotle and Fénelon, moral perfection entails the deliberate desire of people to perform 
the function of human beings properly, viz., to perform it voluntarily in the awareness of 
possible alternatives, which, however, are rejected in deciding to act the way one wills.  
Decisions are reached through a process of deliberation.118 No action can have moral value 
without this process. 
The third corollary is the role of sentiment in moral perfection. He identifies sentiment 
as perception. “ Pour le sentiment, je m’ en tiens à Descartes qui dit souvent que les sentiments 
ne sont que des perceptions de l’ âme.”119 But, these sentiments are not based on appetitive 
senses or reason. For Fénelon, morality is a matter of the heart. He is a great apostle of 
sentiment or disposition, the moving force of the will. "If I truly love, it will be impossible to 
conceal my love.  Love wants to be active."120 Of all the human qualities, the most important 
one is love, charité.  Fénelon referred to 1 Corinthians 13: "[I]f I have no love, I am 
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nothing.”121 "Charité animates all the virtues, and directs their several acts."122 Goodness and 
virtue are matters of the heart.  The ability to do good and be virtuous emanates freely from the 
heart. Without preeminent movement of the heart in the will, deliberation is difficult and lacks 
the fruition of its potential.  Thus, the most important enacting human characteristic is a 
disposition of spirit, not reason: 
All virtue consists essentially in the good will...”The kingdom of God is 
within you.” It is not a question of knowing much, of having great talent, nor 
even of doing great things. We only need to have a heart and to desire the 
good.  Outer works are the fruits and the inseparable consequences by which 
we recognize true devotion.  But true devotion, the source of these works, is 
all of the heart.123  
The fourth corollary of moral perfection is that it is a matter of activity, not passivity. 
Fénelon criticized organized religion in general for fostering worry about judgment in the 
next world rather than instructing people how to live in the temporal world. He criticized 
certain forms of quietism for the passive inaction implied in the state of disinterested 
contemplation.124 
The second paradox is that society is necessary to satisfy mutual need and moral 
development, but it is also a source of dissension among people and of corruptibility of 
human nature. Human existence is relational. Aristotle is relevant again in this regard. 
People are social and political beings who realize their nature fully only in the civic society. 
"Moral action is impossible outside human society, for actions are virtuous or not when they 
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are performed in relation to one's fellow men."125 Society provides opportunities for a person 
to develop beyond the world of individual interests and vacuity, and choice is moral in 
relation to other people in a social environment. The moral quality of a choice issues from 
its consequences. In order to fulfill the highest good of moral perfection, people must act 
in association with one another. This premise has three corollaries. 
First, civil association is a natural development, which is patterned after familial 
relations. Social cohesion issues from interdependency. The individual is an autonomous 
entity, but one does not exist in a vacuum in temporality.  Life necessarily involves 
movement and interaction. A distinctive aspect of Fénelon's theory is that social organization 
is a necessary ingredient of human happiness and fulfillment. It is neither a neutral aspect nor 
a necessary evil with respect to human activity. 
Second, society is inevitable because association is based on mutual need. Fénelon 
provides a hypothetical anthropological account to describe the mutual need which brings 
people together. His explanation is based upon Epicurus.126 Because the accounts in 
Epicurus in Fénelon's Lives of the Ancient Philosophers and the first part of Rousseau’s 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality are so similar, it has been suggested that Fénelon was 
the immediate source of Rousseau's account. 
Paradoxically, society is also the source of corruptibility. Fénelon finds the cause of 
psychological, spiritual, and physical maladies of the individual to be the vices of 
civilized existence. The more one lives in conformity with the simplicity of nature, the less 
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one is subject to ill. The less one lives in conformity with nature, the more one is prone to 
such internal states as intemperance, impatience, fear, and inquietude. Pride and the desires for 
honor and fame are vices, flattery and luxury are the worst social influences. The focus of 
Fénelon’s argument is the negative impact of luxury upon the inner character of the 
individual. Luxury affects the heart and is most effectively rooted out by education rather 
than sumptuary law. The argument extends beyond the impact of luxury upon the individual 
to the character of civil society and the state as well.127 Fénelon and Rousseau also share a 
common position regarding the corruptible tendency of pride in social organization. 
The final paradox is that one must lose oneself to find oneself; a person must 
grow beyond selfish intérêts particuliers in order to find his self. The paradox is parallel 
to the Biblical scripture in Matthew 16:25: "For whoever wants to save his own life will 
lose it; but whoever loses his life for my sake will find it." Fénelon's explanation of this 
paradox is that the will of God is the best will for the individual. "I am the way, the truth, and 
the life" means that the way of life God prescribes for the individual is the only way to human 
fulfillment. One must relinquish voluntarily his prideful will to the will of God as the 
means to transcendence and perfectibility. This means relinquishing pride to Union. The libre 
arbitre that was given by God with no strings attached must be reunited with the donor in 
order to achieve perfectibility. For Fénelon, the surrender of one's will to God must be 
absolute. 
How does our will become good? By conforming itself with no reservations to that 
of God. What does self-renunciation mean unless it means to give all right over self, 
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with no reservations? St. Paul also told us, 'You no longer belong to yourselves.'128 
Thus whoever works to let go of himself...cuts at one blow the root of all his vices, and 
finds in the simplest renunciation of himself the seed of all virtues....The more we give 
ourselves up the more we find peace, and this peace so enlarges our hearts that we 
are ready for everything....We must lose ourselves if we want to find ourselves again in 
God.129 
 
It is necessary to forgo the selfish interest of the individual (intérêts particuliers) to 
become truly master of oneself. This paradox is secularized and applied to the state. The libre 
arbitre submits to political authority. Whether the will submits to God or king, the result is the 
same: moral liberty, the transformation of the individual toward perfectibility. 
 This paradox resolves two fundamental issues in Fénelon's political theory. It is the 
means of maintaining individual liberty even though that liberty is transcended for the sake 
of association and perfectibility. Individual liberty is maintained because the will to transcend 
one's volonté particulière in the sense of intérêts particuliers is a voluntary one motivated by 
character and deliberated by reason. One acts in favor of his own good. This understanding 
harmonizes the individual will and the will of God. This paradox is the means to spiritual 
as well as social atonement. It ameliorates conflict between volontés particulières and 
volontés générales in society. Fénelon’s philosophical agenda of is not to annihilate the 
possibility of this conflict through argumentation. This possibility is inherent in human nature.  
Instead, the focus is to clarify the benefits of choosing the higher good. 
Atonement reconciles one of the other central paradoxes in Fénelon's works. Humans 
can be at one with their innate good nature, even in the face of the corruptible aspects of 
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human association, if they embrace a higher good. Association in civil society is both the 
means to moral perfectibility as well as moral corruptibility. The individual's disposition to 
embrace a higher good enables the mutually beneficial arrangement of society to move 
beyond particular interests and to facilitate the development of both the individual and the 
public good. 
As much as Fénelon's philosophy is one of paradoxes, it is also one which 
attempts reconciliation. The autonomous and interdependent aspects of the self do not deny 
one another. Just as the Cartesian distinction between mind and body are distinct parts of the 
complete human, so there are distinct individual and cooperative parts of the whole person. 
The individual who associates himself as a member of civic society is the active 
subject and the society is the passive predicate.130 The complete autonomy of the will is 
the cause réelle.131 The individual must affirm or prescribe political authority unto himself 
in order to realize moral freedom in association. Both the act of self-prescription and the 
content of the choice determine this freedom. This aspect of will correlates to the causal 
role of thought in Cartesian nomenclature. The acts based upon ascent and assent correlate to 
the effectual role of extension in Cartesian nomenclature. Fénelon meant extension as a moral 
part of the corporate body of the community. These human acts of extension are the 
connective tissue between the individual and cooperative self. The dual role of the individual 
as both subject and predicate of his act puts him completely at one with his true nature. 
This atonement makes possible his perfection. 
The cooperative self emanates from the association of individuals. Association is a 
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matter of will in the sense that individuals tend toward and choose it freely. This choice brings 
about the marriage between the identity of the community and the individual. The cooperative 
will signifies the individual choice to transcend beyond oneself and toward the common good. 
It generates the individual's receptivity to civic education. In this manner, the act of 
association lends one to moral perfection in the sense of personal identification with a higher 
good, the wills of God and king. 
Active free agency is a key to Fénelon's theory of the self as well as his political 
theory. People act morally on the basis of their characters, and morality presupposes free 
choice. The individual, as the motor of virtue, has the independent and self-sufficient will to 
experience le moi commun notwithstanding any authority of the church or state. The free will is 
the foundation of political association and obligation.  The viability of the foundation depends 
upon whether the choices are oriented toward the well being of others without self interest. Free 
assent and ascent of the individual will toward the greater good, not social contract, is 
the key to Fénelon’s political thought. 
Fénelon’s concept of libre arbitre connotes the autonomous free agency of the 
individual and of the Creator to act morally in a universe of infinite possibilities. To live in 
the present intentionally is to conform oneself to eternal order. The perfection of disposition 
is manifested in the creative act of choice among possibilities. The faculties of the soul, will 
and choice, are free of any material and rational constraint and necessity. Fénelon believed 
that people are dependent upon God for their existence, but not their actions. People are 
creative, perfectible, moral agents, and there is no limit to possible choices. The individual is in 
control of his actions, and he is morally responsible for them. Fénelon’s political theory is one 
of moral responsibility toward others. 
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The next two chapters explain love as the basis for unselfishness. Fénelon defines love as 
the spring that moves the will. This spring is disposition, or character, the source of moral 
virtue. Disposition of the will is distinct from rational reflexivity of understanding, so it is 
crucial to understand Fénelon’s concept of love as the second thread, along with free will, 
that weaves his political theory. The chapter that follows this one sets a substantial 
background within which to orient Fénelon’s concept of love. The subsequent  chapter  
pedagogically presents Fénelon’s unique concept of love. There are several reasons for an 
instructional and textual, rather than argumentative, presentation. The first is to organize and 
provide important aspects of his theory in English translation for the benefit of further 
Fénelonean studies. Studies of his concepts of disinterestedness and pure love are 
available, but this chapter will help Anglophone scholars distinguish Fénelon’s ideas about 
love in Christian theology in depth.  It will also set the foundation for further intertwining 
the relationship between his philosophy of free will, theology of love, and concept of civic 
virtue. 
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Chapter 2:  The Roots of Amour pur and Disintéressment in Philosophical Theology 
 
Fénelon’s concept of amour pur descends from centuries of writings on the subject of 
whether the core of love is egoistic or disinterested.1 There were scriptures to support both an 
egoistic approach and a disinterested approach. After a brief overview of the former, the focus in 
this chapter will be on those supporting the disinterested view. 
Old and New Testament scriptures of the Bible can be cited to assert that self-interested 
behavior affects eternal reward or punishment.  They establish a consequence of action as either 
personal gain or forfeiture.  Ethical consequences can be judged according to rules and can be 
understood in terms of duty and obedience.  According to the Book of Exodus 20:12, “Honor your 
father and your mother, that your days may be prolonged in the land…your God gives you.” One 
theological interpretation of this scripture is to associate personal conformance to God’s laws as the 
primary means of temporal and spiritual reward. Again, in the words of the Prophet Jeremiah, “I 
the LORD search the heart and examine the mind to reward each person according to their conduct 
according to what their deeds deserve.”2 Self-interest in conduct is a motivation for reward. 
According to the Apostle Paul, judgment is based on deeds, “We must all appear before the 
judgment seat of Christ, that each one may be recompensed for his deeds.”3 Words of Jesus 
explained reward and punishment from the point of view of self-pursuit.  “For whoever would save 
his life (soul) will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel’s will save it.  For 
what does it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his soul?”
4 To emphasize how the lack 
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of self-interest can lead to eternal punishment, Jesus warned, “The angels shall come forth and take 
out the wicked from among the righteous and will throw them into the furnace of fire….”5 
Notwithstanding the inability to conclusively determine whether human efforts impact God’s 
judgment, this warning sufficiently justifies Pascal’s wager in terms of leaning toward ethical action. 
Indeed, the fear of judgment was incorporated into the ethics of les moralistses and homme honnête. 
The emphasis of self-interest in these scriptures is that a person ought to care about what he 
can own.  Reward is something to be acquired and deserved by individual deeds. As a system of 
ethics, the individual actor is the agent for his own welfare.  This is ethical egoism.  What can be 
possessed or avoided, either temporally or spiritually, is of primary sufficiency for an action or 
desire to be a duty to fulfill.  Reward is the incentive for earning, achieving, and deserving.  A 
deontological ethics of personal reward can be generalized to a morality of public reward. One 
example of ethical egoism is contemporary so-called prosperity gospel that associates individual 
fidelity to God’s laws with collective prosperity.6  
 
The earliest sources of disinterested love are ancient philosophy, biblical scripture, and the 
patristic Christian church fathers.  Fénelon was keenly knowledgeable about these writings as well 
as about medieval and renaissance considerations on this subject.  He knew Plato’s writings as well 
as those of Homer, Demosthenes, Aristotle, and Cicero.  He knew the writings of Christian writers 
from Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Augustine, Aquinas, medieval scholastics, and most of all 
Christian mystics up to the time of his most immediate source, John of the Cross. An examination 
of relevant sources establishes a pattern for the development and understanding of Fénelon’s concept 
of love.  This examination will set the stage to establish Fénelon’s idea of love as the fruition of a 
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pattern. The fruition is that Fénelon’s idea of pure love brought to a head, especially in his 
controversy with Bossuet, the consideration of whether happiness has anything to do with appetite. 
During the patristic period, questions on the acts of almsgiving, good works, sacrifice, and 
brotherly love considered whether or not the self-interested motive of eternal reward is biblically 
justified.  Jesus (4 BC-30) said, 
You have heard it said, “You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.” But I 
say, love your enemies…For if you love those who love you, what recompense will 
you have?  Do not the tax collectors do the same?  And if you greet your brothers 
only, what is unusual about that? ... So be perfect, just as your heavenly father is 
perfect.” 7 
Matthew 6:1-4 warns readers not to give alms to win the praise of other humans.8 
Elsewhere, Jesus complains of those who seek Him only because of the loaves of bread he offers.9 
And, there is his well known teaching to “love one another. As I have loved you, so you also 
should love one another.”10 In these scriptural passages, Jesus rejected the egoistic conception of 
love and instructed that love does not merely benefit the individual. 
The most important scriptural basis of disinterested love for God is Jesus’s sacrifice of his 
life according to the will of God. “Take this cup away from me, but not what I will but what you 
will.”11 He affirmed this sacrificial attitude of love for others in other scriptures.  “I lay down my 
life for the sheep.”12 “No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.”13 
This scripture refers to Jesus’ sacrifice and to the instruction for others in regard to friends. The 
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8 cf. Matthew 23:5 and Sirach: 31. 
 
9  John 6:26.  
 
10 John 13:34; cf. the more egoistically suggestive version of Mark 12:31 to “[l]ove your neighbor as yourself.” 
 
11 Mark 14:36; cf. John 12: 27-28. 
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13 John 15:13. 
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import of these scriptures is twofold: an individual must do the will of God and must love others 
regardless of the personal cost. The apostle Paul (5-67) claimed that our attitude should be the same 
as that of Jesus who: “being in very nature God, but made Himself nothing, taking the very nature of 
a servant,…humbled Himself and became obedient to death--even death on a cross!”14 Thus came 
about the tradition that Christians must be willing to imitate Jesus (imitatio Christi) in sacrificing, 
suffering, and dying for others.  This is the source of Fénelon’s associations between sortir de soi, 
self-abnegation, and amour pur. 
The Apostle Paul echoed this willingness in his words, “I wished…that I was anathema to 
Christ for my brethren.”15 He further developed the disinterested idea that love is not selfish:  “Do 
nothing out of selfishness or out of vain glory; rather humbly regard others as more important than 
yourselves, each looking out not for his own interests, but everyone for those of others.”16 No one 
should seek one’s own advantage, but that of one’s neighbor.17 In Romans 15: 1-3 Paul explained 
that we should please our neighbor for his own good, not ours, because even Christ did not please 
Himself. Paul’s Hymn to Love sums up his view that love “is not self-seeking.”18 He set himself as 
an example when he put off his salvation by delaying his execution.  “I long to depart this life and 
be with Christ, for that is far better.  Yet, that I remain in the flesh is more necessary for your 
benefit.”19 The examples of Jesus and Paul affirmed the selfless appeal of Moses to God to atone 
for the golden calf that the weary tribe of Israel made, “Either forgive them this sin [i.e. idolatry], 
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18 1 Corinthians 13:5. 
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or release me from Your book that You have written.”20  
These biblical concepts were developed in the patristic period.  John Cassian (365-435 AD) 
wrote that Paul’s example should be imitated.21 Irenaeus (c. 125-202 AD) claimed that a Christian 
shows compassion to others without asking for a fee or reward. The reasoning is that Christians, 
who receive freely from God, should act in like manner toward others.22 Clement of Alexandria 
(130-200 AD) wrote that one must not love others out of mercenary motives or for the sake of 
worldly things. The only reward one should seek is the salvation of the other, not another’s favor.23 
Some early patristic writers ranked forms of human love for others.  For example, Julianus 
Pomerius (fl. 498 AD) designated a low form of love, albeit it natural and somewhat honorable, 
which is to love for the sake of some earthly gain or hope of receiving something back. The 
highest form of love is to love a friend freely and for the sake of God, wishing nothing for oneself 
from them.24 
According to Basil (330-379 AD), one ought to prefer all others to oneself.25 Augustine (354-
430 AD) and Ceasarius of Arles (470-542 AD) maintained that love of others must be gratuitous and 
without recompense.  It must be for the other and not for anything else, be it money, gifts, or 
advantages; otherwise there is no love for the person, only for what he has to offer.26 Augustine 
                                                            
20 Exodus 32:32. 
 
21 John Cassian, Conferences, 23, 5; cf. 16, 22. Others such as Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, and John 
Chrysostom refer to this example of Paul as well.  Cited in Vincelette, 52. 
 
22 Irenaeus. Against the Heresies, 2, 31:3; 2, 32:4; cited in Vincelette, 24. 
 
23 Clement of Alexandria.  Stromata 1, 1; cf. 2, 18-19; 7, 9; cited in Vincelette, 24. 
 
24 Pomerius, Julianus. The Contemplative Life, 3, 25; cf. 3, 24:1-2; cited in Vincelette, 25. Maximus the 
Confessor gave more rankings in. Four Centuries on Charity, 2, 9; cf. 1, 72, 75; 2, 36, 49;  ibid., 25. 
 
25 Basil, Ep. 22; Morals, Rule 70, Cap. 22; Concerning Baptism, 2, 12 cited in Vincelette, 51. 
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echoed Paul in writing that charity at no point seeks its own interests.27 Also, “When we take pity 
upon another person and care for him or her, it is for his or her advantage that we do so. Thus we do 
not care for others to seek to gain heaven.”28 Gregory the Great went so far as to say that the 
righteousness of God is not for sale and that no one has charity for himself because it only occurs 
when love does not turn inward but reaches out to others.29 He also emphasized the idea that friends 
should love in God and enemies for the sake of God.30 In sum, the patristic idea developed that love 
for others is disinterested, even to the point of foregoing heavenly reward. 
The patristic idea of the disinterested love of God developed in parallel manner through the 
eighth century.  The love of God must not be motivated by a fear of hell or the hope of either earthly 
or heavenly reward.  According to 1 John 4: 18, “perfect love drives out fear.”  God must be loved 
entirely for Himself.  Loving God and being virtuous are invaluable in themselves apart from any 
reward. This was the first notion of a purely disinterested love of God.  The idea developed even 
further to include the stipulation that anyone who truly loves God would prefer hell or no reward at 
all, even eternal, instead of being separated from loving God and doing good works. 
Origen (185-254) and Ambrose (339-97) were early representatives of the disinterested love 
of God. They maintained that it is better to cling to God not out of slavish fear but in the freedom of 
love.31 God prefers to be loved than feared.  God wants His children to consider themselves sons by 
adoption, and He wants them to give love freely and do good out of love. According to scripture, 
                                                            
27 Augustine, Ennarrationes in Psalmos 122, note 12 cited in Vincelette, 42. 
 
28 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1, 32, 28 cited in Vincelette, 42. (translation by current author). 
 
29 Gregory the Great. Pastoral Rule, 3, 20; Hom. Gospels, 17:1; cf. Aristotle, EE 1240a13-22; Augustine, The 
Trinity, 9, 2,2 all cited in Vincelette, 43. 
 
30 Gregory the Great, “amicus diligendus est in deo et inimicus propter deum,” Homiliae in Evangelia. 9: 6 (PL 
76,1108), as cited in Chydenius, Love in Medieval Tradition, 29; See also, Gregory the Great, in Evangelia, 40 (PL 7, 
1075-1312). 
 
31 Second Letter of Clement (c. 120-70 AD), cited in Vincelette, 59. 
102  
“you are no longer a slave, but a son; and since you are a son, God has made you also an heir.”32 
Fear creates bondage while love creates a spirit of adoption and freedom.  Anthony of Egypt (251- 
356 AD) and Jerome (340-420 AD) did, however, attribute some merit to fearing God in the sense 
that it can be a guide to adoption and prevent the commission of sins. Also, Christians came to 
believe that God must be loved entirely for Himself rather than from the fear of hell or the hope of 
reward.  Some, such as Jerome, maintained an allowance for loving God for the sake of eternal 
rewards, but not temporal ones.  To seek temporal reward would resemble hired servants or wage- 
earners who, for example, give alms to “earn” a productive harvest. Others extended the argument 
by adding that the only way one can demonstrate that he loves God for Himself is to forego any 
reward, temporal or spiritual.33 In other words, giving alms in the hope of attaining eternal reward 
would not demonstrate an entire love for God even though there is some merit in this case because 
God is recognized as the source of the reward. But, in either example, to seek reward is commerce, 
not godliness. The suggestion here is that a desire for reward is not the primary motive of love. 
Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215 AD) is the first to explicitly hold a disinterested view of 
love.  According to him, anyone who acts kindly out of fear does so out of coercion. Fear may 
create an abstinence from evil but it does not create the volition to do good. So, it is better to do 
good and to love God for hope of eternal reward than for fear of hell. It is better yet to love God 
without consideration of any gain or enjoyment. As Clement explains, the true disposition is 
revealed if dread and promise are taken away.  Only those who do not think of what is in it for 
themselves will do good and love God in all circumstances.34 There is perfection in “doing good 
                                                            
 
32 Galations 4: 7. 
 
33 Vincelette, 63. 
 
34 Vincelette, 64-65. 
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when it is done not for any advantage in what pertains to him, but because he judges it right to do 
good.”35 Thus, a progressive threefold (or fourfold) classification developed to describe the 
disinterested love of God.  There are those who do good out of fear of punishment as servants, those 
who do good out of hope of reward (either temporal or eternal) as wage-earners, and those who do 
good for its own sake as sons. 
According  to Ambrose (339-97 AD), “one who follows Him is not led to perfection by the 
reward, but by perfection he is made perfect for the reward.”36 The position of his student, 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD), is worth noting closely. God must be loved freely (gratis). 
What is not loved for its own sake is not loved at all.37 “ Charity is the movement of the soul which 
seeks to enjoy God on account of Himself.”38 
The heart was made chaste; God is loved by it freely; it seeks no other reward. 
Whoever seeks another reward from God and desires for that reason to serve God is 
making that which he wants to receive more dear than Him from whom he wants to 
receive it.   The reward from God is God Himself.  This the heart loves, this it prizes. 
If it loves another, it will not be a chaste love.39  
God is to be loved as goodness itself.40  
It is questionable whether Augustine totally abandoned the eudaimonism that he 
inherited from antiquity, because the yearning for God does emanate from the desire for 
union in the Platonic sense of eros. However, when Augustine speaks of loving God for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
35 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 4, 22 cited in Vincelette, 66. 
 
36 The Prayer of Job and David, 3, 11:28; cf. Jacob and the Happy Life, cited in Vincelette, 67. 
 
37 As cited in Vincelette, 67: Augustine affirms in several his writings this idea that what is loved for its own 
sake is not loved at all: Confessions, 7, 17; Enarrationes in Psalmos 19, n. 8-10; 53, n. 10; 55, n. 17; 72, n. 32; 79, n. 14; 
104, n. 35; 134, n. 11; 149, n. 4; Sol. 1, 13; Sermons 165:4, 178:11; 340:1; 385:4-5; City of God, 10, 5. 
 
38 Vincelette, 68; see Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 3, 10, 16. 
 
39 Augustine, Ennarrationes, in Ps. 53, note 7 cited in Vincelette, 63. 
 
40 Augustine, The Trinity, 8, 3, 4 cited in Vincelette, 68 
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Himself what he means is that the enjoyment of God is a result of gratuitous love for Him.  
“Somehow or other our own advantage follows by a sort of natural consequence, for God 
does not leave the mercy we show to him who needs it to go without reward. Now this is our 
highest reward, that we should fully enjoy Him, and that all who enjoy Him should enjoy one 
another in Him.”41 In other words the enjoyment of God is bestowed because He has 
promised it gratuitously, not because anyone has earned it.  The enjoyment of God is the 
natural, viz. ensuing result of loving Him distinct from any desire for it. 
A final source in the discussion of the patristic background of the concepts of unselfish love 
and amour pur is Gregory the Great (540-604 AD).  In a sentence much quoted in the Middle 
Ages, he distinguished two kinds of love and reserved the word caritas for a love completely rid of 
self- love.  “It is not possible to have a charity between fewer than two. For strictly speaking no 
one is said to have charity for oneself; rather charity becomes possible when love tends toward 
someone else.”42 This idea is significant because it acknowledged a dualistic concept of love in the 
sense that there must be a lover and a beloved and because it emphasized as intrinsic the other-
regarding quality of love.  Love cannot exist in isolation.  Self love is deficient. 
Classical ideas were important influences in the development of the idea of disinterested love 
because of their subsequent influence on Christian thinkers. Neither Plato nor Pythagorus, for 
example, believed that one should love others or act virtuously for the sake of monetary gain.43 
Beginning with the Greeks, beauty was a function of harmony and order where parts could not 
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42 "minus quam inter duos caritas haberi non potest. Nemo enim propri ad semet ipsum habere caritatem 
dicitur, sed dilectio in alterum tendit, ut caritas esse posit,” Gregory the Great, in Evangelia Hominae, 17, 1, PL. 76. 
1139) cited in Vincelette, 155. See also Oliver O'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven, CT: 
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43 Diogenes Laertius, “Pythagoras” in Lives of Emiment Philosophers, 8, 8; cf. Plato, Eurhyphro, 29d-30b, 
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cohere unless they were good for one another.44 Goodness was commonly accepted by them to 
mean excellence or perfection (arete), rather than the contemporary meaning that is related to 
keeping a set of moral standards.  So the Platonic idea of the Good relates to a state of perfection 
that is ordered and harmonious. Plato described a series of five upward steps to this perfection in 
the Symposium as a movement of the soul from physical beauty to absolute beauty that is beyond 
any individual instance of beauty whether material, social, or moral.45 Plato described this beauty as 
“unique, eternal, and all other beautiful things as partaking of it…”46 From this Plato concluded that 
what is beautiful must be good and that all men desire to participate in it.47 This Beauty or Good is 
the Summom Bonnum, and the desire for it is referred to as eros.48 The ultimate Platonic experience 
is the state of illumination provided by “the supreme knowledge whose sole object is that absolute 
beauty.”49 For Plato love is a yearning of the soul for the beautiful because all men want everlasting 
possession of what is good for them.  It is the yearning to participate in eternity.  Here possession 
indicates a harmonious bond rather than acquisition.50 Actually, the true lover possesses the Good 
by enabling the Good to take possession of him because love is a spiritual power that mediate 
between the divine and mortal, and it binds all together.51 Love is the transcendent desire for order 
and union, and it represents a metaphysical objective that transcends the individual human being.  Its 
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45 Plato, Phaedrus is another important work with respect to his idea of love. 
 
46 Plato, Symposium, trans. Hamilton (New York: Penguin Books, 1951), 93-94; cf. Symposium, trans. Benjamin 
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47 Plato, Symposium, trans. Jowett, 46. 
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effect is happiness.52  
Aristotle continued the Platonic idea of love as a search for goodness and perfection. 
However, he did not focus on a transcendental ascent as the Summon Bonnum. He focused on 
goodness and perfection from a personal point of view where he found a love of good character 
among persons.  Therefore, Aristotle explained love in terms of friendship (philia).53 In the 
Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle described three types of friendship, which are based upon use, 
pleasure, or excellence. The first two types are not affection for someone per se but affection for 
what can be accrued from someone.  These are not true friendships because they are transient. 
On the other hand, “it is those who wish the good of their friends for their friend’s sake who are 
friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves.”54 "The perfect form of 
friendship is that between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue. For these friends wish 
alike for one another's good because they are good men, and they are good per se, (that is, their 
goodness is something intrinsic, not incidental).”55 They are friends on the basis of what they 
are.56 To be friends "men must have good will for one another, must each wish for the good of 
the other...and must each be aware of one another's good will.57 Friendship is a matter of the 
reciprocity, awareness, and mutual communication of goodwill.  These qualities compose the 
Aristotelian idea of philia, which implied in traditional Greek culture a bond of harmony or 
goodwill according to the proverb "friends hold in common what they have."58  
The idea of likeness in Aristotle’s idea of friendship is particularly important because it will 
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53 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), bks. 8, 9. 
 
54 Ibid., 8, 3, 1156b-9111; cf. 7, 2, 1155b 31. 
 
55 Ibid., 1156b, 6-10, 219; .cf Eudemian Ethics,  trans. and intro. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University 
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56 Ibid., 1157a, 15-20. 
 
57 Ibid., 1155a, 3-5. 
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later be a fundamental idea for Thomas Aquinas.59 Similitude of nature (physis) is the cause of 
affectionate attraction between friends.  According to Aristotle: 
Properly speaking likeness is the cause of love…For from the fact that any two are alike, 
they have as it were one form [nature] and are one in that form; thus two human beings 
are one in the species of humanity, and two whites are one in whiteness. And so the 
affection of one goes to the other, as to someone who is one with him, and he wills good to 
the other as he wills it to himself.60  
 
For Aristotle self-love is also a basis of friendship. A good man has the greatest affection 
for himself and therefore does what is good for him for his own sake. He is his own best friend. 
His friend is really another self; so all friendly feelings toward others are an extension of the 
friendly feelings a person has for himself. 61The similitude of physis is the link that allows a certain 
type of equality between otherwise dissimilar friends whose distinct excellences emanate from the 
reference point of self love.62 True friendship for Aristotle is an association and companionship of 
persons who delight in one another’s character and act on one another’s behalf.  It is only possible 
for morally virtuous persons who are consciously interested in one another as persons irrespective 
of use or pleasure. 
According to Cicero, amicitia and amor have the same derivation.  “For it is love (amor), 
from which the word ‘friendship’ (amicitia) is derived…Friendship springs rather from nature than 
from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love.”63 Love leads to 
goodwill: 
Love is nothing other than the great esteem and affection felt for him who 
inspires that sentiment, and it is not sought because of material need or for the 
sake of material gain. Nevertheless even this (material concern) blossoms 
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forth from friendship, although you did not make it your aim.64  
 
In other words, advantages ensue from friendship although it does not spring from the 
hope of gain.  This is because “friendship is desirable, not because we are influenced by hope of 
gain, but because its entire profit is in the love itself.”65 As noted above, Augustine developed this 
idea that love is gratuitous and yet reward ensues.66 Also, according to Cicero, love is neither 
isolated self-perception nor egoistic self-care but an intentional existence with others.67 
Everyone loves himself, not with a view of acquiring some profit for himself 
from his self-love, but because he is dear to himself on his own account; and 
unless this same feeling were transferred to friendship, the real friend would 
never be found; for he is, as it were, another self.68  
 
Such a good man is rare, although true friendship cannot exist except among good men.69 The 
defining characteristic of real friendships is that they are eternal because sentiments of love and 
kindly affection emanate from the true nature of a man.70 When true friendship is found there is an 
element of innate and timeless constancy. 
Another important aspect of Cicero’s idea of love, found in de Invention, is that there is 
giving and reciprocity between friends.71 “Friendship is to will good things to another for his own 
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109  
sake, and to have this will reciprocated."72 Cicero referred to this reciprocation of goodwill as 
amicitia.73 Friendship involves redamare, “to love in return.”74 His idea carried the Aristotelian 
influence that friends wish goodness to each other and that friendship includes reciprocity and 
equality. Friendship for Cicero, as for Aristotle, is a relationship of mutual respect, self-giving, and 
benevolence.  Unlike Aristotle, Cicero maintains “that we should have the same feelings for our 
friends as we have for ourselves” because there are instances in which one treats a friend differently 
from oneself. “There are numerous occasions when good men forgo, or permit themselves to be 
deprived of, many conveniences in order that their friends rather than themselves may enjoy 
them.”75  
Augustine was influenced by classical ideas. Plato’s transcendent idea of the Summon 
Bonnum, in addition to his Manichean experience, influenced Augustine’s idea that the highest good 
is God.  As he said, “For me the good is to cling to God.”76 “Our hearts are restless till they find rest 
in Thee.”77 Love is a longing which lacks its proper object until it finds it in God  (eros).  Amare 
amabam expresses a longing which has not yet found its object (God) and which man cannot find in 
earthly life.78 The transcendent goal is not to be found in the human sphere. Augustine described life 
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as a journey according to which “my weight is my love.”79 As he explained, “Gravity keeps 
everything in its own place.  Fire climbs up, while a stone goes down. Elements that are not in their 
own place are restless until they find it.  This applies to us also. My weight is my love; wherever I go, 
I am driven by it.  By the love of God we catch fire ourselves and, by moving up, find our place and 
our rest.”80 Love turned upwardly toward God is an lluminated way to Him (caritas).  On the other 
hand, love turned away from God is darkened misdirection away from its true end and toward the 
self as a mistaken end (cupiditas). In the latter condition, one is “stopped in himself.” 
The role of self-love (amor sui) in this journey can be understood in three ways by 
Augustine. It can be understood in accordance with Platonic roots as a well-ordered, legitimate 
value on a scale which leads toward the highest good.  Here a person loves God as He deserves, 
and he loves the world and himself only in relation to their roles as means of reaching Him. 
According to the Scripture, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” there is a place for self- 
love on this scale of value. Self-love can also be used as a false kind of love in which man seeks 
only his own pleasure and loves himself instead of God. Finally, Augustine also used amor sui as a 
synonym for love in general. Here the focus is upon the highest destiny of one’s own welfare.  It 
was in this sense that Augustine meant that proper self-love is to love God and to deny oneself.  
Here amor sui is synonymous with amor Dei.  In other words, there can be self love only if there is 
love of God.81 There is a sense of ecstasis in which the lover “goes out of himself” to follow the 
desire of seeking union with a higher good.82 There is a voluntary transformation of the lover into 
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the beloved.83 Fénelon’s Augustinian interpretation of the dynamics of free will in its ascent 
toward perfectible love is crucial to Fénelon’s political thought. 
In the early twelfth century the concept of love as giving and reciprocal between lover and 
beloved appeared.  Philia is introduced into the idea of Christian love. Peter Abelard (1079-1142 
AD) transformed Cicero's idea of friendship as a definition of love, amor.84 According to him, 
desirous love is self-love, which is essentially not love at all. Unselfish love that rejects desire is 
pure love. William of Auxerre (13th c.)  also distinguished between desirous and unselfish love. 
The former was referred to as amour concupiscentiase and the later as amor amicitia.  According 
to Abelard and Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite before him, love involves "walking out of 
oneself" (extra se) to leave selfish desire behind.85 There is a movement out of oneself and 
towards another. Abelard's philia-based concept of love as friendship was developed by the 
Cisterian school and adopted by the schoolmen of the thirteenth century.86 
Thomas Aquinas also adopted the idea of love as friendship. According to him, loving 
involves two objects: the person who is loved (formal object) and the goodness which is 
hoped for that person (material object).87 In the Aristotelian tradition, to love is to wish some 
good to somebody.88 Amor concupescentia is wishing good for oneself. Amor amicitiae is 
wishing good to the beloved.  Aquinas referred to the love between man and God as caritas 
that is analogous to amor amicitiae because both are based on reciprocity and 
communication.  Caritas is more perfect than amor amicitiae. There are three types of 
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friendship according to Aquinas: Amicitia utilis and amicitia delectabilis are concupiscent. 
Amicitia honesta, quae est cum quadam communicatione, is love of friendship.89  
The root of wishing good is appetitive because it is based on similitude of nature. So, love 
emanates from the natural soul.  Metaphysically, love is a movement toward order, cohesion and 
unity.90 Love is a natural part of the movement of the universe toward integration. It is the 
recognition in the friend of the rational nature that an individual has learned to value in himself. 
This is a positive use of the term philautia.91 To use a contemporary term, the one who loves is 
transformed into an alter ego, and this is mutual.92 
In the tradition of Aristotle, Aquinas maintained that shared nature (physis) and self-love 
coincide to allow a type of love wherein there is unity or concord in loving oneself and loving 
others. The reason for the concord is that beings love the whole of which they are parts more than 
they love themselves as particular beings. Because they love the whole supremely, loving the 
good of themselves and others is the one and the same.  Aquinas explained: 
In nature, every being which by its nature belongs to something is more principally 
and more intensely concerned about it than about itself…Every part naturally 
loves the whole more than itself, and every particular being naturally loves the 
good of the species more  than  its  own  particular  good…[Every  being]  has  a  
much  greater inclination to what is without qualification the universal good.93  
 
The human experience (res) of love as friendship is also a symbol (signum) which leads 
to the knowledge of God. The love of God is analogously interpreted as the friendship of God: 
Caritas est amicitia quaedam hominis ad Deum.94 The relationship between the person and God is 
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a type of friendship. The friendship of God is analogous with human friendship. A type of 
ecstasis results from friendship because the lover “goes out of himself” (extra se) to seek the 
good of the beloved.95 Ecstasis is a consequence of unselfishness and reciprocity. 
John Duns Scotus (1270-1308) further developed the philia-centered concept of love as 
friendship on the basis of a distinction made by Anselm of Canterbury before him. Anselm 
distinguished two affections in volition: justice and self-interest, the former of which is 
preferable. The affection of justice is the innate freedom of the will to move toward good, 
regardless of personal advantage.96 There is an innate freedom to will unselfishly  which develops 
by means of man or the Holy Spirit. The affection of self-interest, on the other hand, is an action 
of volition which moves toward personal advantage. Upon this distinction, Scotus concluded 
that loving something for its sake is freer than loving for one's own sake.97 It is also the more 
perfectible and highest form of human love because it does not involve hope or acquisitive 
desire.98 Self-interest is tantamount to self-love, and it is not really love at all, but concupiscent 
hope for gain.  Scotus also concluded that the highest form of love, caritas, is the love for God 
that is infused by grace. It is not a matter of human perfectibility because only God is perfect. 
Furthermore, Scotus distinguished between a primary and a secondary motive for loving. The 
primary motive is the terminal reason of an act as in loving God qua good for His sake. Here the 
motive of love as an end refers to the beloved. The secondary motive precedes the act as an 
expectation, because of which the act takes place. In the act of love there is an antecedent 
consciousness that love will be reciprocated.99 In so far as this consciousness is an expectation, 
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the motive of love refers back to the self in the end. Only the primary motive of love lacks 
concupiscence. 
An important distinction between Aquinas and Scotus is reflected in Fénelon’s thought. 
Scotus’s voluntarism maintained that God and man share the same capacity of intuitive will. 
Scotus emphasized God as infinite will. Aquinas emphasized God as ordered intellect. For 
Aquinas, the vegetative soul is the source of human knowledge and will. Knowledge is based 
on the capacity of the appetitive will to know by its participation in the whole as a part of it. In 
this respect, the capacities of human knowledge and will are limited because understanding of 
divine will can only be made through analogy of human experience. For Scotus, on the other 
hand, spirit exists without form. So man, as part of infinity, participates intuitively in infinite 
will. God and man share the very same univocal qualities, only in a matter of degree of 
perfection. Hence, Scotus’s idea of univocity. Fénelon applies the idea of univocal sharing to 
the creative capacities of God and Man. 
The mystic Bernard of Clairvaux’s (1090-1153) concept of love is one of the most distinct 
examples wherein the concept of love as friendship (philia) supersedes that of love as desire (eros). 
The central point of his doctrine of love is that the reciprocal union between man and God is like 
unselfish human love; love is not desirous.100 He distinguishes between pure love that is unselfishly 
benevolent and impure or mercenary love that is opportunistic. According to Bernard’s later works, 
there are five types and corresponding motives of love.  He expands the patristic distinctions 
between slaves, wage earners, and sons.  There are first slaves who fear the power of God. Next, 
Bernard distinguished between two types of wage earners who desire compensation. There are hired 
workers who hope for reward, and then there are sons who honor and defer to their father as pupils 
who learn in the hope the reward of inheritance. Fourthly, there are also sons who venerate their 
fathers without thinking of inheritance.  The highest form of love is represented between a bride and 
groom.  In this relationship, there is complete community, likeness, reciprocity, and unselfishness. 
 There is complete sharing of property, and they are one indeed one flesh. This 
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mutual relationship of philia is the purest form of human love. Analogous to it is spiritual caritas, 
or pure love for God, which Bernard does not believe can be entirely free from impurity during 
earthly life.101 In another work, the highest grade of love consists of those “who want nothing else 
from God except God himself.”102 “Such a soul does not desire anything of its own, neither 
happiness nor glory nor anything else. It has, as it were, been deprived of love itself.”103 Thus, for 
Bernard, there are various degrees of impure, or mercenary love in contrast to pure love. Impure 
and pure love are incompatible. 
John of the Cross (1542-1591) was also a mystic. His idea of love is influenced by both the 
Platonic-Augustinian and Aristotelean-Thomistic ideas on love. He follows the former tradition in 
the sense that there is a desire for union with God in the lower stages of love.  The way to this 
union is analogous to the image of ascending a mountain while emancipating self-will and 
engagement in the world. As love progresses, desire becomes extraneous, and it is replaced by 
mutual benevolence and communication in the Aristotelean-Thomistic tradition. The soul’s only 
desire is greater love until it reaches perfection.104 This perfection is reached when the soul “is lost 
to herself, she takes no thought for herself in any way, but only for the beloved, surrenders herself to 
him freely and disinterestedly, and in this wise becomes lost to herself, desiring no gain for herself 
in any way so ever.”105  
There is a union and transformation in perfected love, but it does not mean annihilation of 
the lover.  The transformation of the lover into the beloved is a mutual and equal process: 
In the soul of the lover, the image of the beloved is outlined in such manner, 
when there is union of love, that it is true to say that the beloved lives in the 
lover and the lover in the beloved; and in such manner of likeness does love 
make in the transformation of the two that are in love that it may be said that 
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each is the other and that both are one.  In the union and transformation each one 
abandons itself to the other and exchanges itself for the other. Thus each lives in 
the other, and the one is the other, and both are one.106  
 
John of the Cross reinforced this idea of transformation with the words of the Apostle Paul: 
“I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me.”107 According to John 
of the Cross, Paul meant that although he lived, his life was no longer his own because he was 
transformed.  Thus, there is a mutually benevolent union of the two natures of God and man without 
either of them changing their being. The Divine nature is communicated to human nature is such a 
manner that each of them appears to be God.  John of the Cross conveyed this idea of the friendship 
of God according to the words of Jesus to his disciples, “But I have called you friends; for all that I 
heard of my Father, I have manifested to you.”108 In his Cantico Espiritual, John of the Cross 
referred to the Old Testament friendship of Jonathan and David to explain the idea of the friendship 
of God.  “The love which Jonathan had for David was so straight that it knit the soul of Jonathan 
with the soul of David.”109 He commented: “If the love of one man for another man was so strong 
that it could knit one soul with another, what will be the union that is to be made between the soul 
and God its Spouse by the love which the soul has to God Himself?”110 John of the Cross was one 
of the most immediate authorities for Fénelon. 
Before turning to Fénelon’s concept of love it will be helpful to address contemporary 
historical studies on the concept of love. The abundance of studies on the subject of love in the 
fields of philosophy, theology, history, and psychology is too large to address. Two of the most 
important in the sense that they are most well-known are those of Anders Nygren and Pierre 
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Rousselot, although Rousselot’s study until recently has not been available in English translation. 
A brief review of these studies will provide a context, in addition to historical development, for 
understanding Fénelon’s idea of love. 
Anders Nygren’s study, Eros and Agape, has been the departure point for many 
contemporary studies on the concept of love. He distinguished between an egoistically desire-based 
love in terms of eros and the self-giving and sacrificial love of agape, and he claimed that there is 
no relationship between them either in historical or philosophical development.111 The roots of one 
are in antiquity and the other in the New Testament.  Eros developed from Plato and agape 
developed from the Apostle Paul’s Hymn to Love, neither of whom knew anything about the ideas 
of the other.112 He stated that “Platonic Eros and Pauline Agape, have, so to speak, no common 
denominator; they are not answers to the same question.”113 Nygren claimed that these two forms of 
love are mutually exclusive and incompatible.  One can love others and God with a love of eros, 
defined as self-interested means of seeking and acquiring a greater good. The defining 
characteristics of eros according to Nygren are desire for happiness and acquisition in the quest for 
it.  Or, one can love another in the sense of agape by surrendering self-gain and personal interest for 
the sake of another.  He did admit, however, that the two motifs constantly run into each other as 
they strive independently to put a stamp on spiritual life.114 The purpose of his study was to 
discover their roots and to determine their characteristics in the various historical forms in which 
they appeared.115 Others have followed Nygren’s distinction. For example, C. S. Lewis 
distinguished between need-love and gift-love, although he, unlike Nygren, held that these loves are 
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Pierre Rousselot’s study, The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages, has been an 
equally important point of departure, although not so directly in the English-speaking domain. 
Instead of eros and agape, he distinguished between an ecstatic and physical conception of 
love. He did mention an egoistic type of love similar to Nygren’s eros, in which loving others 
and God is a way of loving oneself.  However, he focused on developing two different concepts. 
The idea of personhood is important to the ecstatic concept of love. As Ildephonsus of 
Toledo wrote, charity “arises with regard to two: either from a human and to God, or, from a 
human being and to a neighbor. For the experience of love in one individual is not the least bit 
evident, because a single individual does not have anybody to [sic] whom it would unite itself.”117 
Here the person goes “outside of himself” to sacrifice gratuitously his personhood to the beloved’s 
personhood.118 Rousselot described this relationship between two independent entities as 
dualistic.119 Because of the duality, or distinction, of lover and beloved, there is a potential conflict 
between their interests and, hence, the need for gratuitous sacrifice. The lover acts with total regard 
for the other person’s interests and not his own; hence, the name disinterested love.  The more the 
lover goes “outside of himself,” the more the love is perfect and disinterested.  Gaining one’s own 
good in loving others, if it happens at all, is incidental rather than essential. A stricter interpretation 
of disinterested love is that the lover no longer acts in favor of his own interests, but acts solely for 
the sake of the beloved, even to the point of sacrificing his own good and happiness for the 
beloved.120 For the ecstatic, love may begin in self-love, but it remains imperfect and flawed 
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unless it leaves this starting point behind.121 
Rousselot assigned several characteristics to ecstatic love. It has a violent character because 
it disregards or even acts against natural inclinations.122 It violates innate appetites.  Mystics 
described this characteristic of love as wounding, mortifying, self-abasing, and annihilating. To 
love is to “lose one’s soul.”123 The characteristics of irrationality and equality are also related in 
Rousselot’s idea of ecstatic love.124 Love, as a matter of the heart, is not subject to reason, 
judgement, or intellect; so the mind does not perceive differences between persons. The result is 
an egalitarian love.  The final characteristic of ecstatic love is that it is free. Love is self-
sufficient because it does not depend on the appetites, any end other than itself, or any 
justification for itself other than itself.125 Because of its independence, love is freely chosen. 
Rousselot identified the concept of ecstatic love in Duns Scotus, Abelard, and Bernard of 
Clairvaux.  Fénelon brings the possibility of non-appetitive love to a head in his disagreements with 
Bossuet. This love involves love as friendship, not love as desire. It has been referred to as 
disinterested love.  
According to Rousselot’s physical conception there is fundamental harmony between the 
love of oneself and the love of others and God.126 The physical conception is characterized by unity, 
not duality as in his ecstatic concept. There is harmony because one finds his own good in the love 
of others.  He combined the Aristotelean idea of physis that self-love is the basis of love of others 
and the Augustinian idea that in all actions a person desires and seeks his own happiness. Here 
there is no conflict between self-love and love of others because an individual tends naturally to the 
good of others and, in so doing, tends to his own good.  For Rousselot, the greatest exponent of the 
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physical conception of love is Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there is transcendental unity 
between God and humans because humans are participations of God and derive their being from 
Him.  Here Aquinas’s concept of the whole and the part is relevant. A person desires his own good, 
and, because his good as a part is found only in the good of God as a whole, humans naturally tend 
toward God and love themselves for his sake.127 Rousselot explained Aquinas’s view: “Instead of 
reducing the love of God to a mere form of the love of self, it is the love of self that is reduced to a 
mere form of the love of God.”128 Love as friendship and love as desire harmoniously lead to 
happiness. “Our good, in reality, cannot be distinguished from the good of God, because the Good 
of God is our good, more so even than our own good itself.”129 Self love in Thomism is the love of 
Being itself instead of love of the individual.130  
In the next chapter, many of the foregoing historical and conceptual themes of unselfish 
love will appear in Fénelon’s concept of love. The next chapter will not focus upon a 
comparison and contrast between his and historical ideas. That would be another substantial 
project in itself. It will present Fénelon’s ideas as a continuation of an historical tradition. 
The biblical concepts, particularly, the idea that “love seeks not its own,” will be prevalent as 
well as many of the historical interpretations of these concepts.  He will continue the discussion of 
pure love that dates to the twelfth-century ideas of Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux. There will be 
the distinction between servants, mercenary wage-earners, and sons. In accordance with the ideas of 
Clement of Alexandria, there will be rankings of love according to the degree to which love 
excludes egoistic desires, hence the idea of Christian perfectibility. In particular, Fénelon drew 
upon the ideas of rankings in Bernard of Clairvaux and of mystical ascent in John of the Cross. 
Fénelon interpreted the idea of disinterestedness in the sense of loving God without fear of hell or 
hope of heaven. Themes of both the Platonic sense of eros and the Aristotelean-Thomistic idea of 
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the friendship of God are present.  Fénelon’s idea of love is both a continuation of these themes as 
well as a unique interpretation that stems from them.  One unique ramification of Fénelon’s idea of 
love stems from the primary focus outside of oneself, toward another.  Self-love, understood as 
self-interest, is not the central focus. 
His other-oriented concept of love is a very different foundation for political theory than 
self-interest, upon which nearly all political thought in the modern and contemporary periods is 
based. As Fénelon’s idea of unselfish love unfolds, so will the foundation for his political ideas. His 
idea of the king as a benevolent father relates to his concept of God as a friend. The king 
communicates through example and education as God communicates through the Holy Spirit in 
such a manner as to foster reciprocity.  The ideal in Telemachus that all hold property in common 
makes sense in light of the idea that perfect love is unselfish. The most dominant theme that 
becomes apparent in a study of Fénelon’s concept of love is the idea that both the king and 
populace are perfectible and that the purpose of society and state is to facilitate that perfectability 
in a manner consistent with Christian perfection, whether the state is Christian or not (as in 
Telemachus).  Perfection is a personal matter. It is achieved through unselfishness and evidenced 
by harmony.  In both his theological and political ideas, Fénelon strove for perfection, although he 
realized that there is in fact predominantly a mix of self-interest and unselfishness.  The states of 
perfection, spiritual and temporal, are reserved for a few.  Although just as few will reach a state of 
spiritual perfection, the possibility of perfectibility exists within Fénelon’s depictions of the non-
ideal and ideal states, Bétique and Salenté. The focus of his theology and political theory 
represents a struggle between interested and disinterested love that is dependent upon the 
dispositions of individuals.  Moral education, which is based upon theological principals and leads 
to virtuous political activity, is a critical determinant of the balance between the egoistic and 
unselfish types of love in civil society. 
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Chapter 3:  Fénelonean Amour Pur and Disintéressement 
 
Disinterestedness and Perfectibility through Contemplation and Meditation 
 
 
He only keeps us in the pilgrimage of this life to lead us to perfection1 
Until the creature loves, he only corresponds imperfectly with the end of his creation.2  
 
One purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why Fenelon’s idea of love brings 
to a head the consideration of whether happiness has anything at all to do with appetites 
that emanate from passions, senses, or even reason. Fénelon’s interpretation of unitive 
mysticism through contemplation is that love does not thing to do with these emanations. 
Happiness is a result of the inner peace that is experienced through disinterestedness. 
This hypothetical proposition in Maxims of the Saints sparked a major dispute between 
Bossuet and Fénelon, which ended in the latter’s dismissal from the Court of Louis XIV, 
the forfeiture of his appointment to the Duke Burgundy and his pension, banishment 
from Paris, and censure by the Pope. 
In brief, Fénelon queried whether it would be possible for a person to love God 
despite foreknowledge that he would be eternally dammed.  Fénelon answered 
affirmatively on the basis that it is possible for humans to love disinterestedly, an 
essential quality of which is to act without expecting any particular result or reward.   It 
is also possible for the primary motive of human action to be disinterested in this way.3 
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Fénelon clarifies that it is consistent with disinterestedness for a person to want his 
personal salvation because this is what God wants for him.  This basis of desire does not 
conflict with disinterest because it is what the beloved wants.  This is not a mercenary 
motive for loving.   So, not even the fear of damnation has a hold on the freedom of the 
will to love unselfishly. The free will is unfettered after its creation.  By affirming the 
possibility of the free will’s detachment from amour propre, Fénelon gave the free will 
autonomous integrity to stand alone without dependency on mercenary interest. 
Fénelon segregated happiness from the appetites according to an ontological 
rather than epistemological explanation of reality. His argument turned away from two 
long-held tenets: First, happiness as appetite is consistent with the interpretation of 
Augustine’s theology that dichotomizes charity and cupidity. Second, as long as 
intellect remained a function of the vegetative soul, knowledge limited the ability to 
experience God non-discursively. Fénelon replaced appetite and reason with an 
ontological emphasis on relationship. The ontological reality of mystical, non-discursive 
contemplation exists prior to appetite and reason. The ontological basis of reality sustains 
the distinct identities of the giver and receiver and also sustains their union. It allows 
for a continuum of common good that arises through the experience of perfecting 
disinterestedness. Movement fluctuates rather than polarizes. According to Augustine’s 
idea, “my weight my love,” personal perfectibility moves toward union as it 
relinquishes vegetative reason and appetite.  Unity arises, apart from appetite or reason, 
from being good.  
Why did this argument provoke such potent responses?  It marks the possibility of 
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one person relating to another without a primary motive of self-interest.  A foundation of 
human action and interaction that does not rely on self-interest runs contrary to the then-
prevailing thought on human motivation and the underpinnings of authority. It marks the 
possibility of basing association in religious, moral, and political thought on unselfishness 
as an authentic human quality.   Association depends upon unselfish personal interaction. 
Fénelon stood boldly against the prevailing momentum of self-interest in political and 
religious thought. 
The non-discursive realm of existence is real and very present. It brings to fruition the 
ultimate meaning of personal being. The meaning and purpose of personhood can only be 
fulfilled by self-determination.  The roots of political life emanate from the development of 
personhood. From this starting point of personal relationship, Fénelon’s moral and political 
theory is distinct from utilitarian and rule-based theories.  There is a distinction between 
Fénelon’s moral theory and those of utilitarian, Kantian, or liberal theories, which 
impersonalize moral rules abstractly.4 Fénelon’s concept of love requires intellectual humility. 
It requires not accepting what is contrary to reason as well as accepting what is above and 
beyond reason. Rousseau explored this aspect of Fénelon’s thought. 
This chapter will also establish the kernel of the idea that ultimately provides the 
link between Fénelon’s theology of love and free will to ancient virtue. The ancients, 
according to him, attributed a flourishing civic society to disinterested virtue. Amour pur was 
the principle of disinterested virtue. In addition, this chapter will establish an understanding 
of why Rousseau followed the  model  of  contemplative  spirituality  of  disinterestedness  in  
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Fénelon’s  thought. Rousseau once prayed, “My God! Give me virtues and place me some 
day close to Fénelon’s, Caton’s, Socrates’!”5 In his last work, Rousseau wrote, “I prefer 
Fénelon to all.”6 These are powerful assertions that call attention to the importance of 
Fénelon’s thought. The primary reason Rousseau was attracted to Fénelon’s spirituality is 
that it does not focus on ceremony, ecclesiastics, or institutions. This spirituality brings to 
fruition the state of being human and honors the goodness in human nature. It is a 
spirituality that brings tranquility to human existence. Here the person can experience a 
sense of peace, unity, and harmony. Julie, the Nouvelle Héloïse, describes sublime truths 
that constitute the ultimate goal and value of existence. 
The free will is unencumbered in terms of autonomous individuation. In other words, the 
will of each person distinctly determines itself in terms of relationship with universal eternity 
and then extends this relationship by determining itself within the general principles of finite 
community. The interior struggle of the self is to resolve conflicts between the prideful 
and beneficent, imperfect and perfectible, finite and eternal, and particular and general. The 
struggle involves acceptance that the finite self as distinct from the eternal and that the 
meaning of the finite self is fulfilled as it progresses toward union with the eternal.7 The finite 
self will never be perfect, but it is perfectible. Purposeful being is experienced when the 
perfectible part of the self prevails over the imperfect part.  Purposeful being lies at the core of 
                                                            
5 Rousseau. Correspondance, 1933, vol. 19, letter 3781, 57 and cf .OC. 4, 1141-42, as cited in Charles A 
Spirn,Prayer in the Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 128. 
 
6 Bernardin de St.-Pierre, La vie et les ouvrages de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: Édouard Cornély et cie., 
1907), 123. 
 
7 This is akin to Jungian psychology, although Fénelon would not describe the human struggle as one that 
integrates and unifies the self through layers of conflict. For Fénelon, it is a matter of the perfectible part of the self 




a thriving civic society. 
Through contemplation, le moi is brought into harmony with the order of universal 
goodness. Contemplation strengthens rather than weakens humanity and encourages a person 
to contribute actively to the moral goodness of finite activities toward others. This is the model 
of Fénelonean and Rousseauian thought that explains their kinship on such concepts as the 
goodness of human nature, the lack of accident in creation, individuation, voluntarism, the value 
of civic education, the dangers of luxury, political reform, and ancient republicanism. 
This chapter will further provide a thorough explanation of Fénelon’s concept of love, 
because it is the connecting thread of his entire system theologically, philosophically, and 
politically. The approach here is pedagogical and contains many quotes. Laying out the 
fundamentals of Fénelon’s idea of love in his own words will provide scholars with a source of 
reference that is not otherwise gathered accessibly in English to conduct further research. 
Fénelon’s own words reassure the reader that the concomitant interpretations are valid and help 
clarify his thought processes.  As the language of contemplative mysticism is very bold, the 
quotes will provide a context that allows the reader to become familiar with this language. 
The chapter is organized to lay the groundwork for connecting the metaphysical idea of 
free will with the moral idea of civic virtue, which the following chapter addresses. Fénelon’s 
idea of love is the essential link to this connection, and thus his chapter is intentionally an 
instructional map more than an expository argument. For example, Benjamin Thompson and 
Robert Lamb recently asserted that the Fénelonean inheritance of disinterestedness and virtue 
remains only partially unpacked in Rousseau studies.8 Part of the reason for this lack of 
investigation, as intimated above, is the limited availability of English-language translations of 
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Fénelon’s principles of reality stem primarily from Christian mysticism, the interior life 
of the individual in non-discursive and supra-sensible transcendence of selfism, particularly in 
the form of egoism.  Fénelon affirmed the existence of the individual soul as it was defined by 
the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century. To wit, once it is created, the individual soul is 
indestructible and immortal. Denying selfism is not a denial of selfhood. First of all, in the 
language of Christian mysticism, interior life indicates prayer that entails absolute intellectual 
freedom from the passions and scruples of the self.  Second, reality is eternal, abstract, and 
supra-natural as well as temporal, cognitive, and physical. Fenelon was keenly aware of and 
conversant with the Greek and Roman classics.  He knew the Phaedrus and Symposium well, 
and his understanding of reality is similar to the cosmos as conceived by Plato.9  
The long and rich history of Catholic mysticism had been cloistered until Protestant 
criticisms of Catholic spirituality during the Reformation opened the door to the incorporation 
of mystical practice into daily life.  Until that time, mystical practices and beliefs had remained 
within the walls of Catholic monasteries and were not something accessible to the layman. 
Protestants such as the Anabaptists and the Quakers promoted the idea that the interior life of 
individual prayer rather than ritual is the authentic way of union between God and the soul. As 
the Catholic Counter-Reformation developed, the Roman Church enfranchised this principle 
more widely, drawing upon the heritage of this principle in the realm of Catholic mysticism. 
The purpose of the interior life was the same for the Protestants as it was for Fénelon: to 
develop authentic and personal spiritual union between God and man. The consequence of this 
conviction for Fénelon was to alienate the Majesterium of the Catholic Church that undergirded 
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absolutism and the intertwined institutional structure of the church and state. The upshot was 
the same for both Protestants and Catholics: an emphasis on individual identity, although not 
the end of isolated spirituality. Union was the goal; individual identity was the means.  The 
ensuing inner freedom entails a freedom of conscience that is dependent on neither the Church 
nor the state.  The Counter-Reformation contributed substantially to Fénelon’s experience in the 
mysticism of the contemplative inner life. 
Fénelon’s theology begins to unfold under an examination of the means and degrees 
of man's love for God and God's love for man.  The possibility of loving unselfishly belies 
the uniqueness in Fénelon’s system of ideas, and his thought develops according to the 
degree to which man is capable of loving without self-interested motives.  “It is His [God’s] 
wish that we should all be perfect and it is by means of His grace that we are enabled to be 
so.  That is why Jesus Christ said to His disciples: ‘Be ye perfect even as your Heavenly 
Father is perfect.’ And that likewise is why he teaches us to say: ‘Thy will be done on earth 
as it is in heaven.’”10 Christian perfection is a progression. According to Fénelon, there are 
five degrees or stages of love, culminating in unselfish love (amour pur), which is pure 
because it is void of a self- interested motive.  Lower degrees of love contain different 
mixtures of self-interest, andthese degrees can be understood according to whether the self 
is either interested or disinterested (intéressé or désintéressé) with respect to its own sake or 
personal advantage. 
Pure love, l'amour pur, is the act of unselfish love. It is to love without acquisitive 
desire for personal gain and without fear of punishment. In theological terms, pure love is to 
love God without selfish desire for the reward of beatitude and without fear of eternal 
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punishment: It is to go outside of oneself, extra se, to be transported out of and to relinquish 
the motive of self-interest. As the will is not interested in itself for its own sake, the alternate 
term for pure love is disinterested love. When it loves purely, the will is interested in the 
object of love, the beloved; it wishes for the beloved to   retain the goodness that it has and to 
possess any goodness that it lacks. The will of the lover is not interested in receiving anything 
in return. 
Pure love does not mean that there is no self or that the self does not accrue any benefit 
from loving.  It means that the will does not desire benefit for the sake of personal gain at all. 
As Cicero declared, “[L]ove is nothing other than the great esteem and affection felt for him 
who inspires that sentiment, and it is not sought because of material need or for the sake of 
material gain.”11 In accordance with the ecstatic tradition, Fénelon maintains that love is free.12 
It stands alone, distinct from pleasure or reason in the sense that appetite and reason are silent. 
To support his position Fénelon quotes Francis of Sales, “Love must needs be very powerful, 
since it stands by itself, without the support of any pleasure, or of any pretension.”13  
Étienne  Gilson,  the  French  philosopher  and  historian  of  philosophy,  expands  
this concept: 
Love seeks no recompense: did it do so it would at once cease to be love. But 
neither should it be asked to renounce joy in the possession of the thing [read: the 
person loved], for this joy is co-essential with love; love would no longer be love if 
it renounced its accompanying joy. Thus all true love is at once disinterested and 
rewarded, or let us rather say that it could not be rewarded unless it were 
disinterested, because disinterestedness is its very essence. Who seeks nothing in 
love save love [read: save the person loved] receives the joy that it brings; who 
seeks in love something other than love, loses love and joy together. Love, then, can 
                                                            
11 Cicero, de Amicitia. xxvii, 100. 
 
12 Rousselot, supra. 
 
13 Francis of Sales, Love of God, L.9.c.21 as cited in Fénelon, The Maxims of the Saints Explained, 




exist only if it seeks no reward, but once it exists it is rewarded. Thus the idea of love 
at once disinterested and rewarded contains no contradiction, quite the reverse.14 
 
William Liujpen, the Dutch phenomenologist and Catholic priest of the Order of St.  
Augustine, also puts the matter very clearly:  
We are of the opinion that it is impossible for man to love his fellow-men in 
such a way that his love will not de facto be for the benefit of the lover 
himself. It is not possible for man to forego the fact that love, as active leaning 
to the other, is equally immediately the achievement of his own being. This, 
however, does not mean that the achievement of one’s own manhood is what 
love aims at, that this achievement is the motive [for] why man loves.   The 
opposite is true.   In love man goes forward to his destiny, he finds the 
fulfillment of his manhood, on condition that this fulfillment be not the motive 
of his love.15  
 
Fénelon put it thusly:  
 
The will is passive in the sense that it sets aside the anxiety associated with 
hope and fear so that it is receptive to the will of God. But, the will is active 
in the sense that it is prepared to act or not act. The will is also silent, but not 
inactive. The silence involves the cessation of all useless and unquiet thoughts 
that would prevent listening to God speaking within us. When I say silence, 
I mean an operation of the soul, and an intellectual operation, accompanied by 
affection and the action of the will. When I say that the soul imposes silence 
upon herself, I mean an action of the soul which makes a free choice, and that 
also with a love that is meritorious. In short, this silence is an actual fidelity of 
the soul, who, in her most profound peace, prefers to listen to the interior 
spirit of grace which is then speaking to her, rather than to give her attention to 
anything else…The soul will pay no more attention to these things than a 
mathematician, who is making deep calculations and speculations, will allow 
the involuntary sight of the flies that are buzzing around him to become part 
and parcel of his speculations.16  
 
Pure love is theocentric. The starting point of Fénelon’s thought is that God is all.  Man's 
true essence and fulfillment lie in his relationship with God, and man's true end is union with 
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God as the common universal good.  This means that the true end of the individual is a 
relationship with the whole rather than his own particular ends. Finding the true self comes by 
way of union with something greater than itself.  This also means that there is an emphasis on 
corporate, rather than individual existence.  Through disinterestedness, the will relates the self 
to the whole, not to itself as a part separate from the whole.  The good in a man is “perfectly 
realized in God, the universal, prime and perfect cause of all good; therefore, he is more pleased 
with its existence in God than in himself, and so with a love of ‘friendship’ a man naturally 
loves God more than himself.”17  
There are scriptural bases for Fénelon’s idea of the corporate essence of man’s union 
with God. “Don’t you know that you yourselves are God’s temple and that God’s Spirit lives 
in you; you are not your own.”18 The principal law, which is the end of all others, is the great 
commandment of love according to scripture: “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and 
with all your soul and with all your mind.”19 Fénelon interpreted these scriptures thusly: 
He who loves not, does nothing….This love, when it is rooted in the heart, is the 
Holy Spirit dwelling is us as in His temple. God is love; and he who loves 
until he becomes all love, is transformed into God, and is made one with 
Him…Until the creature loves, he only corresponds imperfectly with the end 
of his creation. Then there remains no more self-interest, no more self-seeking, 
no other will than the will of our Father…20 Through love, God and man are one. 
“Thou art nearer to us than we are unto ourselves.”21 “Love…is much more God 
than ourselves: it is God Himself, loving Himself in our hearts…The more we 
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18 1 Corinthians 3:16; 1 Cor 6:19; cf. 2 Cor 6:16: “For we are the temple of the living God. As God has 
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19 Mathew 22:28. 
 
 20 Fénelon, "He exhorts her to the practice of pure love," Letter to Madame de Maintenon, Lettres Spirituale 
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love God, the more we feel that it is God Himself, who is at the same time the 
Love and the Beloved One.”22 The spirit of God is the soul of our soul, and so it 
unites us to Himself so that we are no longer other than one spirit with God.23  
 
However, this corporate union with the whole does not negate individuality. There is 
always in this ecstatic union a self and another; the role of the individual is crucial to the nature 
of the unitive relationship between God and man, the whole and the part.  The will to love is 
necessary for this relationship.  Also, ontologism is the reference point for Fénelon's thought. 
The knowledge and experience of God are available to everyone. This ontologism is similar to 
the idea of univocity in Duns Scotus.  “The ideas of the mind are universal, eternal, and 
immutable.”24 Reason is the same in all men of all ages and countries.25 For example, it “makes 
Chinese geometricians find out much the same truths with the Europeans.”26 The knowledge and 
experience of God are the standard of all judgment.27 Their availability to the human will creates 
an inherent possibility of its connection with this standard. The import of the relationship 
between the individual and God is that the individual does not exist in an isolated vacuum of 
existentialism.  
It is important to establish the attributes of God and man in order to understand what 
type of relationship exists between them. God, who alone is infinitely perfect, is the creator of 
everything. “We may observe, at the first glance, an all-powerful hand, that is the first mover of 
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24 Fénelon, A Demonstration of the Existence of the Wisdom, 130. 
 
25 Ibid., 139. 
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every thing, in every part of the universe.”28 The distinct essences of the perfection of God as 
creator are creativity and possibility.  Fénelon cites the authority of Augustine that God has a 
libre arbitre, or arbitrary will.29 Libre arbitre refers to God's prerogative to participate in his 
creation by arbitrary acts. Fénelon also refers to this liberty as the volonté particulière of God, 
the capacity to enable good on a case by case basis. “[I]l est plus parfait à Dieu de mêler des 
volontés particulières que de se borner absolument à ses volontes générales.”30 God “chooses 
only among possible plans, and all possible plans are equally perfect.”31 He is not limited or 
determined by a necessity to choose what is most perfect because he is perfect.  
God is also the creator of all that is good. 32 His infinite goodness is the source of an 
order that is dependent, proportionate, and harmonious,33 and thus all created beings have some 
degree of goodness.34 Each is either closer in likeness to God’s perfection or farther away from 
it, between the supreme being and nothingness.35 The design of creation is that everything is 
                                                            
28 Fénelon, Selections (1829), 121. 
 
29 Fénelon, “Refutation du système du Père Malebranche,” Œuvres de Fénelon, 2, (Paris: Lefevre, 1835), 
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30 Fénelon. “Refutation,” as translated in James Herbert Davis, Jr., Fénelon (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
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31 Fénelon, “Refutation,” Œuvres (Lefevre), 2, 258.  Malebranche also used the terms general and 
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logician. See: Patrick Riley, “The General Will before Rousseau,” Political Theory, VI, 4 (1978), 486. 
 
32 Fénelon, On the Knowledge and Love of God (Norwich UK: Thomas Robinson, 1837), 30. 
 
33 Fénelon, Immortality of the Soul, 1. 
 
34 Fénelon, “Refutation du Père Malebranche,” Œuvres, vol. 2 (Gallimard, 1983), 351, 361 
 
35 Ibid., 361, n. 2 which cites Augustine. Contra Epistolam Manicaei, 11, 45, 500-502. 
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lovable according to its degree of goodness, that is to say, its likeness to God’s perfection.36 
Because God is perfect goodness, loving His infinite goodness is the principal end of man’s 
creation. Fénelon described the place of man in this design: 
It is true that He [God] wishes our happiness, but our happiness is…only a 
lesser aim, which he connects with the last and essential aim, which is his 
glory…To reach this main aim of our creation, we must prefer God to ourselves, 
and only wish for our own salvation for the sake of His glory. Otherwise we 
should reverse His order.37  
 
According to Gregory of Nyssa’s comment on Genesis, 
 
When “Scripture says that man arose last of all the animated beings,” it 'is 
simply giving us a philosophical lesson about souls, seeing the most 
complete perfection realized in the beings formed last of all, because of a 
certain necessary succession of order." We are thus being taught that “nature is 
elevated by degrees as it were, that is, through the varieties of life from the 
lower states up to the perfect.”38 
 
God is also an ever-present communicator and benevolent friend. The union of the soul with 
God is a familiarity with God so great, that no two friends upon earth converse oftener together, 
nor with greater openness of heart.”39 God is the true friend who frees,40 and he whose heart 
is united to God enjoys communion of the creature with God, the most faithful friend.41 To 
make this point, Fénelon makes an analogy between God and an earthly father.  “If a mortal 
king, or a father, through his wisdom, acquires the esteem and confidence of all his children, 
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he would be consulted, honored, believed, and obeyed.  As such, God is the king, father, and 
universal friend; He would be the living law of hearts.”42 He is benevolent and exhibits 
fatherly compassion,43 but, most importantly, he is love and goodness.  God is love.44 As 
Fénelon states it, the Christian religion is based on the love of God (for creation), while other 
religions are based on “fear of the gods.”45  
Because man is made in the image of God, he has many of the same qualities as God: 
goodness, love, possibility, creativity, and free will.  The soul is made in God’s image, so it is 
innately good and perfectible.46 However, man is finitely rather than infinitely good.47 
Furthermore, there is no one that is not endowed with some good thing which is the gift of 
God.48 “Everything has a degree of goodness in it, and the very worst men are capable of 
becoming good while they continue in this life.”49 “The love of God never looks for 
perfection in created beings.... It loves every living thing, according to their respective 
value.”50 “He who loves God, loves all his works.”51 Fénelon wrote with respect to possibility 
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and free will in man, "I am dependant [sic] upon the Supreme Being even for my will, 
nevertheless I am free. What is this dependant [sic] Liberty? I am free in my will, as God is 
in His. It is in this principally, that I am in His image, and resemble Him."52 What Fénelon 
means by dependency is that the soul is created, and thus, in accordance with the Council of 
Trent, it is indestructible.  Men then share the same type of free will as God: unfettered, 
unlimited, and creative in its possibility. 
Even with respect to grace, Fénelon took the position that God offers grace but that the 
individual can accept or refuse it. “Grace is never more strong to make the will consent, than 
the will is to resist.”53 Fénelon cited the authority of Tertullian “que la liberté que nous 
éprouvons en nous n'est qu'une image de celle de Dieu,”54 and, “ce qui est très remarquable, 
c'est que ce Père dit que notre liberté ressemble à celle de Dieu, dans un ouvrage où il veut 
montrer...que notre liberté est une perfection véritable qui vient du bon principe...[L]a liberté 
de Dieu se trouve dans les volontés qu'il a par rapport aux créatures.”55  
Although God alone is perfect, man has the quality of perfectability. Fénelon differs 
from preceding theologians because he claims the possibility of reaching this stage of 
Christian perfection in this life. Although Fénelon has described life as short and 
miserable, his emphasis is optimistically on man’s perfectibility.56  Fénelon quotes two 
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scriptures to build his argument: “I am God Almighty, walk before me and be blameless” 
and “The kingdom of God is within us.”57 “God only keeps us in the pilgrimage of this life 
to lead us to perfection.”58 Knowing and loving God is the noblest, most perfect end of 
man.59 However, “there is but a very small number of souls [who]make an end of purifying 
themselves from all self-interest,”60 and the state of perfection is not continuous even for 
them.  “Continual desire is divided into as many real acts as there are successive moments 
during which it lasts…there is nothing but the positive renewal of an act that can make that 
act continuous.”61 In other words, there might be a continuous desire to be perfect, but 
perfection exists only when it is being performed.  Here Fénelon makes the very important 
theological distinction between acts and virtues.  The former exist only while they are being 
performed; the latter are abiding habits.  For example, I make an act of faith when I tell 
God that I believe what He has revealed, on His word, but the virtue of faith is in me all the 
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time.  This distinction is equivalent to the one between instant decisions and sustaining 
intentions.”62 The habitual inclination (desire) of the heart is dispositional rather than 
rational. Habitual motive is abiding and pervasive. 
Fénelon cites Clement of Alexandria to support his idea of perfectibility. "In all our 
labours, to raise pious souls to the highest pitch of divine love…we ought not to propose the 
practice of the highest perfection, but to such souls as truly thirst after it."63 “We endeavor 
only to distinguish between the way of the perfect and that of beginners, and show more 
elevated maxims of perfection to such as are capable of receiving them.”64 “Less perfect souls 
have also a natural and deliberate love of themselves, which creates mercenary affection in the 
disposition of the will. This mercenary affection diminishes perfection of the will.”65 “Self-
love, though it be good when duly regulated, becomes the root of vices when it is not under 
any rule or government.”66 
The path of perfection does not leave one without signs of faults: 
 
God has a way of permitting certain weaknesses, quite out of keeping with 
their general excellence of character, to exist in men who are well advanced in 
the path of perfection; just as when a field is grazed[,] patches known witnesses 
are left in order to show what conditions were like before. So likewise, in the 
case of a good man, God often leaves patches to show the wretched state 
from which man has been called.67  
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The propensity to love others is another quality that man shares with God. One cannot love in a 
void.  Union is a quality of love that distinct individuals create. As Cicero wrote, “Life without 
friends is insupportable.”68 According to Fénelon, “All men should be united by the bonds of 
love.”69 Love leads to benevolence, and benevolence leads to unity. The society of men is one 
family, the father of which is God; they are one heart and soul.70 “The true way of loving 
mankind is to love them in God and for His sake.”71 “No one has ever seen God; but if we love 
one another, God lives in us and His love is made complete in us.”72 “We never love our 
neighbour so truly, as when our love for him is prompted by the love of God.  We must love God 
in them.  We must love the good things that God has endowed them with, and we must...submit 
to the privation of those things that he has denied them.”73 Everyone has some degree of 
goodness, so “we must receive from them what they are able to give us, as from trees the fruits 
that they bear.”74 “Because God bears with imperfect beings, man ought to imitate this. It is only 
imperfection that complains of what is imperfect.”75 “All other foundations for our affections 
have reference to self.  It is ourselves that we love in our friends, and this in an imperfect love. 
It is more like self-love than real friendship. When we love them with reference to self, our self-
love makes us impatient, sensitive, jealous, demanding much, ever distrusting ourselves and our 
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friends.”76 Self-love seeks obvious, refined or disguised interests.  For example, these interests 
might include money, convenience, favor; or the glory to be attained by loving; or the pleasure 
of being loved mutually.77  
In one of his letters to the Duke of Burgundy, Fénelon conveys the idea that the love of 
God ought to be the principle of action, man’s end, and his rule in everything.78 Love is a 
prescription for action, a way of life.79  Living accordingly would bring universal brotherhood 
in which the inner constitution of the community is one of harmony, peace, abundance, and 
prosperity. The principle of loving the goodness of God in others is the source of duty.80 The 
love of God demands right conduct. It bids a person to do what reason dictates be done.81 “It 
calls upon us to do from love for Him, what men of the world do from a sense of honor, or self-
love.”82 According to Christian perfection, it is not a constraint to do the things that one loves 
to do. Christian perfection increases the benevolent desire to do what one ought to do towards 
others.  In other words, an individual does what he ought to do because he wants to.  Duty and 
desire correspond. 
Also, love becomes an experience of existence as part of something in addition to and 
beyond the limits of corporeal, temporal, emotional, and rational individuality. 
When we have no longer any will for the things of time, we enter into the will 
of God, and become, in some measure, like Him, unchanging and eternal.   It is 
only through our bodies that we are subject to time. As soon as we have no 
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longer either desires or fears, with regard to the body, then we are freed from 
the law of time. The extinction of all self-will, and our detachment from all 
that is passing away, leads us to that peace of eternity for which were created.83  
 
Fénelon’s position that this end can be achieved in this lifetime, albeit it by only a few, 
differs from most Catholic theologians prior to his time.  The significance of love lies in its 
manifestation in the here and now.  Human time is moment by moment.  The Incarnation is the 
ultimate example of present love.  Eschatology is the active yearning for present relationship, 
not for end times   The connection with this timeless peace is the source of universal principles 
of virtue. The meaning of the Incarnation is a present path for living. 
Mystical living involves actively being in temporality and spirituality.  Setting aside 
egotism is not an ascetic disregard for the disinterested love of oneself or his neighbor.84 As 
Cowburn explains, 
It is impossible to abstain from willing except by refusing to make acts of the 
will— which refusal is in itself an act of the will. Not to will is not to be 
inactive, but on the contrary it is ‘to act violently’ against oneself, by virtue 
of a precise and firm decision; it is strongly to will not to act…One wills to 
will nothing.85 
 
A “violent” act of will was as common to the language of mysticism as activity. 
 The union of God and man’s will takes place in a life of action. “Love wants to be 
active.”86 Love engenders moral living.  Fenelon explained the difference between a sterile faith 
and love. 
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Reste à savoir comment on peut distinguer l'acte de foi d'avec l'acte 
d'amour. L'acte de foi, quand il est seul et sans amour, me paraît un simple 
consentement, un simple confirmation de la persuasion que l'on a sur les 
vérités révélées....L'acte d'amour me paraît un consentement et une 
confirmation de cette persuasion pour régler par elle toutes les autres 
persuasions de pratique dans le détail des mœurs. Ainsi l'acte de foi morte 
et sans charité va à un consentement spéculatif et stérile. L'acte d'amour est 
pratique et opérant.87  
Elsewhere, Fénelon quotes Paul’s letter to the Galatians 5:6: “The only thing that 
counts is faith expressing itself through love.”88 “The object of action is to will and to do 
good…Immense generosity is the result of unselfish love.”89 Love of one’s neighbor is the 
highest human expression of the love of God. “Let us pray with our duties before us. Do not 
let us make eloquent and abstract prayers that have no connection with the practice of virtue, 
but let us pray to become…more disinterested in the performance of our duties.”90 Virtue for 
Fenelon is action without self-interest. 
 
In a defense of his controversial book, Maxims of the Saints for the Inward Life, Fénelon 
states that the whole sense of his book, as well as his whole system of thought, turns upon 
correctly understanding the term “interest.”91 Interest has two meanings that correspond to the 
benevolent and egoistical parts of the self. In the first respect, interest relates to man being 
made good in the image of God.  It is indicative of congruity between the natural and 
supernatural orders.  He explains that there is a love of ourselves which is different from 
l’amour propre and an intérêt nôtre different than propre intérêt. Propre indicates a 
                                                            
87 Fénelon, “La Nature de l'homme,” Œuvres (Gallimard, 1997), vol. 2, 865. 
 
88 Ibid., 864. 
 
89 Fénelon, “1. Lettres et opuscules spirituels,” Œuvres, vol. 1 (Gallimard, 1997), 608-609. 
 
90 Fénelon, “On Piety,” Selections (1829), 9. 
 




disposition of mercenary proprietorship whereas intérêt nôtre indicates non-faulty forms of 
natural and supernatural love. “The love of ourselves, or our interest, is good in its nature, and 
good again supernaturally, when by charity it is returned to God.”92 What Fénelon means here 
is that it is in our interest to desire salvation because God wills it for man, not because man 
wills it for his own sake. To exclude the hope of salvation from this point of view would be 
monstrous according to Fénelon. In this sense there is an “indispensable necessity” to love 
oneself. Without this love, warns Fénelon, we would fall into the Manichean “hate of our 
souls.”93 Elsewhere, he warns never to “confide in those who talk of an oblivion of 
themselves, and an utter cutting off of all reflections on themselves.”94 He gives the instruction 
to “abhor that monstrous disinterestedness, which would destroy even love itself, by an 
acquiescing in the loss of eternal happiness.”95 Intérêt nôtre is the individual’s respect for his 
creation in the image and likeness of God. 
The second meaning of interest pertains to self-interest.96 When the word propre is 
attached to the words amour or intérêt, there is a denotation of ownership or entitlement.  Here 
interest is an inclination to act with selfish motives, and Fénelon declares “the whole scheme of 
my book endeavors to cut off self-interest and mercenary affection (profit and reward), all 
natural and deliberate love of ourselves."97 In this respect, self-interest is an affection that 
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signifies a complacency in and natural love of oneself.98 “When we are excited by a natural 
love of ourselves, we act upon a motive of self-interest.”99 Fénelon defines interest here as 
proprietorship, avarice, and spiritual ambition concerning reward, merit, and perfection.100 
Fénelon describes natural self-love as morally indifferent, neither good nor bad in itself, only 
imperfect.101 This natural love is a human imperfection, although it is not a sin.102 It is in the 
natural rather than supernatural order.103 Fénelon explained in his famous dispute with 
Bossuet, “Interest is an imperfection to diminish.  It is a natural, innocent, and only imperfect 
affection by comparison to the perfection of supernatural affections.  I recognize imperfections 
which are not sins. You, Bossuet, make sins all the affections which are imperfect and which 
are not elevated to the supernatural order.”104  “Interested love is not a sin, and we are 
free…to call it impurity, only because we wish thus to distinguish it from that disinterested 
love which we call pure.” 105 
This natural love is “bad when it is confined to our own persons (i.e. selfish interests)” 
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because it becomes the root of vices. It is good when it is regulated by right reason and 
conforms to public order.106 Although it is an imperfection which involves possessive aims, 
interest is not a vice per se.  It is an affection that leads to perfection by helping a person 
recognize and thereby correct his faults.107 “Interested love is found often even in very great 
saints, and it is capable of producing most excellent virtues.”108 So, Fénelon does not speak of 
eradicating natural love, only of letting it operate conjointly with grace to the end that grace 
dominates it.109 Contrary to being a vice, interest or affection is an aid that helps lead to 
perfection.110 Fénelon’s mysticism focused on detachment from sinful ways, not being saved 
from sin.  He is not focusing on the Jansenist question of grace, sin, and predestination. Also, he 
writes of annihilating selfish love, amour propre, not abandonment of the world as in Stoic 
asceticism.111  
The idea of motive is crucial to Fenelon’s thought because it defines the disposition, 
and it places the responsibility for action, especially moral action, within the individual and 
not on externalities that influence it.112 The determinant of action is the disposition of the soul.  
Fénelon concurs with Francis de Sales’s meaning of the term motive, to express the principle 
of Love which moves the soul.113 Fenelon explains in his Pastoral Letter, “By motive, I never 
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mean the external object which attracts the will, but the internal principle which determines 
it.”114 “Though the object may be the same, yet there may be different manner of desiring this 
object. Therefore, it is plain, that according to me, the formal object and the motive are not the 
same thing.”115 “The difference (between two types of interest) is in the affectation with which 
one wills, not the object itself (so, my conclusion, motive is an affection with which one 
wills).”116  
Fenelon admits that his differentiation has not exactly followed the schoolmen, but he 
cites the authority of mystics and the ancient saints, Sylvester and Silvius.117  Fénelon here has 
moved away from Thomism that binds love and appetite. The significance of Fenelon’s idea of 
motive is that the nucleus of action is within the free individual.  The determinant of action is a 
quality, or disposition, within the soul, not an external influence on it.  Fénelon’s idea of 
motive means autonomous personal responsibility for action.  Here is the whole core of 
Fénelon’s political thought.  Autonomous personal responsibility for moral action as 
disinterestedness is the vital building block of sustainable civic society.  No institutional 
mechanisms are sustainable without authentic, disinterested motive. 
What Fénelon means by motive relates to his understanding of desire. I have said that 
love is a desire of the beloved object, and that is true in one sense, although in another 
sense, a love that is pure and peaceful, is not an eager desire. What is commonly called 
a desire, is an uneasiness, a transport of the soul, which longs after some object that 
she does not possess; in this sense, a love that is wholly peaceful can never be a 
desire: but if we mean by desire, the habitual inclination of the heart, and its close 
union with God, then pure love is also a desire; for indeed whoever loves God, wishes 
all that God wishes.  He desires his own salvation, not for his own sake, but for God’s 
sake, who wills to be glorified by it, and who has commanded us to will it with Him.118  
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Fénelon describes five states of love according to these two meanings of 
interest, which parallel the benevolent and egoistic qualities of the self.119 The first 
four states involve various degrees of self-interest whereas the fifth is void of it, but 
includes interest in the sense of loving oneself for the sake of God. The first four are 
imperfect, and the fifth is the perfection of Christian love.  He refers to the first type 
of love as servile love. "We may love God not for the sake of himself, but for some 
other good things...we hope to obtain from him...It is a hope of recompense which 
does not love God but his own self, and seeks entirely for himself, not God, but what 
comes from him.”120 There is not recognition of the love of God here at all. God is a 
means to an end.  This is a love of oneself rather than God. But, it might prepare a 
person for righteousness in the sense that it counterpoises passions and renders 
someone prudent in discerning where his true good does lie. 
The second type is love of hope, or mercenary self-love.  Fénelon also refers to it as 
concupiscential love, a concupiscent desire for happiness in which the individual knows God as 
an object and the only object which can render happiness.  God is only an instrument to be used 
acquisitively for seeking happiness. Here there is a recognition of the love of God but only for 
self-interested reasons. The self is the ultimate end in this eudemonistic type of love. 
The third type is a love of hope. There begins a genuine love of God for his sake, 
although mercenary or servile love remain mixed to some degree.121 The motive of self-interest 
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remains predominant.  Fénelon quoted Francis de Sales: “...There is a great deal of difference 
between saying; I love God for the good things I expect from him: and this expression, I love 
God only for the good things I expect from him.”122 The motive of individual happiness prevails 
over the glory of God. 
The fourth love is pure love or perfect charity. Fénelon also refers to this fourth type of 
love as interested love because there remains a mixture of self-interest. Yet here the 
disinterested motive over-rules it.  This love prefers God before anything else and seeks God for 
His sake.123 The soul relates and subordinates itself to the ultimate end, the glory of God.124 
God is not sought primarily as a means of happiness. 
The fifth love of God is the love of pure charity without any mixture of the motive of 
self-interest.125 Neither the fear of punishments nor the desire of rewards has any share in this 
love.126 There is no more regard for merit or perfection or for the self-interested happiness, 
which is found in loving God. The soul loves itself not out of self-interest but because God 
wills that it be so. This love negates self-interest and drives out fear or solicitude for its 
advantage. It does not emanate from emotion or reason, but from emptying the soul of both. 
 Fénelon also uses the threefold classification of slaves, wage-earners and sons to 
define types of love for God. 
Mankind do not comprehend what the love of God is; therefore they fear that they 
cannot realize this filial and intimate communion of children with a beneficent 
parent. They think only of a powerful and severe master…The love of God is an 
oppressive debt that they think they must pay; they try to elude it by the 
performance of certain ceremonies and an external homage, that they would 
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substitute for a sincere and practical love of God.127  
 
Many do good only with reluctance to escape punishment.128 Elsewhere he comments: “Too 
many fear God without loving him; as children fear the instructor who chastises them, or as an 
evil servant fears the stripes of the master whom he serves selfishly and without attachment. 
Would we accept such treatment from a son, or even from a servant, as we offer to God?”129  
Fénelon distinguished a superior and an inferior part of the soul. In so doing, he 
presented his version of established higher-self doctrine.  One source of this doctrine is Pauline 
scripture that describes the inner self as tormented.  For example, “If anyone would come after 
me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and follow me.130 “Set your minds on things 
above, not on earthly things. For you died, and your life is now hidden with Christ in God.”131 
Another source of the doctrine of the higher and lower self hearkens back to Plato's sections of 
the soul in the parable of the line.  These sections are also referred to as mental processes and 
forms of existence. 
For Plato, in ascending order, the sections of the soul are eikasia, pistis, dianoia, and 
noesis and episteme.132 In other words, the sections are imagination, opinion, reasoning, and 
understanding.  They are ordered according to the degree of clarity and content which each 
shares in truth, the Good. There is a further division between abstract and epic thought, also 
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referred to as the intelligible and visible realms and as being and becoming. The philosophical 
doctrine of the higher and lower selves stems from this division. 
The lowest form of existence consists of images, shadows, or reflections. In the second 
form of existence the models of images, that is to say, living creatures, plants, and 
manufactured things, are regarded as the measures of truth and untruth. In the stage of 
dianoia, the soul uses hypotheses based upon the images which were models at a lower level.  
Because the hypotheses are based in the lower processes, the soul cannot reach a first principle 
at this level. Such is the case, for example, in the mathematical sciences. In the highest stage, 
reason uses hypotheses as first principles for stepping stones in order to reach that which is 
beyond hypothesis, the first principle of all that exists.  This intelligible reality is contemplated 
by the science of dialectic.133 
The Platonic simile of the sun is also a point of reference for Fénelon, who refers to God 
as the Light of the world and the Sun of the soul.134 According to Plato, the sun is not sight, but 
it is the cause of it and is seen by it. 
[T]he sun is the offspring of the Good, which the Good begot as analogous 
to itself. What the Good itself is in the world of thought in relation to the 
intelligence and things known, the sun is in the visible world in relation to 
sight and things seen. Whenever the eye of the soul is fixed upon that 
upon which truth  and  reality  shines,  it  understands  and  knows  and  
seems  to  have intelligence, but whenever it is fixed upon what is mixed 
with darkness—it opines and is dimmed.135  
 
Fénelon was not the first Christian thinker to assimilate Plato's parable of the line and 
simile of the sun and the metaphors of light and darkness.  He states, “He [God] has given us 
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corporeal eyes to see the light of the sun: shall we believe that he has given us the eyes of the 
mind, which are capable of discerning his eternal truth, without willing that the same should be 
known to us?”136 He sheds “on the soul that light which opens the mind to truth.”137 “God 
himself should become the I of the soul.”138  
The Augustinian tradition transformed the Platonic Good sought by the dialectic to God 
turned to by the will.  The highest form of existence in the higher self was redefined as love or 
contemplation instead of understanding.  The object of man's search changed from knowledge to 
God.   In the Augustinian tradition love leads to cognition, whereas for Plato cognition led to 
love.  Succeeding generations of mystics including Bernard of Clairvaux and John of the Cross 
referred to this doctrine of the higher and lower selves. Thus, this doctrine was accessible to 
Fénelon through the mainstream of mysticism. 
Fenelon’s use of the metaphysics of the lens of the eye represents a specific and 
important development because he incorporates into it the Cartesian metaphysical distinction 
between the mind and body.  Fénelon credits the analogy of the eye as a lens to Anaxagoras. 
With this analogy, he sets aside Thomistic interpretations of Augustine that admit the will as 
appetitive. Instead, Fénelon defined the pure and authentic will as disinterested according to the 
ecstatic, unitive, and contemplative mysticism that was outlined in the last chapter. In so doing, 
he even went a step further than Descartes to separate metaphysically not only the body and 
mind but also the intellect and will. The will is contemplative reality.  Fénelon’s analogy 
between the human lens of the eye and light maintains a distinction between human and divine 
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will.  This distinction metaphysically establishes the human will as completely autonomous, 
aside from the fact that it was created free. The divine and human will have two commonalities: 
freedom and light.  The divine will is the source than emanates light as goodness, and then the 
human will is free to experience light through the lens (conative filter) of the mind (finite 
interpretative faculties of the appetitive senses and reason).139  
In ascending order for Fénelon, the parts of the soul are: senses, imagination, reason, and 
contemplation.  "The inferior part consists of the imagination and the senses; but the 
imagination is incapable of reflecting.  The superior part therefore only reflects, which consists 
of the understanding and will."140 In effect, Fénelon makes the division of the lower part of the 
soul as senses and imagination, just as Plato does with imagination and opinion. He also 
makes the division of the higher part of the soul as reason and contemplation, in the same way 
as Plato does with reason and understanding.  Contemplation is in the heart of the will.141 
Fénelon speaks of contemplation as the eye of the soul as Plato would speak of dialectic as 
such.  
Fénelon applies established theological distinctions between meditation and 
contemplation to his higher-self doctrine. Meditative reality is discursive and sensate whereas 
contemplative reality is non-discursive and non-sensate.  These theological distinctions 
establish the metaphysical distinction between intellect and will.  The distinction originates with 
Hugo of St. Victor (1096-1141).  Meditation implies a search for truth, similar to prayer, whose 
communicative objective is to kindle the love of God in human hearts through listening and 
reflection. There are stages of contemplation, the highest of which presupposes that the soul has 
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overcome desire, is illuminated by the light of truth, and is filled with inexplicable joy and 
peace because it has attained the perfect love of God. 142Awareness in this stage can only be 
explained by intuitive interpretation or analogies, such as the fulfillment of nuptial union. 
According to Fénelon, the state of contemplation begins with annihilation of self-interest 
but never annihilation of the self.  There is a transformation.  “The end of our creation, indeed, 
is to enjoy our God, even in this life; but, alas! How few there are who ever come to know the 
pure joy which his presence gives.”143 When Fenelon uses the term end here, he is referring to 
the result of, not the initiating motive of action. He is using the Augustinian interpretation of 
enjoyment as that which flows from the love of God. Augustine would say that one loves 
oneself perfectly only when he loves God without reservation.144 For Fenelon, enjoyment is not 
a possession, but a union of love with God out of a total respect for Him.  This is contrary to the 
type of enjoyment men commonly seek in created good. To desire to enjoy is to desire to love 
without any self-interest, to love disinterestedly.145 Love is a willful act to reject self-interest. 
Paradoxically, this rejection leads to self-fulfillment.  Love becomes an experience of goodness, 
happiness, simplicity, and peace. 
One of the most important dynamics of Fénelon’s theology focuses on the internal effort 
of man to relinquish his selfish nature in favor of his true nature to love God. The significance 
lies in the action of striving for perfection. Denial of selfish love “violently” checks the part of 
man’s soul, which is his own idol, to bring him to love himself by way of the charity of God, 
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the source of his soul.146 Some of Fénelon’s theological works, such as Maxims of the Saints for 
Inward Life and the defenses thereof, focus on the striving of the few for pure love.147 Other 
works as well as Fénelon’s correspondence focus on the striving for perfection by those whose 
love is mixed with degrees of interest.  Perfection is indeed the aim; yet Fénelon realizes that 
this will only be reached by a few. 
The themes of his theology incorporate not only the idea of perfection, but imperfection 
and perfectibility.  The end and the effort are important.  Perfectibility leads either to pure or 
impure (imperfect) love.  What stands out is the internal effort of the self. That is a person’s 
search for his identity and capacity, which he then establishes as benevolently as possible in 
relation to another, to God or to other people. There is a clear distinction between the lover and 
the beloved before there is a transformation of unity in the spirit of infinite Goodness. 
Fénelon clarifies the process of renouncing the isolating, mercenary will in one of his 
letters to Madame Guyon. Fénelon is emphasizing that he does not agree with any type of 
Quietism that would negate the ontological existence of the autonomous will of the 
individual. In every moment of perfectibility, the will experiences death, transformation, and 
resurrection. Fénelon relates the language of the death and resurrection of Jesus in his idea 
of human perfectibility: 
On the renunciation of the will, I do not believe it is perfect at the moment of 
mystical death. The soul still needs to be purified in its resurrection. But to 
purify is to cleanse an impurity. The soul has nothing impure other than willed 
proprietorship. I say voluntary proprietorship because there is no more true 
ownership where there is no ownership of will. After what one calls death, it is 
therefore necessary for some proprietary will to remain that soils the soul a little 
and needs to be purified. This is what you call rust. Although it is a good 
comparison, it does not exactly show the nature of the impurity. The soul, being 
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pure spirit, has no rust, but it retains an attachment to itself that we call 
proprietary, and that tarnishes itself as rust tarnishes the body. I can understand 
nothing impure in the soul other than what is voluntary and proprietary. I 
conclude then that the soul enters immediately in God as soon as it goes out of 
itself. It finishes going out of itself when it finishes losing itself in God. There is 
no emptiness as the soul is filled with God…There is, at the bottom, emptiness of 
self to the measure than one fills up with God. How would it empty itself if God 
were not there to empty it? The plentitude of God makes room for Himself when 
He enters. Thus, the heart is never empty an instant. God opens Himself by 
pushing outside the pride that filled the space. Being in God is being entirely 
resigned of one’s will and wanting no more than divine movement. This is what 
happens to the soul by annihilation, transformation and consummate 
resurrection.148  
 
Here we come face to face with what could be one of Fénelon’s most puzzling claims 
“l’être libre et voulant doit se regarder sans cesse comme un demi-néant.” The solution to this 
puzzle refers to human experience as ontological. Fénelon precisely uses the word “demi” to 
indicate the human being is something, not nothing.  Fénelon then explains that being is will and 
intellect. These qualities are squelched, or hardly anything, unless they are connected to 
something.  Will and intellect need a rapport to be meaningful. This most meaningful rapport is 
with infinite goodness. This rapport cannot be experienced unless the will experiences the fact 
that it is finite, demi-néant.  As Karl Rahner explained: “The more really special a thing is, the 
more abundance of being it has in itself, the more intimate unity and participation there will be 
between it and what is other than itself.”149 He also said, “union and distinction are not 
opposites, but correlates which increase together.”150 What Fénelon means is that a human being 
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would be perfected only finitely, as half nothing, without a rapport with what is beyond the self. 
Fénelon’s claim is similar to the scholastic thesis: ens et bonum convertuntur, 
where bonum means perfectum in se: that is, the higher a being is (the more inner unity it has), 
the more inner perfection it has. Although it is important to keep in mind that Fénelon, like 
Descartes, does not regard the will as appetitive in the scholastic sense. There is a natural love 
that is good, not a Manichean hate of soul. Natural good is Thomistic in the sense that it is 
good when love rests in perspective of the whole.     Here there is a respect for the self as a 
created being.  This natural love is good when it does not terminate in itself.151 There is 
consummation in union, not recompense. A motive of recompense is a mercenary motive.152 
This is very contrary to Bossuet and the amour propre society of Louis XIV where 
expectation, even beatitude, is part and parcel of motive. For Fénelon, self-interest is 
selfishness.153  
Annihilation of selfishness in Fénelon’s thought is different from that of Pascal’s. For 
the former, God does not expect absolute perfection, as this is found in God alone.  Fénelon 
refers to hate of egoistic tendency. This is not Pascalian hate of the self. Laurence Delivlliars 
distinguished Pascal and Fénelon well.154 For Pascal, interiority is not the bearer of truth; truth is 
elsewhere “outside” in Jesus Christ, the Scriptures, and the Eucharistic body.  For Fénelon, on 
the contrary, le moi is never empty of the presence of God. It is the infinite contained in the 
finite. All are capable of goodness in temporal life.155 For Pascal, man is marked by an 
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absence, a masqued misery, a grandeur that it has lost. 156 
Selflishness engenders dejection and misery. “The whole source of your misfortune is 
that you cannot get out of yourself….[G]oing out of ourselves is what we want….[G]o out of 
yourself, and then you will be in peace...but, how shall we go out of ourselves?”157 Fénelon 
instructs that we form the habit of fidelity by turning again to God each and every time we 
stray.158 The question is not, what we feel; but, what we will….If any thing is capable of setting 
the heart at large, and making it free, it is this abandon. It diffuses in the heart a peace and a 
justice (Isaiah).”159 “We abandon ourselves, and where we die to ourselves, by suppressing 
whatever is of self.”160 This daily accomplishment…is the coming of His kingdom within 
us.”161 “Die to all wills of our own...it is in this bottom of the abyss [that] we begin to take 
footing...This oblivion is an annihilation of self-love...then the heart enlarges.”162 Here, in the 
Augustinian sense, one turns again toward God.163 At the point of sortir de soi, a humbled soul 
is more annihilated and dead to all self-desire than strong souls, who enjoy in peace the fruits of 
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their virtue.164  
This order of this internal effort follows the paradoxical message of Jesus: “Whoever 
finds his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it.”165 Because the 
individual is made in the image of God, he will find the “kingdom within” when he loves God 
without self-interest.166 He is not his own.167 “Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done, on earth 
as it is in heaven.”168 In other words, when someone vacates his own selfish interest, then the 
will, that is to say, the kingdom of God, can occupy the heart. The order of the personal 
perfectibility takes place inwardly before it extends outwardly.  This gain, or expansion of the 
heart, is the nature of the true self.  
We must refer everything to God or to ourselves. If we refer everything to 
ourselves, we have no other God except this “ego” of which I have said so much. If 
on the contrary, we refer everything to God, we are in his order, and then, not 
regarding ourselves more than his other creatures, without self-interest and with the 
one object of accomplishing the will of God, we shall commence that self- 
renunciation.169  
 
This effort of perfectibility is a matter of the heart, not the understanding.170  
The word “heart” in the scriptures and elsewhere means inner subjectivity of thoughts 
and volitions, not the emotions.171 At the same time, “heart” does not refer to rationality.  
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According to Pascal, “It is the heart that perceives God, not reason. That is what faith is: God 
perceptible to the heart, not to reason.”172 "The heart has its reasons reason does not know."173 
Fénelon describes the heart as an inclination or disposition toward something.  This inclination 
is a desire to the degree that it is toward union with God.174 “It is not a question of knowing 
much, having great talents, or even doing grand actions. It is only necessary to have the heart 
and desire for good. External works are the fruits and follow inseparably from true piety; but 
true piety, which is the source of these works, is found in the depth of the heart.”175 The heart 
is first of all the command someone has over himself. It is the liberty or power that a person 
has to determine himself.176 Then, the determination of choice follows in one direction or 
another.  Fénelon cites Francis de Sales who “distinguishes between sentir, to have a perception 
of something, and consentir, to agree to something. Man cannot necessarily command his 
perception of, or feeling for, a thing, but his agreement or consent he can command.” 
Christian Perfection is victory over self-love.  Perfection requires surpassing human 
respect, including the needs for pride, achievement, and recognition. “Love…is much more 
God than ourselves: it is God Himself, loving Himself in our hearts…The more we love God, 
the more we feel that it is God Himself, who is at the same time the Love and the Beloved 
One.”177 “You must seek peace…through the interior dispositions of your soul…The peace of 
                                                            
172 Ibid., 327, citing Pascal, Pensées, no. 225 Brunschvicg, 278, Cowburn translation. 
 
173 Pascal, Pensées, §4, 81. 
 
174 Fénelon, "Upon the prayer of contemplation, and upon the different degrees of Christian perfection," 
Letter to Sister Charlote of Saint-Cyprian, a Carmelite Nun, no. 13, March 10, 1696. Spiritual Letters, 44. 
 
175 Fénelon,,“Au Marquis de Blainville” Lettres et opuscules spirituels, 35, Œuvres, (Gallimard),, 1, 724. 
 
176 See discussion of this subject in Cowburn, Love and the Person, 22, note 1. 
 




God can only exist perfectly in the utter annihilation of all self-will and all self-interest.”178 
“Your peace will be deeper than the depths of the sea…It is in this state of despair that you will 
find peace.”179  
Love can never be satisfied with loving; it incessantly seeks to increase 
itself, by destroying in us everything that is not itself. Although this love 
may not say formally, “I wish to increase”;…nevertheless, it always tends, 
by a peaceful and uniform progress, to destroy all obstacles, and even the 
slightest imperfections, and to unite itself more and more with God. This is 
the true desire, in which the whole of the interior life consists.180 
 
This chapter will draw toward a conclusion by presenting the experience of 
perfectibility in Fénelonean terms.  It will focus on how love moves the will. There is not a 
linear progression of perfectibility according to time.  Also, there can be simultaneously 
varying degrees of misery, dejection, receptivity, humility, renunciation, transformation, 
and unselfish love. The will can have egoistic and benevolent inclinations at the same time. 
The engagement of the will in moment-by-moment perfectibility toward amour pur 
demonstarates self-determination.  Misery, dejection, and self-examination lead to humility 
and perfectibility though meditative experience. Humility most immediately connects the 
contemplative and meditative inner llife. The journey is reminiscent of Augustine’s 
Confessions.  Fénelon did, as a matter of fact, write that he preferred Augustine to all 
others.  The Fénelonean inner journeys of perfectibility also prefigure those of Rousseau. 
The following three segments will pave the way toward understanding the moral issues 
underlying Fénelon’s political theory in the next chapter.181  
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Misery and Dejection in the Depths of Amour propre 
In his explanation of dejection, Fénelon explains the misery that stems from the 
limitations of selfishness. There is no more perfect description of the dilemma of perfectibility 
than the lament of the apostle Paul: “For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I 
do….For I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out.”182 According to 
Fénelon, “the fault in us which is the source of all the others is love of ourselves, to which 
we relate everything.”183  
For Fénelon, “[s]elf-love is…ingenious in methods of self-torture.”184   
 
Love of self is the stumbling-block. To be shut in on oneself is really to be in prison. 
True freedom is only to be found when one escapes oneself….The poison itself is its 
own antidote. If one presses self-love to extremities, it is unable to disguise itself or 
hide any longer…You ask me what is the cure for this love of self?  There is no 
question of a cure; the thing must be killed…What then is to be done?  To strip oneself 
bare; to ask for nothing and keep nothing.185 
 
“The operation is painful in the extreme; but we all must die. So let yourself die, and you will 
live.”186  The ego is never satisfied, and its efforts to satisfy itself lead to spiritual abyss. Le 
Moi is conscientious of its imperfections and mistakes. If it is wounded, it gets entangled in 
assuaging itself. Through prideful and vain internal struggles it is incessantly consumed with 
attempts to perfect itself, something which can never be accomplished because man is 
imperfect in nature.  In short, the lack of humility leads to individual and human misery 
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because “mankind are great enemies to themselves.”187 “[T]rue peace is only to be found in 
death.”188 Here Fénelon denotes spiritual death of self-love.  There is a kinship with Socrates, 
who, upon his death, remarked that there is no difference between life and death.  Life is 
authentically situated in Universal Goodness both temporally in finitude and spiritually in 
infinitude.  
Dejection proceeds from the desire of being assured in and consoled by the love of 
oneself.  Human nature is impatient and wants to see its own advancement; at the sight of fault, 
the pride of le moi frets and considers this fretting as consoling penitence.  Le moi wants the 
pleasure of seeing itself perfect through self-love and chides itself for not being perfect, as if it 
could unite itself to the God of peace by losing its peace within.   It seeks imaginary relief and 
continually oppresses and tortures itself with struggle.189 “When you torment yourself about 
your miseries, you are alone with yourself.”190 A person is sunk in abysmal mire and cannot get 
out; “the whole source of your misfortune is you cannot get out of yourself.”191 “The true 
source of our misfortune is our pride, our vanity.”192 Amour propre is monstrous, poisonous, 
and enslaving.  Self-idolatry is a charming delirium, and “there is no peace except in the 
destruction of our self-love.193  
The problem is: “That ‘I’ is still with you, an idol which you have not yet broken. You 
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wish to go to God with your whole heart, but not by the loss of the I; on the contrary, you seek 
the I in God.  You are seeking yourself, when you think you are only seeking him.”194 “[O]ur 
own passions are worse than the most cruel tyrants.  If we obey them only in part, we must 
maintain a continual contest with them, and have hardly time to breathe. Then they betray us, 
they distract our hearts,…and never say, ‘It is enough.’” 195“What we do from fear is always 
wearisome, hard, painful, and oppressive.”196 “[P]reserve me from the fatal slavery that men 
madly call liberty.  With thee alone is freedom. It is thy truth that makes us free. To serve thee 
is true dominion.”197 False wisdom, which is always self-centered and jealous of its own 
perfection, suffers a sharp pain every time that it sees the least stain upon itself. When we are 
not disturbed by restless reversions to self, we begin to be free with true freedom.  Fénelon 
continues to explain that it is not that the simple, self-detached man does not work for his 
perfection. The problem is that he only thinks of his self-interested “virtues” to accomplish the 
will of God. Thus, whoever works to let go of himself cuts at one blow the root of all his vices 
and finds in the simplest renunciation of himself the seed of all virtues. The more we give 
ourselves up, the more we enlarge our hearts so that we are ready for everything.  We must lose 
ourselves if we want to find ourselves again in God.198  
How do we go out of ourselves according to Fénelon?  By doing nothing.  Humility 
requires silence and stillness to escape pride. “We are inspired, but we silence it by outer noise 
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and passions within.”199 “We do the will of God in doing nothing because we break our own 
will; and, consequently, we do a great deal, although we may appear to do nothing.”200   “[God] 
wishes to crucify you by an apparent prosperity, and to show you the depths of the nothingness 
of the world by the misery that is attached to all that world counts as most dazzling.”201 This is 
not a question of feeling or reason, but of will. All is done without doing anything, except being 
led by whatever God wills.  “The peace of God can only exist perfectly in the utter annihilation 
of all self-will and all self-interest.”202 This accomplishment of the will of God is the coming of 
his kingdom within us.203 Fénelon quotes 2 Corinthians 3:17: “‘Where the spirit of the Lord is, 
there is liberty;’ where there is constraint trouble and slavery, there is our own spirit, and an 
excessive love of self.” 
This silence is not an inaction or an idleness of the soul, but merely a cessation of 
useless thoughts that would be out of place when God wishes to make Himself 
heard. What we have to do, then, is to give simple attention to Him. When I say 
silence, I mean an operation of the soul, and an intellectual [reflexive] operation, 
accompanied by affection and the action of the will. When I say that the soul 
imposes silence upon itself, I mean an action of the soul which makes a free 
choice with love.  Here, the soul will pay no more attention to anything else than 
a mathematician, who is making deep calculations and speculations, will allow 
the involuntary sight of the flies that are buzzing around him to become part and 
parcel of his speculations.204  
 
The second remark to be made upon contemplation is that this pure and direct 
state, into which no image or sensation is voluntarily admitted, can never in this 
life be continual and uninterrupted; there must always be intervals in which we 
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can and in which we must, having regard for our own needs, practice distinct acts 
of every virtue, such as patience, humility, obedience, watchfulness, and 
contrition: in a word, we must fulfill all the interior and exterior duties marked out 
for us in the Gospel. Far from neglecting these things in a state of perfection, we 
can only judge of the degree of perfection to which a soul has attained by her 
faithfulness in observing all these things.205  
 
Again, Fenelon emphasizes the cooperation between the contemplative and discursive 
life. 
Balthazar Alvarez says to St. Teresa that, when contemplation fails, we must 
always fall back upon [discursive and reflexive] meditation, like a sailor who 
makes use of his oars when the wind no longer inflates his sails. This rule 
concerns those souls who are still in a mixed state; but in whatever high and 
habitual state of prayer we may be, we are never dispensed from making distinct 
acts of virtue…; on the contrary, these acts of virtue ought to be the fruit of our 
contemplation.206 
“All the better, indeed, if your courage fails you. In such a strait the abandonment of one’s self 
to God is a never-failing remedy.  ‘My strength is made perfect in weakness,’ St. Paul says.”207 
And when he asks to be delivered from this weakness, God replies that it is out of our 
infirmities that we should seek perfection.  Perfect yourself therefore by the experience of your 
own imperfection and by humble recourse…‘Blessed are the poor in spirit.’”208 “‘Where the 
spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom’: where the spirit of constraint, worry and servitude is, 
there is selfishness and too great an obsession with self.”209 “That liberty consists in seeking 
love which best draws us into communion with the Beloved.”210  
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In his Discourse on Christian Perfection Fénelon emphasizes self-examination in 
Christian perfection.211 This process incorporates contemplative reality by means of discursive 
reflexivity for everyday life.  The wise first step in the progress of the soul is to meditate upon 
its true interests. This is wise self-love.212 Self-examination is a process of knowing one’s 
uniqueness.  It is a process of knowing what part of the self to forget so that the individual can 
love purely, especially in relation to God and fellow men. 
The purpose of self-examination is to prepare a person for perfection by preserving 
humility as well as fear and distrust of oneself. Man is subject to ignorance, mistakes, 
uncertainty, and irregularity with respect to what he wills and thinks. When Fénelon describes 
the weakness of the human mind, he says that it “is ignorant of its own thoughts and wills. It 
knows not, with certainty, either what it believes, or wills. It often fancies to believe and will 
what it neither believes nor wills…It is liable to mistake, and its greatest excellence is to 
acknowledge it.  To the error of its thoughts, it adds the disorder and irregularity of its will and 
desires.”213 Moreover, self-examination prepares a person for self-abasement.  “The best and 
highest use of your mind, is to learn to distrust yourself, to renounce your own will, and to 
submit to the will of God.”214 He explains that examination of a person’s past and current life 
prevents presumptuous or illusory confidence about his virtue.  An individual must consider 
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whether his piety is the type which makes him forget himself except to correct his faults or 
perform a duty. 
Fenelon cautions that the process of self-examination does not involve scrupulous 
obsession with faults.215 Such concern would be a self-defeating return to self-idolatry.  “A 
calculated abandonment of self is no abandonment.”216 “True love is too simple to be 
scrupulous.”217 When a person fails to do the will of God, the remedy is to begin again and to 
do it better, always with the hope of being able to do it in the end.218 The remedy is not judging 
oneself harshly or viewing God as a spy waiting to ensnare. Although the process of self- 
examination involves discursive reason and reflexivity, the relinquishment of selfishness is a 
matter of the heart, viz. disposition of the will.  Pure love lets go of scruples to open the way for 
a pure relationship with God.  “All that your heart does freely is well done…There is no 
constraint except in self-love….[ T]he ‘I,’  which promised us liberty, binds us in fetters of 
iron219  
The result, although not the purpose, of self-examination and annihilation 
is liberty as Fenelon understands it. Fearlessness of mortal death indicates that 
self-concern has been vanquished because the experience of the pure love sustains 
eternally, during and after mortal life. “As soon as we have no longer either desires or 
fears, with regard to the body, then we are freed from the law of time.”220 Fénelon 
                                                            
215 This idea of scruples is a common theme: cf. Letters no. 68, 70, 71, 98, 126, 128, 129, 135, 137, 161 in 
Fénelon, Spiritual Letters. 
 
216 Fénelon, “Letter 75,” Letters of Love and Counsel, 291. 
 
217 Fenelon, Spiritual Letters no. 161, 269. 
 
218 Fénelon, Selections from the Writings of Fenelon with a Memoir of His Life (Boston: Munroe and Co., 
1859), 270. 
219 Fénelon, “That there is no true liberty but in the love of God,” Spiritual Letters, 368. 
 




acknowleged this state of freedom in Socrates. “‘Where the spirit of the Lord is, 
there is freedom’: where the spirit of constraint, worry and servitude is, there is 
selfishness and too great an obsession with self.”221  
Humility 
 
 The concept of humility is fundamental to that of pure love, and Fénelon uses categorical 
language to explain humility.  It is the link between the contemplative reality of pure love and its 
temporal actualization. “It is the…source, original, and guardian of all virtues.”222 Humility 
creates a space to isolate the will from pride and open it toward otherness. This space is vital in 
Fénelon’s theological, moral, and political thought. The inner silencing of pride as well as 
appetite inspires civic virtue. 
“The more one loves purely, the more humility is perfect.”223 The works of God are all 
founded in humility.224 Humility is the basis of Christianity, and we shall never have any virtue 
or any degree of holiness, if we are not humble.225 This virtue is the principle of true 
greatness;226 it is the foundation of peace with all men.227 Fénelon’s political theory depends 
on the virtuous action of each individual. Humility is the foundation of civic peace because it 
is first the source of inner peace and proper direction for virtuous civic participation. 
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There are two inseparable aspects of humility: the presence of God everywhere and the 
abyss of nothing from which God drew man and over which man remains suspended.228 
Humility requires losing our “false and dazzling” ideas of what is really our own 
nothingness.229 Appetite and pride are nothing; there are only two truths in the world for 
Fenelon: God is all, and the creature is nothing.230 True humility stays in its place of lowliness, 
which is ‘to love being nothing’.  Anyone who is conceitedly conscious of lowering himself 
“is not yet in his place which is beneath all lowering.”231 We are nothing in ourselves. All of 
the good in us comes from and belongs to God.232 This concept of nothingness of the 
dependent creature stems from mystic thought.  At issue is the ontological nature of the reality 
of creation. The mystic’s answer is that creation has no reality apart from God.233 The things 
of creation are like rays of light which could not exist apart from their source.  They are related 
to God as light is related to fire. Omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent infinity is 
contrasted with dependent finitude that is nothing without being created.  Created humans do 
indeed participate in Ultimate Goodness, but only finitely. Humility is an appropriate order. 
The scripture 1 John 1:5 declares, “God is light, and in him is no darkness at all.” 
Fénelon’s intent expresses the metaphor of light and darkness in the Sermon on the Mount, 
“You are the light of the world.”  People do not light a lamp and place it under a bowl. 
“Instead, they put in on its stand, and it gives light to everyone in the house. In the same way, 
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let your light shine before men that they may see your good deeds.”234 The apostle Luke adds, 
“For there is nothing hidden that will not be disclosed.”235 This is a Christological 
interpretation of the words of Jesus in John 8:12: “I am the light of the world; whoever follows 
me will never walk in darkness, but will have the light of life.” Humility is the key to the light 
of life that is offered to free will through the Incarnation.  It is the key to the ability of the finite 
to experience infinite goodness as it is meant to do.  The physical death and resurrection of 
Jesus was the means by which God manifested to the individual how free will can crucify 
personal pride with the same humility that enabled Jesus to carry all human effects of pride to 
the cross. 
Fénelon used austere language to describe man’s humility toward the will of God. “It is 
love which makes us really humble, because it makes everything that is not the Beloved look 
infinitely vile.”236 It requires stripping, becoming naked, resigning, renouncing, abandoning, 
forgetting, divesting, strongly separating from, annihilating, and abasing ourselves.237 Humility 
goes beyond sacrificing pride and vanity.  The humble person wants, seeks, assumes, and 
expects nothing. The humble person speaks of himself as he would speak of another.238 
“Everything is the same then, because the ‘I’ is lost and annihilated.  The ‘Í’ is no more myself 
than another.”239  
The transformed soul is like a ball on flat ground that can move in any direction.  In this 
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state, the sole principle of being and movement for the soul is love.  The soul is 
unobscured by sin and transformed as the image of God more clearly aligns itself and 
renews similitude.  The soul says with St. Paul, “I live, but it is not I, but Jesus Christ, 
who lives in me” so that His life may be revealed in mortal flesh.240  
 
In this state man can hear the will of God. The purpose of these austere measures is to silence 
pride and create the inner space where the meaning of purpose can be realized as yearning 
toward greater goodness. 
Stripped of qualities, talents, and virtues, humility gives and takes away all by showing 
us that we have nothing; all belongs to God; we are reduced to total spiritual poverty. Fénelon 
quotes from the Beatitudes:  “Blessed are the poor in Spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of 
God.”241 “Humility results from the reduction of the individual will to spiritual poverty when it 
realizes that it is part of infinity. 
Akin to a child, a person in the state of abasement does not know what he needs and 
lets himself be led.242 Fénelon refers to more scripture, “Let the little children come to me, 
and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of God belongs to such as these. I tell you the 
truth; anyone who will not receive the kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it.”243  
Humility is an act of the will, “an abasement to which the will consents.”244 It does 
involve practice.  According to Fénelon, the unexplainable lesson of the human spirit is “mourir 
à soi-même par la mortification, par la véritable humilité.”245 Humility is mortification, the 
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foundation of which is to know prideful defects.246 There are three defective inclinations in man, 
which humility resists: the desires to aggrandize, to enrich, and to assume all to ourselves.247 
Fénelon claims that these defects stem from pridefully and vainly attributing to oneself what 
comes from God and that we must “do violence” to these inclinations in order to practice 
humility.248  
We shall never succeed in our reformation…until we have despoiled ourselves of 
all that we attributed to ourselves…we must appropriate nothing to ourselves, 
neither talents, merit, virtue, nor even our very being; a Christian soul must know 
that all belongs to God, and that it is the possessor of nothing; it is by this, 
that, finding itself entirely stripped, nay, as it were annihilated before God, it 
becomes capable of that new life which Jesus Christ communicates to humble 
souls.249  
According to Fénelon, the self-abasement of humility has three effects with respect to 
the relationship between man and God: familiarity, friendship, and resemblance.250 First, all 
familiarity is founded in friendship, and friendship involves free access. Humility is the means 
of familiarity and free access for man and God.251 To explain this idea, Fenelon turns to 
Augustine: “God is great, God is elevated; however, if you elevate yourself, you will find 
yourself very far from Him; if you humble yourself, he will descend instantly, and you will find 
Him near you…God will humble Himself to us if we do not raise ourselves by our pride.”252 
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God communicates through prayer with those who love mortification and renounce worldly 
vanity.253 Thus, humility is a source of reciprocal communication for God and man. 
 Secondly, humility aids God’s friendship for man by making man more compatible with 
Him.254  Humility forgoes the placement value on reputation of birth or station in life; temporal 
dignities; character qualities; and vain senses of pride, talent, virtue, goodness, experience, 
capacity, or conduct.255 It reconciles God’s favor with us.256 A result of this conciliation is an 
egalitarian quality of esteem for others. The third effect of humility is similitude, an essential 
component of love, which fosters the friendship of God for man. Humility is Christ-like; Pride 
is contrary to it. Because it was the first step that Jesus took when he came into the world, it is 
the first step a person must take in embracing Christianity.257 Fénelon referred to the scripture 
of Philippians II for the example of Jesus: 
who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to 
be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being 
made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled 
himself and became obedient to death—even death on a cross!”258  
 
Fénelon described Jesus as having been scorned and slighted, as having lived a mortified life, 
and as having suffered with humility the wrongs of men.259   “To be Christian is to be imitators 
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of Jesus Christ. And how can we imitate him than in his humiliations?  Not anything else can 
draw us near him.”260 It is the manner in which we are like God, so the likeness of humility 
brings familiarity and leads to access to God. “‘When I am weakest then am I strongest of all.  
Virtue is made perfect in weakness.’ We are strong in God only in proportion to our weakness 
in ourselves. Your weakness, if in a spirit of humility you consent [emphasis added] to it, will 
be your strength.”261  
In describing the way in which man should and should not be like God, Fénelon again 
referred to the imagery of descent and ascent.  Lucifer and Adam and Eve chose to elevate 
themselves by appropriating to themselves the honor and glory due to God. They fell in their 
attempted ascents to the place of God because of their pride and vain ambition.  On the 
contrary, the way to resemble God is to descend according to the example of Jesus’s humility. 
Christ came into the world to seek humiliation and abasement, “that we may become like him, 
without leaving the state which is due to us, and without elevating us above what our 
nothingness merits….I will humble myself and descend to become like the most high.”262 The 
example of Jesus’s redemptive humility is the way to restore the likeness of God in man after 
the Fall. “This is the only means of growing great in Christianity, and he who takes another 
way falls instead of rising; it is only humility which can exalt us; it is impossible to rise unless 
we first descend.”263 Humility, by lowering, raises us; by stripping, enriches us; and by 
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annihilating, gives us a new being.264 Another analogy of descent and ascent is that Christian 
perfection can be represented as an edifice; as an architect proportions the depth of a foundation 
to the elevation of a building, so a person must sink in humility to rise in true greatness.265  
To Fénelon, John the Baptist was the foremost human example of humility. The 
prophet regarded himself as nothing but a voice calling in the wilderness to prophesy the birth 
of Jesus.266 He lived and died sacrificially as a sign and an instrument of someone greater 
than himself.  When his work was done, he was annihilated figuratively and literally.267 
Accordingly, men are also nothing in themselves and are a sign of the greatness of God. 
Fénelon is careful to point out, to avoid misunderstanding, that the scriptures do not say that 
we are nothing in the eyes of God.268 The key to humility is the self-realization, like John the 
Baptist, of our nothingness. Anything less is a matter of subtle conceit. What Fénelon means, 
when he says that we are nothing, is that our true essence lies in the will of Infinite Goodness, 
not in our perceived self-interest. Fénelon understood the psychological ego (le moi) and the 
existential condition of the human spirit.  It is precisely because he saw in egoism a principal 
spring of human behavior that he sought a relation with God which escapes from this 
perversion.269  
Summary 
To summarize this chapter, Fénelon defines love as pure when it is void of 
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mercenary interest.  Because it emanates from ontological contemplation, pure love is 
dependent on neither appetite nor reason. Yet, there are meditative aspects of the journey 
toward perfecting love in human living. Perfectibility involves the struggles of dejection 
and the reflexivity of self- examination. The essential link between contemplative and 
meditative experience, as manifested in the Incarnation, is the virtue of humility. The 
moment-by-moment and non-linear experience of sortir de soi leaves the individual 
responsible for the transformation of his personhood. Despite its power of self-
determination, the ultimate purpose of the free will lies beyond individual autonomy.  When 
the will silences passions and appetites, either along with or aside from reason, there is room 
for union with what is outside the self. The individual is hungry for spiritual transformation 
with freedom of conscience.270 This union opens the door for civic association based on 
disinterested rather than mercenary interest. 
Man, who does not bring himself about, is not made to seek after himself, but 
to exist solely for Him who has made him. His glory and his perfection 
consist in going out of himself, in forgetting himself, in losing himself, in 
being swallowed up in the simple love of infinite beauty.271  
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Mystical Contemplation, Discursive Meditation, and Civic Virtue 
Rhetoric, Virtue, and the Personal Responsibility for Free Will 
 
Virtue is more precious than life and stems from religion and philosophy.1  
 
 
Along with the concepts of free will and love, which are essential to Fénelon’s political 
theory, the idea of virtue completes the underpinnings of his political theory. The focus on virtue 
turns the page in his thought from metaphysics and theology to moral philosophy. For him, as 
with the ancient Greeks whom he admired, there is a close association between the perfectibility 
and the vitality of an individual and of a community.  This is not merely perfection according to a 
linear timeline but one that depends on the possibility of qualitative degrees of change within 
individuals. Perfectibility, as noted earlier, is an end which all are capable of reaching to some 
degree and is the teleological search for union with another.  Its purpose pertains to an inner 
progression of an individual toward goodness as other-regarding.  This perfectibility is virtue. As 
Fénelon claims, “Le passage de la puissance à l’acte vertueux est ce qu’il y a de plus parfait dans 
l’homme.”2  
The outward manifestation of virtue pertains to conscientious action toward the well- 
being of others.  The source of this manifestation is the virtue of humility, as the previous 
chapter explains.  Virtue leads a person to seek his neighbor as love leads him to seek God. In 
this manner, virtue is the guide of moral relationships. Virtue is the manifestation of 
transcendent reality as cooperative belief and behavior.  According to Fénelon, humility is the 
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foundation of virtue.3  
The previous chapters have explained Fénelon’s ideas of free will and love in historical, 
philosophical, and theological contexts.  This chapter adds a third dimension to these two 
concepts and thus deals with the final element in the framework of his political theory. At its 
heart, Fenelon’s political theory is a moral one, and these three concepts together are the basis of 
that. He explains this connection in his Dialogues of the Dead between Herodotus and Lucien. 
In this dialogue, Herodotus corrects Lucien, “Tu louais même la vertu sans vouloir remonter 
jusqu’aux principes de religion et de philosophie qui en sont les vrais fondements.”4 The 
relationship of the moral and the political is inextricable because one primary purpose of being 
human is to perfect individual goodness, which is experienced through unselfishness in social 
communion with others. Furthermore, political issues lie at the heart of that collective human 
effort known as civic society, which brings moral philosophy inevitably into play. If the 
previous chapters have established as Fénelon’s position the stance that individual perfectibility 
stems from free will and love, then community is by nature the result of spiritual, moral, and 
political relationships.  This chapter will demonstrate how Fénelon integrated his concepts of free 
will and love with a moral theory of virtue. 
Fénelon’s moral and political ideas are founded upon the moral philosophy of virtue and 
character. Virtue emanates from love, the spring that moves action and manifests itself in 
unselfish individual actions in the here and now.  There is correspondence with the degree to 
which the will is disposed non-egoistically and with the degree to which virtue emanates from 
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the will.  The common root of regard for others and being virtuous is a disinterested disposition. 
Consequences and outcomes of actions flow from the character from which they emanate. In 
like manner, adherence to duty and obligation are determined primarily by character, not by 
externally formal structures.  To make this point Fénelon refers to the wisdom of Solon in 
“Dialogue 12” between Solon and Justinian.5 According to Solon’s example, laws are effective 
only when they are beloved, respected, and preserve good, i.e., unselfish morals. Outcomes and 
adherence are consistent with their source, inner disposition. As a result, contrary to the focus of 
consequential or deontological ethical theories, Fénelon assumes that the disinterested 
disposition of each member, especially leaders, is the fundamental concern of ethics with respect 
to the question of whether a community flourishes.  “An action growing out of a man’s spirit or 
temperament is an original and precious feature in history. It sets before you the whole man.”6 
Disinterested disposition is the anchor of moral habit. 
What Fénelon advocates is inspiring, one-by-one, temperaments that are at peace because 
their sense-based, rational, and spiritual experiences are in congruence. The only way to achieve 
this congruity is to develop unselfish dispositions in these realms.  Fénelon was a realist as well 
as a mystic.  He recognized that there are different forms of government and cultures. The 
sustaining factor for any of them is the degree to which they rest upon the principle of 
unselfishness, interpreted as otherness.  For Fénelon, this is the only way to for a civic society to 
thrive and endure.  Otherness is the key to flourishing, peace, harmony, and order. This is how his 
political theory addresses the republican interest of the relationship between the individual and 
the community. 
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Because morality relates to the interactions among individuals, communication is an 
essential aspect of Fénelon’s moral and political theory, and this is perhaps the best place to start 
to uncover these various connections.  Communication relates various forms of reality including 
the temporal and spiritual, the particulier and général, the finite and infinite, and the individual 
and others in a community.7 Of course, communication requires language, and there is a parallel 
in the development of Fénelon’s concept of love and his concept of language. The way language 
is used to cultivate virtue through civic education becomes an important part of the story. 
In Fénelon’s thought, language expresses the link between belief, understanding, broader 
conative experience, and action.  The volonté particulière is what enables the libre arbitre to 
transcend signs through Plotinus’s language of illumination. Language is an important link of 
accessibility between the Word of Illumination and virtuous action according to free will. 
Language is one way to express the emanations of infinite goodness, the Word. Just as 
Augustine did, Fénelon recognized that the intimations of language impact this free access by the 
will, for better or worse. There is a relationship in the ideas of both Augustine and Fénelon 
between liberty and language. 
Inspiration and persuasion are as much within the purview of the libre arbitre as reason 
and logic, and intention and aptitude are both embraced. Therefore, moral meaning can stem 
from aesthetic, inspirational, and persuasive communication just as it also can from conscientious 
reasoning. Thus, Fénelon insisted on a vital role for rhetoric as the public language to inspire 
the essential quality of having regard for others. In his system, “everything is spoken for the 
common welfare and no word is self serving.”8 Although today the appreciation of rhetoric is 
greatly diminished, partly due to the primacy of reason that has been prevalent in philosophy 
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since Descartes, Fénelon defended the significance of rhetoric as one of several art forms that 
can inform virtuous experience. 
I seek a serious man man who speaks for my sake and not for his own,…The man 
who uses speech only to communicate his thoughts and thought only to further 
truth and virtue is worthy of being heard….Music is good only insofar as it agrees 
with the sense of the words, and as the words themselves inspire virtuous 
sentiments….Painting,  sculpture,  and  other  fine  arts  should  have  the  same 
end…Eloquence should also be part of a design wherein pleasure exists only to 
counterbalance evil passions and to make virtue attractive.9  
 
 To comprehend how Fénelon’s ideas on free will and love integrate into his moral 
thought, it is helpful to explain how these ideas relate to his idea of communication and lead up 
to those of civic virtue. Two distinctions are important in establishing a structure for 
understanding Fénelon’s perspective on the role of communication, particularly language, and 
reason in civic virtue.  The first is the difference between contemplation as non-discursive 
communication and meditation as discursive communication. The second is between reason 
based on logic and rhetoric based on persuasion, inspiration, and aesthetics. 
The history of theology paves a way to understand how Fénelon combines contemplation 
and meditation in his moral thought. Aquinas divides the soul into the vegetative or sentient 
state of nature and the intellectual state of understanding in his system of the way an individual 
soul naturally reaches union with the whole. Aquinas’s position, which stems from Aristotle and 
was reflected by the schoolmen, is anthropological with respect to how the soul relates to 
eternity. Descartes’s distinction between the body and mind in his considerations of sentiment, 
passio, and cogitatio can be interpreted to follow from this anthropology.  Descartes’s 
anthropology can also explain the role of the spiritual experience of meditation in Fénelonean 
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thought. Fénelon does not disregard this distinction, especially in Démonstration de l’existence 
de Dieu and Lettres sur divers sujets concernant la religion et la métaphysique. For Descartes 
and Fénelon, the soul is independent of the physical world, and the method of acquiring 
knowledge of God is accessed through the soul. The metaphysics of Descartes and Fénelon 
about God and the soul is not compatible with Aristotelian physics of matter and form, and their 
non-Aristotelian ideas lead away from scholasticism. 
But, Fénelon extends beyond Descartes’s understanding of the eternal source of ideas. 
Mystical contemplation explains the source of “clear and distinct” ideas that are equally 
accessible to all.  Cardinal Berulle had pointed out before Descartes that everyone can go out of 
oneself, sortir de soi.   Sortir de soi makes sense as far as Descartes’s distinction between the 
mind and body goes from the point of view that experience is not limited by sense-based 
knowledge of a vegetative soul.  But, for Fénelon, Descartes’ reliance on cogitatio still limits the 
possibility of the soul to experience union with what is eternal, because reason can only reach as 
far as what is not contrary to and is not limited by its finite capacity.  Fénelon reaches a step 
farther than Descartes by maintaining a position in line with the Oratian mystic heritage of 
Berulle. In the development of mysticism, which Fénelon followed, contemplative experience is 
another state of the soul that is higher than the ability to make rational sense of reality. Reality 
and the ability to experience it are not limited to the finite and temporal capacities of reason in 
the mind.  This is the heritage of theology of the Rheno-Flemish school of Meister Eckhart and 
the Spanish mystics.  The spiritual realm of experience is beyond, superior to, and encompasses 
more than the possibilities of cogitation, indeclinability, discursivity, sense-based knowledge, 
and attentive language. 
There is, notwithstanding this, a complementary partnership between meditation and 
183  
contemplation.  Contemplation occurs in sortir de soi by silencing discursiveness and reflexivity. 
“Il faut faire taire toute creature, il faut se fair taire soi-mệme…”10  Sortir de soi is directly 
proportionate to contemplation.  Discursive silence to reflexivity expands contemplative activity. 
Then, attentiveness to the impressions and intuitions of contemplation affirms constant 
participation of the individuated and self-determined free will.  In this silence of contemplation, 
aesthetic intuition and impressions as well as linguistic interpretation become relevant as the 
means to bring the contemplative experience of reality into the meditative realm and active realm 
of daily life. Going out of the self gives free and equal access for each and every interpreter to 
bring into the self truths that are accessible outside of reason, emotions, and the senses.11 
Interpreting entails engaging in a relationship that adds meaning and purpose. As the 
Biblical Love Hymn says, “Now we see but a poor reflection in a mirror, then we shall see face 
to face.”12 What this means in Fénelonean analogy is that the mind acts as the lens of the eye to 
interpret partial, finite, temporal reality.  This analogy dates back at least to Anaxoragas. 
Contemplation is the means of connection to experience the infinite and eternal reality of union. 
The metaphor of Christ as the groom and the Church as the bride is another metaphorical 
example of relationship. Ultimately, reason, reflexive language, cogitation, and indeclinability 
are insufficient to grasp ultimate meaning and purpose.  The totality of human experience 
involves the senses, cogitation, conation, and spirituality.  Fénelon’s thought emphasizes the 
total experience of the mind rather than experiences in categories of will, understanding, and 
natural senses.  To inculcate linguistic meaning, this experience can be described discursively 
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by reason as well as by aesthetics, poetry, analogy, metaphor, and narrative example.  As 
Chapter 3 has noted, ecstatic love engages a lover and a beloved.  There is a duality in loving; a 
person goes outside of himself, extra se, to join another.  Likewise, there exists (at least) a 
duality in communicating, interpreting, and acting.  The one who is communicating reaches out 
to join another. 
The relationship between libre arbitre, amour pur, and communication forms the 
foundation of virtue, both personal and civic. To integrate this relationship in Fénelonean 
thought, it is important to recall the discussion in Chapter 2 about the origins in Christian 
mysticism of the idea of love as unselfish friendship.13 In sum, Abelard transformed Cicero’s idea 
of friendship into a definition of love. William of Auxerre added to this definition with the 
distinction between desirous and unselfish love. Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite laid out the 
idea of walking out of oneself (extra se) to leave selfish desire behind. Duns Scotus explained 
that loving something for its sake is freer than loving for one’s own sake. Aquinas affirmed the 
Ciceronian and Aristotelian ideas of friendship. According to Aquinas, amicitia honesta 
combined reciprocity and active communion in addition to good will.14 Finally, John of the Cross, 
the mystic who was one of Fénelon’s most immediate sources, explained the analogy of 
ascending a mountain in a progression where desire becomes extraneous and is replaced by 
mutual benevolence and communication.  The idea of ascent incorporates the Neo-Platonic 
tradition, and the idea of friendship as communication represents the Ciceronian-Aristotelian- 
Thomistic tradition.  The result of this ascent is the cultural bond of harmony of the age of gold 
                                                            
13 For the details of these origins, supra., especially pages 112-117. 
 
14 “Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est 
amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliquam communicationem,” Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
theologica, 1b. 2a,2ae, qu. 23, a. 1, in corp.; as cited in Chydenius as cited in The Symbolism of Love in Medieval 




and the proverb, "friends hold in common what they have."15  
Freedom is temporally fulfilled in the context of human action that concerns itself with 
the well-being of others. The true foundation of libre arbitre and virtue consists in being able to 
judge vanity and mercenary goods as unsuitable.16 Like Augustine, Fénelon regards bona 
voluntas as the highest state of human perfection. This differs from Stoicism, which sees virtue 
as an end in itself as self-mastery.  For Fénelon, virtue is not a personal excellence, and it cannot 
be manifested without the transcendence of sortir de soi.  Bona voluntas involves an unselfish, 
even sacrificial, relationship, which in turn involves what is moral. The Good means moral good 
for Fénelon, and libre arbitre is an essential part of virtue in Fénelon’s thought. His 
contempative mysticism eschewed asceticism.17 For him love is practical and operant in daily 
life.18  
As a disciple of Augustine, Fénelon’s idea of libre arbitre bears the marks of Liberum 
arbitrium, de Trinitate, and de Doctrina Christiana.  Liberté includes free actions involving the 
perception of contingent relations.19 Libre arbitre relates more specifically to perceptions of what 
is good, and, as explained in earlier chapters, the perfect good, amour pur, is something that is 
only possible if there is free will. As Fénelon states, willing is more perfect than merely being, 
and willing good is yet more perfect than willing. “Power is only a balance or poise between 
virtue and vice, or a suspension between good and evil.  The passage, or step to act, is a decision 
                                                            
15 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1155a.1, n. 1, 214; also 1168b. 
 
16 Fénelon, “La nature de l'homme,” Œuvres, vol. 2 (Gallimard, 1997), 861. 
 
17 This is similar to the mysticism of Cardinal Berulle, although Fénelon scantly mentioned him. 
 
18 Fénelon, “La nature de l'homme,” Œuvres, vol. 2 (Gallimard, 1997), 862-65. 
 
19 See Tad M. Schmattz, “French Cartesianism in Context: The Paris Formulary and Regis’s Usage,” 
Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe (New York: Routledge, 2005), 
94, endnote 13. 
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or determination for the good, and consequent by the superior good.”20  
Augustine wrote the long treatise of de Trinitate for a reason. The idea of the trinity 
 
grounds the distinction between the liberty of being, or non-determination that is related to 
contingency, and the free will of acting, or determining that is related to Goodness. The Trinity 
grounds the infinite Word, the Incarnate Word in Jesus of Nazareth, and the Holy Spirit as the 
light that communicates the unity of Goodness in the Word and Flesh for the sake of the free will 
of each soul. The Trinity focuses on the individual soul as the beneficiary of congruity between 
the Word and the Flesh in spiritual and temporal life. The Trinity allows the soul to experience 
unity, goodness, and truth   In this, knowledge is not primary; the essence of good will is 
ultimately, crede, ut intelligas: “believe in order that you may understand.”21  
 
Despite the primacy of belief, there are significant roles for signum, physical signs, and 
res, the invisible reality of the sign.  In de doctrina Christiana, both lead to good will as Beauty 
in the Platonic sense in Phaedrus.  Language is one means by which signum leads to res because 
words establish a commonly held reference for ascent that all can interpret communally. 
Linguistic signs reach to the simple Word and Beauty as Ultimate Union.22 The role of 
meditation in spiritual life is parallel to discursive language in daily and civic life.  Both 
meditation and language involve discursive reflexivity that bring signum to the realm of res. 
Meditation and language involve Descartes’s idea of reasoned indeclinability through the 
cogitatio, la pensée. 
                                                            
20 Fénelon, Demonstration of the Existence of God, Wisdom, and Omnipotence of God, trans. Abel Boyer 
(London: W. Taylor and J. Baker, 1713), 166. 
 
21 Augustine, Tractus Ev Johannis, 29.6. 
 
22 Brenda Deen Schildgen, “Rhetoric and the Body of Christ,” The Rhetoric Canon, ed. Brenda Deen 
Schildgen (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1997), 161. 
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Indeclinability is the reflexive ability to perceive and weigh considerations. In spiritual 
meditation, reflexivity assists a person to the weigh unitive relationship that stems from 
contemplation separately from the mercenary isolation that stems from the scruples of pride. In 
daily and civic life, reflexivity also assists a person to weigh relationship as part of the 
community separately from mercenary selfishness. Reflexivity in both spiritual and civic matters 
through the signum of language assists a person to recognize that union is consistent with the true 
nature of being. This consistency, in turn, leads a person to turn toward the essence of individual 
fulfillment in relationships.  Self-interest does not end in the self. For example, respective 
members in many contemporary cultures regard each other as individuals who relate and 
contribute to the community’s well-being as being parts of a whole. An example of this is the 
contribution of individuals’ taxes toward the support of public education. Indeclinability in 
Fénelon’s thought can lead to inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness.  Again, the key is to 
separate the role of pride as a limited measure of being when considerations are made. 
 The debate between the Ancients and Moderns in late seventeenth century France 
provided a perfect backboard for Fénelon to connect the use of language with his ideas on 
spiritual meditation and contemplation.  He was aware of the growing contemporary emphasis on 
amour propre as the primary motivation of human behavior as well as the prevalence of ideas, 
including political and economic ones, based on this premise. Fénelon understood the existence 
of self-interest as egoism in socio-political interaction.  Without dismissing the effect of prideful 
amour propre, his thought offered an alternate current, based on inspiring the innate qualities of 
unity and caring in motivation.  Furthermore, he did not dismiss the value of persuasion by 
relegating it to a necessary connection with flattery and vain pride.23 He criticized the role of 
                                                            
23 See, for example, Fénelon, “Dialogues des morts  16, 17, and 18,” Œuvres, vol. 1 (Gallimard), 324-340. 
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flattery in the royal court culture.  For Fénelon, pagan virtues expressed the unifying message of 
contemplation, as he maintains it in Lettre à l’académie,24 De l’education des filles, Dialogues 
sur l’ éloquence, Dialogues des morts, Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté, and 
Les aventures de Télémaque. 
 Unlike his contemporaries, he maintained that civic education in the virtue of otherness is 
a vital element of sustainable and stable political institutions. A flourishing political society and 
government depend upon the character development of each individual within it toward unselfish 
actions that take into account the needs of others. Character development for Fénelon was a 
matter of education, and he believed that people relate best to education and teaching by example. 
Caring actions that persuade and inspire are the best means of inculcating character development, 
not indoctrination or force.  Fénelon affirmed this lesson, which he learned from his first post-
ordination assignment, which was to catechize young Protestant women to Catholicism.  He 
steadfastly admitted thereafter, “No human power can force the impenetrable entrenchments of 
liberty in the human heart.”25 Learning and character development are individual experiences, 
and, in civic life, the example of unselfish political leadership and institutions that provide for the 
well-being of others is the best teacher for members of civic society. Flourishing political life 
and other-regarding personal virtue are inseparable. 
Fénelon’s philosophical foundation of the importance of language and rhetoric is based 
on his position that reality is not dependant upon rational or sensate awareness.   Fénelon does not 
                                                            
 
24 Formally entitled, Réflexions sur la grammaire, la rhétorique, la poétique, et l’ histoire. 
 
25 From advice that Fénelon gave to the Chevalier St. George when St. George visited him at Cambrai in 1709- 
10, Selections from the Writings of Fenelon: with a Memoir of his Life by Mrs. Follen (Boston: James Munroe and 
Company, 1851), 163, as cited in Religion through the Ages, ed. Charles MacFarland (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1948), 8. 
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confine the human ability for awareness and meaninful interpretation in the same way Kant 
would later consider noumenon.  Fénelon’s idea of ultimate reality is closer to the Platonic idea of 
noesis.  For Plato and Fénelon, unlike Kant, man can experience the noumenal world. However, 
where there dianoia is for Plato, there is contemplation for Fénelon.   Neither rational nor sense-
based knowledge limit the soul.  A Fénelonean concept of noumenon is distinct from reason as 
well as the senses, although the latter can lead to perceiving, sensing, and understanding it, as 
there is complementarity.  Fénelon’s position that reality exists and is accessible without reason 
or the senses is answer to Skepticism of his day.26 He was not akin to Bayle or Hume.27 He 
precludes Skepticism by rejecting limitations on the metaphysical experience.  Consequently, his 
ideas about the nature and accessibility of non-rational and non-sensate reality enhance the 
possibilities for language and rhetoric in awareness and interpretation. 
To explain reality, Fénelon follows the Platonic meaning of dianoia and the Neo- 
Platonic meaning of illumination.  Fénelon and Augustine explain how the mind gathers 
impressions in analogy to the lens of the eye, an analogy which Fénelon credits to Anaxoragas. 
The lens is the corporeal medium for linking superior and inferior reality.  The lens is neither 
the mind nor what is beyond; it is the channel for receiving a common infinite link, the 
medium of light – the presence of infinite Goodness. Without light, there is nothing but 
darkness.  Through the filter of the lens, the mind is able to absorb and give meaning to light. 
The individual mind intuits meaning and purpose from ultimate reality as it is experienced 
                                                            
26 Both Fénelon, as a mystic, and Kant, whose parents raised him in the pietistic tradition, share the position 
that noumenon exists, and they both maintain that noumenon precludes Skepticism. However, Kant does not maintain 
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27 Richard H. Popkin and Mark Goldie, “Skepticism, Priestcraft, and Toleration,” Cambridge History of 




through interpretation and representation.  The lens of the eye is a crucial analogy in Fénelon’s 
thought because it affirms moral individuation. The lens is the link between contemplative and 
meditative experience.  It affirms moral reflection according to free will and precludes 
occasionalism.  This analogy is Fénelon’s footing, according to Gratry, to correct Pascal and 
Malebranche and to give exactness and completion to Descartes’s idea of the ability of the mind 
to perceive infinity.28 Individuation is achieved through disinterestedness. Fénelon affirms the 
free will as moral being, and here virtue enters Fénelon’s thought. Virtue is the manifestation 
of contemplation and meditation as cooperative belief and behavior. 
Fénelon’s concept of love as moral relationship and communion can be compared to two 
schools of modern philosophy.  The first school of philosophy is personalism, with a focus on 
French and continental developments in the early twentieth century.29 This school focuses on 
the idea that relationship is the essence of human existence. The second school of philosophy is 
contemporary virtue ethics.30 This is a field where there has been recent interest, for example, 
in the works of Anscombe and Foot.31 Character is fundamental to Fénelon’s idea of 
relationship, so both personalism and virtue ethics resonate in important aspects of his thought. 
Emmanuel Mounier wrote: “If there is one affirmation that is common to all the 
personalist philosophies it is that the essential act in a world of personal is not isolated self-
perception (as in the cogito), nor egocentric self-care, but…existence with others.”32 This 
                                                            
28 Gratry, 242. 
 
29 Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), 17-19, as 
cited in Cowburn, The Person and Love, 7. 
 
30 Fénelon’s moral ideas can be interpreted as Christian virtue ethics. 
 
31 For example, Gertrude E.  M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 1-19;  
Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press, 1978). 
 
32 Emmanuel Mounier, “Qu´est-ce que le personnalisme?” Œuvres, vol. 3 (Paris: Éditions Seuil, 1962), 288; 
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conception of human life is the essence of what is called personalism.  A tenet of personalism is 
that a man must live with and for others, and it is thus the opposite of individualism. Some 
might oppose person to individual on the basis that a human must live as a communal person 
rather than as an atomistic individual.  Accordingly, one might expect that individuals would 
associate less and less as they live more inwardly and within themselves. This is, however, 
actually the opposite of what happens:  As individuality increases, so also does association. 
Heightened inwardness does not cause individuals to isolate in proportion to their individuality. 
Instead, they form societies, live in close association, and bond.  Inwardness and association are 
in a directly proportionate relationship.33 According to Joseph de Finance, "far from opposing 
person to individual, we must say that, on the contrary, every person is an individual, and, that, 
moreover, personality as such includes individuality and perfects it.”34 According to the 
Thomistic thesis of perfection: ens et bonum convertuntur being and good are interchangeable. 
Bonum means perfectum in se. 
When Fénelon speaks of Christian perfection, here is what he means: Christian 
perfection happens in the process but not for the egoistic purpose of individualization. Living 
both with and for others develops in direct proportion to individuation. Individuation and 
association enhance one another.  As Karl Rahner explained, "The more really special a thing is, 
the more abundance of being it has in itself, the more intimate unity and participation there will 
be between it and what is other than itself.”35 He also says, “union and distinction are not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
cf. Emmanuel Mounier, “Personalism,” Œuvres, vol. 4, ch. 2, 451-461, as cited in Cowburn, 169. 
 
33 Cowburn, 12-13. 
 
34 Joseph de Finance, Existence et liberté. Collection problèmes et doctrines (Paris: Vitte, 1955), 71, as cited in 
Cowburn, 13. 
 
35 Rahner, “Individual: on the Significance in Redemptive History of the Individual Member of the Church,” 
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opposites, but correlates, which increase together.”36 In other words, the stronger the 
consciousness of the self, the stronger the recognition of what is other than that self. Separateness 
leads to union.   The act of being is at the same time one of uniqueness and communion,37 so a 
person exists with others and in himself.  There is a love of being as a whole because there are 
individuals. 
Emeric Coreth maintains that “human personal fulfillment is achieved…above all 
through other people…through the other persons in the world.”38 Human existence is not really 
conceivable except as shared with other people whom one loves.39 Ferdinand Ëbner insists that 
the person cannot exist in isolation: “The I has no absolute existence, for it exists only in relation 
to the Thou.”40 John Macmurray agrees: “The idea of an isolated agent [person] is self- 
contradictory.”41 “The unit of personal existence is not the individual, but two persons in 
personal relation.”42  
As has been noted in previous chapters, the scriptures as well as Fénelon and Pascal use 
the word heart to mean subjectivity, not emotions, regarding where a person is. Liberty is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Mission and Grace, vol. 1. trans Cecily Hastings (London: Sheed & Ward, 1963), 118, as cited in Cowburn, 13. 
 
36 Rahner, 196, as cited in Cowburn, 127 and 250. 
 
37 de Finance, Existence et liberté., 58, as cited in Cowburn, 13. 
 
38 Emeric Coreth,  Metaphysik, §84 (Innsbruck, Austria: Tyrolia, 1961), 535, as cited in Cowburn, 4 
 
39 cf. Aristotle , “No one would choose to live without friends, though possessing all other good things.” 
Nicomachean Ethics 8, 1, 1155a5-6. 
 
40 Ferdinand Ëbner, Das wort und die geistigen Realitäten, 3rd fragment, (Regensburg: Pustet, 1935), 26, as 
trans. in Cowburn, 169. 
 





merely a choice between actions.  It is the power that a subject has to determine himself.43 It is a 
matter of consciousness and the power of self-commitment. “The free act is one which I 
recognize as mine and in which I commit my responsibility and my very being…[L]iberty is an 
attitude of a whole being by which it chooses itself.”44 This perspective on liberty does not 
entail a necessity to oppose freedom and determinism.  Rather than exist as opposites, there is a 
flow among them like notes of a melody.45  
Pure love results in personal moral freedom.  According to Gabriel Madiner, “The option 
which we make in the moral order is concerned not with an object to be willed, but with our 
willing itself and the nature that it gives itself.”46 Cowburn echoes that idea with his comment 
that moral freedom is originally and finally not so much the power to decide about individual 
objects which present themselves as it is a power which the subject has over himself.47 De 
Finance writes similarly: “For many, the immediate meaning of liberty is power over contraries, 
or contingency in a determination. We prefer to see in liberty first of all the power of the subject 
to determine himself.”48  
Self-examination is a response to love that is crucial for experiencing otherness. Fénelon 
appreciates the role of discursive reflection in this process.  Self-examination occurs within the 
space of contemplation and reflexive meditation where egoism is silent. Ecstatic love, far from 
                                                            
43 Cf.: Rahner, Concupiscentia, 361, and De Finance, Existence et liberté, 8, as cited in Cowburn, 22. 
 
44 Lavelle, Louis. Les puissances du moi (Paris: Flammarion, 1948), 157 as cited in Cowburn, 20. 
 
45 Roger Troisfontaines, De l’existence à l’être:, La Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel, vol. 1 (Paris: Vrin, 1953), 
as cited in Cowburn, 20. 
 
46 Gabriel Madiner, Conscience et amour: Essai sur le ‘nous’.  Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine 
(Paris: Alcan, 1938), 17-19, as cited in Cowburn, 22. 
 
47 Cowburn, 22, n. 1; for Rahner, Concupiscentia, 361. 
 
48 De Finance, Existence et liberté, 8. 
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running counter to self-realization, presupposes it.  Ecstatic love requires being personally able 
to make the distinction between mercenary love and unselfish love. This distinction helps a 
person clarify his own mind and identity before he enters into dialogue with another. 
Contemplative experience of the will empowers reflexive action.  As Martin Buber explains, 
“Certainly in order to be able to go out to the other you must have the starting place, you must 
have been, you must be, with yourself.”49  
Love involves self-giving, but it does not necessarily involve self-loss.50 The theory of 
ecstatic love states that love is violent.  This could be interpreted to mean that loving destroys the 
lover as a person,51 but what does violent mean in this context?  It means that painful changes can 
occur when an individual enters into a relationship with another. There is usually sacrifice and the 
need to abandon the old way of living for the sake of the relationship. In particular, it is necessary 
to abandon selfishness. The mystical term of annihilation is descriptive here. The violence of 
love, as it appears in Fénelon and earlier mystics, means that love involves breaking egotism and 
the abandonment of a self-centered way of life. Selfishness springs from pride. Pride leads a 
person to lose sight of the fact that his nature is innately good. Pride leads to exhaustive and 
constant attempts to compensate for perceived imperfections and faults by pursuing ineffective 
tendencies, such as flattery, that distract from experiencing innate goodness. Pride leaves a person 
feeling inadequate because he is trying to do something that is impossible, that is to say, 
experience goodness by means of vanity. Selfish actions overshadow innate goodness that is 
                                                            
49 Martin Buber, Dialogue, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), 21; as cited in 
Cowburn, 140. 
 
50 Cowburn, 128; cf. E. Dublanchy, Charité, col. 2223, discussed by D’Arcy in Mind and Heart (London: 
Faber, 1945), 101; cf. also Rahner, 251. 
 
51 As explained by Rousselot, 138. 
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experienced in union; thus, selfishness and self-love are exact opposites.52  “The selfish person 
does not love himself too much, but too little: in fact he hates himself.”53  
So, love does not destroy the lover as a person in Fénelon’s thought. Being a loving 
person is the foundation of personhood.  Moral personhood is the instantiation of integrity and 
substance toward others in terms of Augustine’s statement, “my weight is my love.” The ultimate 
act of freedom is doing what one ought to do because one wants to do it. Thus, ecstatic love is 
always for a particular person.54 It is not love of humanity in the abstract or human kind in 
general.  As Karl Jaspers clarifies, “In love there is uniqueness.  It is not something general that I 
love, but the irreplaceable present [person].”55 “Who loves only man, loves not at all; only he 
loves, who loves particular people.”56 In conclusion, the love of humanity is not a substitute for 
the love of particular persons.   “One loves only beings.  Most men, however, turn away from 
what is and pretend to love only ideas or ideals, that is, what is not.  This is a way of justifying an 
inability to love anything.”57 This concept of the particularity of love is a root of Fénelon’s idea 
of community. A thriving community exists only when its members care about the well- being of 
each other.  Social, legal, educational, and political structures can guide and facilitate caring, but 
individual expression of genuine caring is essential. The expression of disinterested personal 
caring in the community leads to the fulfillment of personhood. In Platonic fashion, the vitality of 
                                                            
 
52 Cowburn, 70. 
 
53 Eric Fromm, Art of Loving (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), 60, as cited in Cowburn, 70. 
 
54 For further explanation of the particularity of love, see: Cowburn, 141. 
 
55 Karl Jaspers, Philosphie, 2 (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1932), 278, as cited in Cowburn, 141. 
 
56 Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, 1, 16. 
 
57 Louis Lavelle De l’acte (Paris: F. Aubier, 1946), 516; cf. also Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. and 
ed. with introduction by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 1, ch. 4 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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political community depends on the success of individual Beauty writ large in leadership. 
“Love exists only if it seeks no reward, but, once it exists, it is rewarded. Thus, the idea 
of love at once disinterested and rewarded contains no contradiction, quite the reverse.”58 
Luijpen explains the matter clearly as well: 
It is not possible for man to forego the fact that love, as an active leaning to the 
other, is equally immediately the achievement of his own being…This however 
does not mean that the achievement of one’s own manhood is what love aims at, 
that this achievement is the motive why man loves.  The opposite is true.  In love 
man goes forward to his destiny, he finds the fulfillment of his manhood, on 
condition that this fulfillment be not the motive of his love.59  
 
It is in this manner that Fénelon claims the purpose of kingship is to make man happy and 
virtuous by example. Happiness is an inner state of peace that is consistent with amour pur. 
Contrary to Plato, Fénelon sees human frailty and imperfection as important factors in 
perfectibility.  They are stains of rust to be polished away.  The stains are on superficially but not 
inherent in the Beauty of the soul. The example set by the king is all the more effective when he 
demonstrates the ability to transcend blemishes and incline toward disinterestedness. 
In terms of categories of contemporary ethical thought, Fénelon’s primary consideration 
is neither consequentialist nor deontological.  Whereas consequentialist theories posit that 
consequences or outcomes of action are the primary focus of thinking about ethics, virtue ethics 
insists that character rather than consequences of actions are the focal point.  Fénelon does not 
deny norms or the rule of law, but disposition is primarily what leads to the public understanding 
and behavior that formulates as well as assents to law.60 Assent is an abiding expression of 
                                                            
58 Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 281 as cited in Cowburn. 
 
59 William Luijpen, Existential Phenomenoloy, 222, as cited in Cowburn. 
 
60 Some virtue ethicists hold that consequentialist theories disregard the development and importance of moral 
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character.  Fénelon’s thought falls within the scope of virtue ethics.  Character and motivation 
are the essential ingredients of action, and personal virtue is the key to public morality and 
political association.  Structural political institutions have no sustaining integrity without 
personal virtue.  From a metaphysical point of view, goodness is participating in infinite rather 
than particular; from a theological point of view, goodness is being unselfish. In civic virtue, 
goodness is being unselfish in the community.  These points of view share the common thread of 
participation with regard to what is other than the self. Participating without regard for personal 
interest is the basis of virtuous character, and, Fénelon would maintain, virtuous character is the 
vital element in the durability of civic society. It establishes the moral foundation of Fénelon’s 
political thought.  From this standpoint, there is an essential role for civic education. 
Also, in the current the language of ethics, Fenelon’s concept of virtue is internalist. 
Internalists connect their arguments with the tradition in ethics that makes the agent central to 
moral evaluation.  The primary condition for self-determination is something internal to the mind 
and accessible to it only.61 Given this, the agent’s motives and intentions are foundations for moral 
action.62 From this point of view, Fénelon’s emphasis on self-examination in disinterestedness is 
crucial.63 The previous chapter explained the constant inner discernment between prideful scruples 
that lead to mercenary love and less mercenary dispositions that ascend toward pure love.  In that 
same vein, disinterested self-examination leads to caring civic virtue that is manifested in unselfish 
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Fénelon is concerned with what kind of communication is best suited for public morality, 
particularly what kind of language will inculcate unselfish dispositions. For Fénelon the 
language of virtue is the public language, and, it is a matter of civic education for individuals who 
are able to perceive common tradition and, more importantly, choose willingly to manifest it as 
part of the community.  Virtue is transcendent and a priori. Virtue is the means by which norms 
and rules of law can be understood as selfish or unselfish contributions to human good, 
individually and publicly. Virtues are the bases of rules of law. The public language of virtue is 
the means by which the particular individual relates to the a priori. There is a need to inspire 
disposition to adopt norms, and virtues enable the moral functions of cooperation and 
coordination.  Impressions of common tradition are gathered from sense and rational experience 
and interpreted into habits of belief and behavior in the phenomenal world of the community. 
Identity, harmony, and order are adversely impacted if their discernment is confused by a lack of 
common tradition, such as that caused by egoism. 
Moral habit is rooted in non-spatial, non-causal, and non-temporal participation in 
infinite reality.  This rooting sustains individuals as they relate beyond individuality. From this 
point, the idea of interpersonal virtue has everything to do with the idea of infinity. Infinity 
includes all particularity, and all particularity participates in infinity.  For Fénelon, infinity as 
simplicity, perfection, and singularity stems from his claim that infinity is pervasive and 
unlimited in definition. Infinity is all being, and so it includes every kind of existence; thus, 
every kind shares in infinity.  To limit infinity to the particularities of a specific kind is to 
preclude simplicity.  For example, to limit the capacity of the human mind to the scope of la 
pensée would restrict its creative capacity of volonté particulière in the likeness of God. The 
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possibility of goodness is realized when a person acts as part of what is it shares with Ultimate 
Being rather than restrictions on species.  As Fénelon clarifies, 
I could never conceive of more than a single infinite; that is to say, other than 
the being infinitely perfect, or infinite in every kind. Any infinite which was 
infinite in but one kind would not be a true infinite. To speak of a genus or 
species is plainly to speak of limitation, and to exclude all ulterior reality, - 
which establishes the fact of a finite and limited being. To restrict the idea of 
the infinite to the limits of a genus shows that we have not considered it 
with sufficient simplicity.  It is clear that it can only be found in the 
universality of being, which is being infinitely perfect in every kind, and 
infinitely simple. 64 
 
Fénelon’s idea of infinity is consistent with his idea of individual free will in contrast to 
the order of volonté générale in occasionalism.  According to Gratry, Fénelon’s development of 
the idea of infinity gives exactness and completion to Descartes’s thought.65 Fénelon delivers 
this because he provides the connection between the participation of free will in infinity, 
unmitigated possibility, and moral action.   Fénelon does this by shifting the emphasis of 
experience from epistemology to ontology.   Fénelon’s idea of infinity simply precludes any 
limit on reality for any reason (including la pensée) by anyone at any time.  Otherwise, there 
would be no horizons for perfection in math, science, or morality.  Descartes examined the 
connection between will and morality in the Fourth Meditation, Passions of the Soul, and his 
letters to Queen Christina and Princess Elisabeth. Descartes would have written, as Fénelon 
echoed,  “La vérité est l’ object de la pensée, la bonté est l’objet de la volonté.”66 But, Descartes 
focused on explaining the relationship of infinity and morality epistemologically as far as rational 
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doubt could point rather than including the expanse of ontological experience.67 For Fénelon, 
infinity, as Ultimate Goodness, and morality are ontologically interwoven as the sources of 
unselfish civic action. For example, Fénelon maintained that divine impressions were the source 
of ancient pagan virtue. He explained, “de leurs idées de vertu, qui viennent de la pure raison, et 
qui sont une impression divine.  Ces hommes, sans être sérieusement persuadés d’aucune 
béatitude future, et n’ayant rien de réel devant les yeux que la vie présent, croyoit qu’on devoit 
sacrifier sans ressource cet unique bien pour la justice, pour la vérité, pour la patrie, pour ses 
parens, pour ses amis.”68  
Contemplative (non-discursive) experience transcends meditation’s involvement of 
discursive reflexivity and reason.  This experience is unmediated by reason, imagination, or the 
senses.  It is likewise unmediated by time, space and causality.  Fénelon’s thought 
acknowledges both what is not contrary to as well as what is beyond reason. He accepts 
Descartes’s premise that the source of eternal principles, upon which clear and distinct ideas 
are derived, is beyond the scope of reason, res cogitans.  Res cogitans is the domain of the 
understanding. Fénelon does not preclude Descartes’s idea of conscientious attention to 
evidence as an aid to moral judgment.  Indeed, Fénelon regarded this ability as a strength of 
ancient pagans in their exercises of disinterested virtue. Nonetheless, attempting to practice 
disinterestedness through reason and meditation are encumbered, because they are finite and 
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restrictive. “Our knowledge stands in the ways of becoming wise.”69 The disposition of 
disinterestedness responds to the persuasion of inspiration more fundamentally than the 
indeclinability of reason. 
Thus, the primary source of virtue lies in the habit of contemplating the inexplicable 
realm of union.  The intuitive and abiding habit of contemplation sustains virtue. Habit plumbs 
the depths of union and imparts an orientation toward others. Humans most abundantly reach the 
principles of infinite truth though non-discursive contemplation. The contemplative world is not 
res externa (temporally-based senses or passions), because it is a shared commonality with 
infinity.  This is the heritage of Rheno-Flemish mysticism in Fénelon’s thought. Contemplation 
is in the domain of the will.  For Fénelon, personal and public morality emanates from 
transcendent love.  Amour pur is prior to reason.  Reason can support amour pur, but it can also 
result in rationalization that corroborates lesser degrees of love. The more amour pur is 
experienced contemplatively, the less need there is for reason to provide an interpretation of it. 
Dispossession of the egoistic moi leads to unity and harmony in civic virtue.  Dispossession is 
manifested in disinterested action that naturally flows from amour pur, but it can also be 
practiced pursuant to the example of ancient virtue. 
Amour propre was historically a theological term that related to self-attachment in 
theological debates about sin and grace.  Unlike Jansenists, Fénelon did not focus on the 
corruptibility of human nature as a hopeless matter. The phrase amour propre denotes pride, and 
it took on moral meaning in seventeenth century France.  Fénelon accepts the Cartesian argument 
about eternity and infinity and then incorporates it into a focus on the moral with the concepts of 
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non-egoistic amour pur and egoistic amour propre.  Fénelon’s place in this transition stems 
from his premise that affinity for infinity indicates the essential quality of goodness in man. 
Distance of the self from its fundamental, relational nature is a mark of amour propre.  Amour 
propre can be the source of experiencing this goodness - not within the inner spiritual life or in 
association with civic virtue.  For Fénelon, amour propre, even when it is guided by reason, is 
the source of moral mistake and limitation. Descartes would have concurred; however, because 
Fénelon realized that emulation of innate disinterestedness through reason and meditation is 
difficult, he emphasized that “there is an innate aesthetic sense that leads to moral awareness.”70 
For example, art forms lead to moral impressions.  Moreover, Fénelon saw language, rhetoric, and 
education as vital for inspiring persuasively and inculcating the transition from contemplation to 
morality.  Descartes, on the other hand, did not trust these sources of moral action. 
Fénelon makes the point that there are states of mind that are not consciously reflexive or 
intentional with respect to the future.  Human behavior can be explained by a reality of the 
unconscious in addition to phenomenally conscious experiences and thoughts. This leaves room 
in the subject of human value that does not identify dignity on the basis of phenomenally-based 
ethics.  In other words, to the degree that intentionality is correlated with the phenomenal 
character of experience, the greater is the likelihood that human dignity will be defined by 
intelligence, emotions, and understanding that are perceived consciously. For Fénelon, 
awareness and affinity of association stem from non-inferential apprehension not from reason. 
This type of apprehension is best explained by metaphor, analogy, aesthetics, painting, poetry, 
and descriptive language. Fénelon is interested in the value of intentionality, especially as moral 
value relates to otherness.   His idea of moral value requires more than the mind and reason. 
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As Fénelon notes, the whole system of his thought turns upon his understanding of the 
term interest, a major topic of discussion in the seventeenth century. For him, interest is a matter 
of interior constitution rather than juridical distinction. He focuses on how interest relates to 
motivation and action. He is concerned with the motive, the “principle of love which moves the 
soul.”71 Actions spring from love in his system, so he is concerned about inclination and 
disposition because they are at the bottom of motivation in moral action and self-interest. His 
concept of interest respects how the will relates to internal scruples and external influences. His 
whole system endeavors to cut off self-interest in the sense of mercenary affection. 
The meaning of motive as a spring of action does not refer to an external object which 
attracts, but to the internal principle that determines the will. He is concerned about the internal 
orientation that determines the relationship to the external. Though the external object is static, 
the manners of regarding it range from selfish to non-selfish. The difference is the disposition 
with which a person wills in regards to an object; it does not lie in an external object itself. The 
significance of Fénelon’s idea of motive for his moral theory is that the nucleus and 
responsibility of action lie within the individual. He focused on the authenticity that prompts 
motive, not on the rational accuracy of intuitions. Intuitions of free will have moral content, the 
question of accuracy notwithstanding. 
For Fénelon, intuitive motivations can reflect degrees of logical reason or pride.  He does 
not posit a neccesary relationship between reason and amour propre. Nor does reason 
necessarily have any connection to amour pur.  Love, rather than reason, best describes 
motivations on the basis of whether they are egoistic or non-egoistic. To recall once again the 
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words of Pascal, “the heart has its reasons reason does not know.”72 This meaning of the heart is 
a consideration that is outside of reason and pride. Here Fénelon’s explanation of 
disinterestedness offers a link for Rousseau between the individual and the volonté générale.  
Civil education plays an important role in manifesting this link from inside the person to the 
outside of civic society. 
Fénelon is not so much concerned with what attracts the soul externally as he is with why 
the soul moves internally.  Ultimately, what occurs internally affects what happens externally. He 
focuses on the inner perception of relating rather than on objects. Motive is a quality of 
constituent meaning that integrates in contrast to juridical interest that separates.  Virtue is action 
without self-interest.  Love is a universal regard for goodness, whether that goodness is 
possessed or not.  This is a matter of the subjective perception and meaning of relations, not the 
formal objectivity of acquisition.  Fénelon’s concept of motive is the very heart of what holds 
individuals together in civic association. 
Fénelon’s concept of interest establishes virtue as the source of action.  His ideas of 
interest and moral value are interrelated.  Interest integrates rather than separates the 
complexities of human existence, and freedom lies in gaining awareness of inner conscience. 
Interest is the grounding or interwoven background for making sense of various dynamics of 
existence.  It links the material and infinite aspects of being human. Conative identity informs 
interest, and this perspective is quite different from the legal concept of distribution that derives 
from the Roman concept of inter esse, in between.73 It is also different from relativism.  Fénelon 
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would have agreed with Heidegger that interest is not grounded in psychological egoism.  “Interest, 
interesse, means to be among and in the midst of things, or to be at the center of a thing and to stay 
with it.”74 In Fénelon’s thought, art is a perfect medium to demonstrate the idea of interest in non-
quantitative and non-discursive ways.  Like mystical experience, art provides insight into depths 
of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect.75 Consider, for example, the painting by Poussin, 
which Fénelon discusses in his Dialogues des morts between Parrhasius and Poussin and then 
again between Leonardo da Vinci and Poussin.76 
 
Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake, Nicolas Poussin 
Printed by the permission and courtesy of the National Gallery of London 
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This painting limns peaceful, calming, pastoral aspects as well as fearful and shocking aspects.  
Fénelon emphasizes distinct “caprices” that nonetheless integrate into a tapestry to make sense of 
the true nature of the human condition. There is an overall meaning that touches the unknown 
recesses of the heart.  Despite the despair of those who witness the horrific death of someone 
bitten by a venomous snake in an otherwise pastoral setting, Fénelon limns wholeness in the 
human capacity to integrate meaning, or interest, in the possibilities of the human condition.  
Furthemore, he describes the enslaving snares of tyranny in his Dialogue Seventeen with the 
image of a snake hiding in a field of flowers.77 The underhanded entrapment of innocent freedom 
through greed is worse than a wild, poison creature. 
There is inspiration in the discovery of meaning.  While Poussin’s picture represents the 
personal reactions of shocked onlookers and the caprice of individual experience, the most 
important element of the artistic representation for Fénelon is how the whole of being, 
represented as pastoral steadiness, integrates the specific contingencies about a common 
experience in a time and place.78 The whole picture, including pastoral and horrific aspects, 
allows the interpreter to be interested in the experience from all angles and thereby interpret 
meaning from within the experience. The interpreter is grounded, i.e., drawn into the experience 
and is interested in the meaning of how infinitely definable dynamics come together. One would 
consider what the experiences mean universally as well as particularly.  The common meaning of 
interest can only be discovered by intimate engagement.  This link between universal meaning 
and interest applies to political being. Just as an inspirational piece of artwork draws the 
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interpreter into its meaning, civic education draws the person into an interest in civic virtue. 
Political being requires inspiration. Otherwise, it exists with no meaning to give it context. 
The part and whole cannot be represented without reference to each other. As in Nicolas 
of Cusa’s de docta ignorantia, there is unity in ostensible opposites. This unity transcends the 
insufficiency of reason. The personal experiences of feeling physically or emotionally, sensing, 
intuiting, relating, discovering, interpreting, thinking, understanding, and realizing occur within a 
context of hermeneutical consistency.  Reason alone is an insufficient guide.  Seemingly 
metaphysical dualisms have a common point of reference. The scope of considering them 
includes a spectrum, including seeming opposites, such as the individual and society—or amour 
propre and amour pur. This scope is similar to the color spectrum that includes variations of 
white and black and the theological metaphor of light and darkness.   Any particular experience 
is part of an aesthetic experience. The common point of reference can be experienced through 
various means, such as interpretation or understanding. This point is where meaning and purpose 
can be experienced through explanation and aesthetics. Rhetoric is not indoctrination but 
inculcation of innate inclinations toward association that can otherwise be overshadowed by 
sense experience, passions, and rationalization toward egoism. 
One of the stated goals of this dissertation is to explain the role of language and rhetoric 
in Fénelon’s theology and politics of virtue.  Because moral value and inspiration are integral 
parts of experiential being, persuasiveness has a role in inculcating the spirit of association. 
Through rhetoric, persuasiveness has a vital role in communication within the polis. Rhetorical 
language is the means of communication among political beings.  When moral value is identified 
as caring for others, rhetoric is the language of civic virtue and education.  Civic education of 
disinterested virtue beckons individuals to bond unselfishly. 
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Short of his ideal of pure love, human virtue emulates non-egoistic love in 
Fénelon’s thought.  To learn how to emulate, Fénelon recommends that we turn Greek 
pages nightly.  “Among the Greeks, everything depended on the people, and they 
depended on the spoken word.”79 Consider how he relates virtue to Christians and non- 
Christians in The Difference between a Philosopher and a Christian: 
A philosopher is a man that examines every thing profoundly by the Light of his 
reason, who will needs know the Cause and Reason of every Thing that is 
proposed to him, whether it be just and reasonable to act in this way or that; who 
believes nothing but what he sees, and which is clearly demonstrated to him: As it 
appears to him a Thing very plain, and which perfectly agrees with his reasoning, 
that we must avoid and abstain from Vice, and, on the Contrary, practice Virtue; 
hate the one and love the other: If such a Philosopher is upright and sincere; he 
will study by all means to practice what his Reason is convinced of; he will not 
suffer his Passions to bear Sway, but will bridle and keep them under by the 
Strength of his Understanding and Reasoning; which persuade him that it is a 
Shame to follow one's Passions, and Suffer them to get the Mastery of him.80  
[T]he more exact he is in following the light of his reason, the more regular and 
formal you shall find him in all his actions. This is what made so many heathen 
philosophers, that have been held in admiration on account of their Doctrine and 
Conduct, practice Virtues and combat Vice, to far greater perfection than many 
others that call themselves Christians.81  
There are particular and finite as well as universal and infinite aspects of human 
existence.  For Fénelon, a person is individuated while he experiences the universality of 
infinity.  Fénelon was concerned with the question of how the individuated soul can best relate 
experientially to the whole.  Consequently, the free will is sacrosanct with respect to any type of 
temporal determinism, including rational, emotional or sensate, for Fénelon. There is an 
acknowledgement of a connection between intuition and awareness, even if the connection 
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appears to be inaccurate by the limits of rationality.  Disinterestedness provides the best 
approximation of this connection because it manifests union. As the idea of disposition is woven 
into the Fénelon’s idea of virtue, he relates historical congruency to personal and socio-cultural 
habit. 
Fénelon maintains that historical continuity arises from a nation's “character and 
disposition.”82 Montaigne had analogized customs to the calf carried lovingly by a young girl 
until it grew to be a cow, an anecdote to illustrate the French conviction that customs and 
institutions, once established, tend to acquire a momentum of their own. As de Tocqueville, 
who wrote after Fénelon, noted, the customs and mores of society are understandable from a 
historical perspective.  The words la tendance and la disposition were used by French thinkers 
from Rabelais to de Tocqueville.83 Fénelon’s uniqueness is that he combines this socio-cultural 
component with the interior component of the will to support disposition as an abiding virtue 
Disinterestedness provides strong continuity. 
Fénelon’s system of thought concerns itself with how natural goodness in human nature 
can develop as a moral self in civic society. Perfectibility of moral goodness requires the 
integration of perfectibility in the spiritual (supra-religious) realm.  The natural and moral 
aspects of self can be at one when they counteract prideful aspects.  Fénelon recognized that 
these aspects can be experienced simultaneously. “Il est certain que notre volonté est capable 
d’avoir en même temps plusiers amours contraires.”84 To recall, human nature is good with the 
potentials of creativity and perfectibility in the likeness of God. In his conflict with Bossuet 
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about the interior life, Fénelon retorted emphatically that intérêt propre (commodum proprium) 
is not a sin or desire and does not include mercenary desire (appetitionis mercenariae).85 
Fénelon stressed that intérêt nôtre is morally indifferent. This interest, for example, includes the 
natural need for subsistence and the experience that God wants man’s salvation. Intérêt nôtre 
can be a guide to perfectibility in even the greatest saints.  It can be best guided by the spiritual 
life, especially by means of grace, and also by reason. Man is not relegated to the discord with 
the self and society that pride, amour propre, causes. 
During the seventeenth century, the theological term, amour propre, took on a moral 
meaning that had attached to the Stoic idea of self-sufficiency and led to the morality of court 
society.  Fénelon associated this morality with selfish aggrandizement at the expense of the 
possibility and well-being of a flourishing society.  Also, this type of morality too readily fit 
hand in glove with Jansenist or Calvinist doubts about how there could be any hope for 
humankind in the here and now due to God’s foreknowledge of destiny according to sin and 
grace.  Regardless of the source of self-sufficiency, Fénelon claimed that amour propre precludes 
fulfillment of the ultimate meaning of being human as union with what is beyond the self.  He 
was concerned with why and how the individual identifies himself as part of the social whole.  
Inner atonement of independency and dependency is the key to civic society and inner 
determination of freedom, a connection which Rousseau made at a later date. There is freedom 
when the will acts as it ought because it wants to. This accordance comes to fruition when the 
orientation toward otherness is inculcated in spiritual and civic education. 
To integrate another point, Fénelon focused on the meaning of free will in the human 
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action in the present, not on how it would turn out in eternity. Accordingly, his idea of free will 
substantially impacts the meaning of individual human action outside of Calvinist or Jansenist 
theologies of predestination and eschatology.  Fénelon’s thought provides much greater 
metaphysical potential for the individual to determine his destiny. The concept of virtue is 
teleological because disinterested virtue, like disinterested love, seeks another, but he does not 
focus on teleology from the perspective of end times. Indifference to salvation removed the 
concept of duty from eschatological concerns. Because the only metaphysical certainly 
regarding the self is that the individual participates in infinity, the will is unencumbered to act 
morally as a part of Ultimate Goodness.  Humility in each present action creates the teleology of 
virtue as habit.  A vital aspect of Fenelon’s political thought is that humility anchors the soul and 
community moment by moment according to free will; Fénelon’s Dialogues sur l’éloquence 
explains the importance of understanding in rhetoric. Fénelon acknowledges the value of 
language and thought as the meditative link between reason and contemplation: 
Plato shows that the great defect of the rhetoricians is that they strive for the art of 
persuasion before they understand, by the principles of philosophy, what are the 
things which they ought to seek to convince men of. He would have the speaker 
commence with the study of man in general; and afterwards apply himself to 
knowing the particular men to whom he will have to speak. Thus the speaker will 
be obliged to know what man is, what is his destiny, what are his true interests; of 
what he is made, that is to say, body and soul; what is the true way to make him 
happy; what are his passions, what excesses they may have, how they may be 
regulated, how they may be usefully aroused in order to make him love the good; 
what regulations are fitted to make him live in peace and to keep society together. 
After this general study comes the particular. The speaker must understand the 
laws and customs of his country, the connection they have with the temperament 
of the people, the manners of each class, their different degrees of education, the 
prejudices and interests dominant in his own time, the means of instructing and 
reforming the mind. You see that such knowledge as this amounts to a thorough 
acquaintance with philosophy. Thus does Plato show that the role of true orator 
belongs only to the philosopher. It is with this in mind that we must interpret 
everything he says in the Gorgias against the rhetoricians; that is to say, against 
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the kind of person who devises his own art of speech and persuasion, without 
putting himself to any trouble to know in terms of principles what one ought to 
seek to convince men of.86  
 
The above quote brings to mind again Paul Tillich’s ideas of vertical and horizontal thinking that 
were explained in the Introduction to this dissertation.87  Fenelon advises that rhetors must be 
concerned with the vertical ideas of what is man’s ultimate interest and destiny before they can 
address the particular means by which man ought to achieve this interest and destiny in practice.   
Also, Fénelon emphasizes that how one learns and experiences is essential with respect 
to what one learns. He would agree with Augustine’s description of a great orator: “To teach is 
a necessity, to delight is a beauty, to persuade is a triumph.”88 Teaching depends on what we 
say. Delight and persuasion depend on the way we say it.  For Fénelon, how one persuades is 
crucial to engaging the recipient in a disinterested relationship. Language as aesthetic and the 
sublime as beautiful are ways to triumph.  Meaningful persuasion must speak to the heart and 
uphold free will. 
A polemic for the demise of rhetoric as persuasion in the seventeenth century began with 
Descartes’s reconfiguration of knowledge.89 What place could remain for the practice of rhetoric 
when philosophers incorporate the Cartesian concepts of knowledge, self-evidence of clear and 
distinct ideas, and the different orientations of the mind and body?90 Rhetoric involves the 
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relationship between knowledge and communication; it also brings up the relationship between 
assent and persuasion.91 Would evidence presented with rational clarity and sincere conviction 
be enough to win over the assent of those listening?  Descartes’s idea of generosity attempted to 
incorporate various passions under a fundamental passion, the zeal for truth according to rational 
attentiveness.  In response to Descartes, de Balzac followed the Stoic humanist tradition and 
combined the use of philosophy and rhetoric in a way that resonated in the salons and court 
culture of honnête homme.92 Bernard Lamy re-emphasized style of presentation and the use of 
imagination in the effectiveness of persuasion.   Like Balzac, Fénelon realized the importance of 
communicating with everyone, not just speculative thinkers. Like Lamy, Fénelon enlisted 
aesthetic impressions, imagination, and reason in the service of the Sublime.  Fénelon 
emphasizes the vital role of rhetoric to communicate the principle of unselfishness to everyone in 
a variety of ways that point to Ultimate Goodness.  Communicating this principle is the 
foundation of civic education in his thought. 
The purpose of rhetoric in Fénelon’s moral theory is to inspire unselfish action. This 
inspiration involves a passive or silent state to receive impressions and communication and an 
active state of the will to be virtuous.  For both Fénelon and Descartes, l’entendement is passive. 
It receives information.  For Fénelon, the understanding and will are silent in the contemplative 
state.  Then, with contemplative impressions, intuition, interpretation and understanding, the will 
determines how it will move actively.  Fénelon emphasizes that the will acts upon what it 
perceives through the understanding as well as through what is unexplainable by reason or 
evidence.  Fénelon conceives the interior life as being beyond reason and imagination. Emmanuel 
Bury’s study of interior spirituality in Fénelon’s teachings of Christian eloquence insists on the 
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effort required in meditation to render the mediator attentive to the divine message that usually 
passes unnoticed.93 This effort involves silencing distractions, especially prideful ones.  
Fénelon’s system incorporates Neo-Platonic emanation, but it also incorporates the moral role of 
the individual in the ascent to union. Union, as noted before, is the basis of Fenelon’s system of 
ethics.  Infinitude and finitude share in reality, including moral reality. 
Fénelon takes a principle and sets it to life through a speaker, writer, or, his ideal, a 
political leader in Telemachus and hopefully the Duke of Burgundy. To do so, he used the 
senses to animate, inspire, and bring reason to light.  The senses represent the undeveloped 
reason that can lead to the true point. Socrates was an exemplar of communicating in a logical, 
reflecting manner that leads to the underlying point.  Socrates’s method was able, in Fénelon’s 
strong mystical language of the annihilation of selfishness in the soul, to strip presumptions, 
preconceptions, and prejudices to down to a point of nakedness so that the soul would be fresh to 
receive impressions of virtue and truth as Ultimate Goodness.  The metaphor of stripping the soul 
of mercenary attachment to the point of nudity is the contemplative mystical language of 
describing the act by which the soul becomes purely receptive to disinterested love.94 The soul 
exists in a receptive state.  Yet, it has stripped itself of all attachment in order to enlarge room in 
the heart and mind toward virtue.  Socrates applied the docta ingoratia to assist his students to 
create this type of space by maximizing the use of reason.  He stripped the soul of ignorance in 
order to create a beginning point to lead the soul to the truth. Socrates’s method became the 
model of Fénelon’s theory of rhetoric. 
He [Socrates] inclined them as much as he could to temperance, and an aversion 
to sensual delights, showing them how they deprived a man of the most valuable 
                                                            
93 Bury, “Éloquence et spiritualité dans la pensée fénelonienne,” 109-29. 
 
94 Fénelon, “Lettres et opuscules spirituels, 29,” Œuvres, vol. 1 (Gallimard, 1997), 690-93. 
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thing he as master of, namely, his liberty. His method of treating moral 
philosophy was so much the more engaging, by being performed only by way of 
conversation, and without any set design; for without proposing any particular 
point to discuss, he took the first which offered: he at first asked a question as a 
man that seeks to be informed; and afterwards making use of what was granted in 
those questions, he led people to the proposition that was contradictory to what he 
stated in the beginning of the dispute. Everybody was welcome, and no body ever 
went away without becoming a better man.95 
 
Virtue begins at the point of passsive receptiveness.  Receptivity to virtue increases 
inversely to the degree to which selfishness decreases. In addition to the method of Socrates, the 
connection between virtue and receptiveness appears in another way in Fénelon’s thought. His 
theory of early education demonstrates that unfettered receptiveness leads to virtue.  The purest 
example of a pure state of receptivity is the state of an innocent infant.96 A child has no fear, 
shame, pride, or preconceptions.  Fénelon maintains that the ideas and behaviors which develop 
later in life are based on impressions children receive in infancy, even before they can 
communicate linguistically. 97 Virtuous care of an infant and child is the best education to instill 
a later trust, openness, and connection to others, and virtuous care is a practical education by 
example that goes beyond language. 
Rhetoric evokes consciousness because there is an internal connection between what is 
learned and the way in which it is learned.98 Rhetoric, whether written or spoken, is experienced 
by both the giver and the receiver of it within an internal context. This context is interpreted 
through spiritual contemplation, aesthetic beauty of poetic arts, learned cultural and social 
                                                            
95 Francois Fénelon, Lives and Most Remarkable Maxims of the Antient Philosophers (Dublin, IR: J. Watts, 
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96 François Fénelon, “The Education of Girls,” Fénelon on Education, trans. and intro. H. C. Barnard 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 10. 
 
97 Fénelon, “Opuscules théologique I. concernant l’ apologétique, Œuvres (Gallimard, 1997), vol.. 2, 885. 
 
98 Maurice Natanson, “The Arts of Indirection,” in Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration, ed. 
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mores, and norms.  Rhetoric affects action between men whether they are speakers, listeners, 
writers, or readers.99 The speaker is in a situation in language.  Words transport intent and 
meaning by engaging impressions, intuitions, and memory.  In this sense, they have teleological 
purpose, although with respect to a timeline. Rhetoric affects action in the present moment, and 
actions in the moment create an accountability and responsibility. 
So, any recipient of communication is a beginner in so far as he considers meaning and 
purpose. Not only what one learns but also how one associates and experiences the learning 
process is important.100 These truths can only be appropriated by a person’s own effort and not 
by direct communication that seeks to impart results.101 So, the rhetor’s task is not to lead, but to 
guide in a way that liberates an individual to engage with his own inwardness.102 The role of the 
rhetor is to support a relationship without permitting discipleship and to encourage interpretation 
without legislating.  The search for connections between the source and recipient of 
communication hinges on the capacity of the one to locate another within a point of common 
reference.  This process aids consciousness of intent and affirms an individual’s place in the 
continuity in the past, present and future. 
The rhetor is a guide for personal development. As Plato saw it, Socrates exercised 
dialectical thinking in order to make room for the docta ignorantia as the beginning point of true 
philosophy. Socrates’s unyielding questions had a positive aim.  The inquiry relied on logic and 
reason to stimulate the spirit toward truth instead of stifling it, although the stimulation required 
                                                            
 
99 Ibid., 36. 
 
100 Ibid., 47. 
 
101 In his reflections of Søren Kierkegaard. see: Kierkegaard, vol. 2 ( of 2 vols) (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1962) 630; as cited in Natanson, 42. 
 
102 Natanson, 40. 
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humility. In terms of Fénelonean truth, the ideal role of the rhetor is to be disinterested in his 
aims, while the listener is to be disinterested with respect to prior experience and assumptions. 
Truth reaches far beyond the Dianoia of pure knowledge to being as goodness. Humility is 
necessary for the silence within that allows reckoning with the limits of understanding to reach 
pure knowledge and to reach beyond its limits to the goodness of the will as part of Fénelonean 
Beauty.   Doubt reveals the contingency of reason in comparison to infinite possibility and in the 
end leads a person to turn toward a reliance on Beauty.  Fénelon, in a manner similar to 
Socrates’s, followed the method of stripping to discover meaning.  “Il faut faire taire toute 
creature, il faut se fair taire soi-mệme…”103   Silencing discursiveness also leads to the docta 
ignorantia in the mystic contemplative life of striving upwardly unkowningly.104 This silence 
leads to awe and receptivity to new horizons. It creates room to focus attention on underlying 
messages that otherwise go unnoticed.  This silence is the milieu of Fénelonean demi-néant from 
which unity emerges105  In this place, personal freedom comes from connative awareness and 
self-determination of conscience.  As a teacher, the rhetor uses intuition, reason, impressions, 
inspiration, and persuasion to free the recipient to find his own meaning.  Finding meaning and 
purpose is freeing as the recipient embraces self-awareness.106  
The meaning and use of language brought importance to the coherence between 
Fénelon’s mystical theology, virtue, and politics. He used language as the means for a reader or 
listener to experience ideas as practical reality. Language facilitated the recipient’s having 
                                                            
103 Opuscules spirituels, cited in Emmanuel Bury, “Éloquence et spiritualité dans la pensée Fénelonienne; 
convergences et tensions,” in eds. Carole Dornier and Jürgen Siess (Paris: Champion, 2002), 109-29; all as cited in 
John D. Lyons. Before Imagination (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 253-54, endnote 24. 
 
104 Pseudo Dyonisius the Aereopagite, On Mystical Theology. c.1.§1. 
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communication that allowed him to grasp the meaning of an idea with feeling, motivation, and 
purpose.  Fénelon used descriptive and detailed language to engage the conscience with the 
purpose and consequences of an idea.  In accordance with the ancient and pre-Kantian 
understanding of the world, a priori moral principles are recognizable through language.  Noesis 
is accessible. An idea can become practice when the inner reflection involved in the experience 
of reading or hearing about an idea allows the idea to become a practice. 
Here Fénelon makes the very important theological distinction between acts and virtues 
in his moral theory. “Continual desire is divided into as many real acts as there are successive 
moments during which it lasts…there is nothing but the positive renewal of an act that can make 
that act continuous.”107 In other words, there might be a continuous desire to be perfect, but 
perfection exists only when it is being performed.  As acts exist only instantaneously while they 
are being performed, an act is a decision and includes rational processes and indeclinability.  An 
act of indeclinability, i.e., perceiving and choosing one side or the other, is not the same as 
disinterestedness as a moral value of unselfishness. 
“La vertu qui est une habitude, c’est la persuasion habituelle du bien qui est nôtre 
véritable bien.”108 Virtue is the abiding habit of sustained intention, the individual’s mode of 
                                                            
 
107 “Desire does not cease, any more than distinct acts, in this way of prayer; for love, which is the root of 
all contemplation, is a continual desire of the beloved Spouse of the soul, and this continual desire is divided into 
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108 Fénelon, “La Nature de l’ homme expliquée par les simples notions de l’être en general,”Œuvres, vol. 2, 
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relating to the past, present and future.109 The habitual inclination of the heart is dispositional 
rather than rational, and habitual motive is abiding and pervasive. Thus, virtue is a leaning of 
inclination that stems from the heart of inner disposition and volition.110   In moral actions, the 
rational indeclinability of decisions (la pensée) flows with movement of the will (la volonté). 
Fénelon seeks to go beyond Descartes to address what connects and provides unity to 
enumerable instances. The same principle of inner unity that underlies the geometrical structure 
of a building underlies the justice of moral disposition. Each depends upon instantiating them 
itself a sustaining way.  Infinity, although it is impossible to limit, includes an intuitive way to 
approximate what is imperfect.111 The approximation of imperfection expands the possibility of 
discovery and perfection of union between the finite and the infinite.  The ineffable continuity of 
infinity and unity are discovered when the self relinquishes epistemological experience in favor 
of ontological experience. 
In Fénelon’s Dialogue 31 between Cicero and Demosthenes, the latter says, “The true use 
of virtue is to set truth in its fairest light, and to incline others to follow their greatest interest; that 
is, to cultivate justice and all other virtues.  That is the use that Plato has made of his eloquence, 
in which neither of us has follow’d in his example.”112  
Platon, dit souvent, que l’amour de beau est tout le bien de l’homme, que l’homme 
ne peut être heureux en soi, et que ce qu’il y a de plus divin pour lui, c’est de 
sortir de soi par l’amour; en effet le plaisir qu’on éprouve dans le transport des 
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passions n’est qu’un effet de la pente de l’âme pour sortir des ses bornes étroites, 
et pour aimer hors d’elle le beau infini.113  
 
….Cette impression est donnée à l’homme dès son origine. Sa perfection est 
tellement de sortir de soi par l’amour, qu’il veut sans cesse persuader et aux autres 
et à soi-même qu’il aime sans retour sur soi les amis auxquels il s’attache…Cette 
idée...est le fondement de toute amitié et de toute justice….Elle est ce qu’il y a de 
plus divin [emphasis in original] en nous.114  
 
As this chapter approaches its end, it is instructive to chart the course Fénelon’s 
moral philosophy took because his premise that conative reality is the proper study of 
mankind was a topic of much interest in the century to follow.  Fénelon rejected the version 
of Stoic wisdom in the salons and court that virtue exists by itself and for oneself.115 This 
version was tantamount to pride hiding under the guise of virtue.116 Fénelon did not agree 
with Locke’s idea of tabula rasa that opposed the existence of innate ideas. Fénelon would 
also have disagreed with Hume’s position of empirical skepticism that it is not possible to 
know of an external world because knowledge is limited to the ideas in the mind, and with 
Berkley’s idealism as well, which dismissed the external world as insubstantial ideas in the 
mind. 
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According to Fénelon, the mind is aware of and capable of reflecting upon itself 
and acting in the world. He emphasized the total experience of the soul rather than 
categories of will, understanding, and natural senses.  Fénelon’s position is akin to Scottish 
thinkers, such as Thomas Reid, who maintained that there are innate ideas and inherent 
ways to grasp common sense in a way that can be interdependent with reason. According 
to Fénelon, common sense, is 
[n]othing but those notions that all men hold concerning the same things. 
Common sense, which is always and everywhere the same, which foresees every 
test, which renders the examination of certain questions ridiculous…this sense 
which is common to all men, waits only to be consulted, is evident at a glance and 
discovers in an instant the truth or absurdity of questions, what else could it be but 
what I call my ideas?117 
 
Most poignantly, Fénelon charted a course which Rousseau would consider. For both 
thinkers, connative experience is that which is discovered through trial and error in life. 
Telemachus journeyed with Mentor, and afterward Émile journeyed with Telemachus in hand for 
the common purpose of discovering the meaning of life through the examples and experiences of 
life. The end is transcendence. Association is an essential part of being a person that is made 
possible when the individual goes out of selfish pride. Disinterestedness and association are 
correlative. As the next two chapters will explore, this correlation is the basis of Fénelon’s case 
for a disinterested king and Rousseau’s recognition of the need for a General Legislator. 
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Chapter 5:  Fénelon’s Political Theory of Disinterestedness 
 
 
“It is the principle duty of a king to represent goodness on earth.”1 
“A king is only king in order to take care of his people….in leading the whole human race to 
virtue.”2  
 
Each individual’s willingness to contribute unselfishly to others is the principal question in 
Fenelon’s political theory.  This willingness underlies the ability of a person to be at one with 
himself and at the same time in relationship with others in a community. Fénelon relied on the 
principle of disinterestedness for individuals to act in favor of others and a flourishing community.  
The challenge that Fénelon faced in his political theory is to match unselfish words and actions 
with veracity.  He follows Homer, “Therefore he sent me to teach thee these things to be both a 
speaker of words and a doer of deeds.”3  
 
Words must convey meaning that is substantiated by actions. “Look for a man who has 
your laws written in his heart….let your choice be determined by actions, and not words.”4 It is 
crucial to remember that the will is a matter of the heart. Disposition, character, and will 
determine action with the assistance of reflection. Fénelon relies on the community language, 
rhetoric, to inspire the will toward unselfishness. Communication that speaks to the heart is the 
link between words and action. In this regard, Fénelon agreed with Augustine’s reference to 
Cicero, “'[a]n eloquent man must speak so as to teach, to delight, and to persuade.”5 Moreover, 
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Fénelon agreed with Augustine’s further explanation.  “To teach is a necessity, to delight is a 
beauty, to persuade is a triumph.  Now of these three, the one first mentioned, the teaching, 
which is a matter of necessity, depends on what is said; the other two on how something is 
said.”6  
In this chapter, the connection between the principle of disinterested virtue and 
communication will be linked in three steps.  One part is theoretical and focuses on Fénelon’s 
theory of property as a primary aspect of his political theory of disinterestedness. The second part 
provides a historical base for grasping how this theory so starkly contrasts with the political theory 
of his time, especially that of absolutism.  The third part establishes civic education as the practical 
bridge of communication to bring disinterested virtue to life in civic society.  It is quintessentially 
Fénelonean to integrate theory, history, and practice in the present. 
Fénelon’s Theory of Property 
Fénelon’s idea of property consistently reflects the ideas of disinterestedness and union 
in his political thought and involves the concepts of altruism, cooperation, and moderation. 
His theory is not based on the assumption that utility or personal satisfaction of preferences are 
of primary importance to the human condition, individually or collectively. In other words, 
his property theory is not based on self-interested acquisition or personal preference 
satisfaction.  It is not based on the premise that there exists a "human propensity to be a self-
interested, rational utility maximizer."7 Fénelon does not emphasize self-ownership in labor. 
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Labor is stewardship for and fruition of donated talents, viz. gifts of God. 
Fénelon’s concept of property is based on social relationship and interdependency.8 
Therein lies its normative, economic, and personal significance.  Property is one way people 
depend on each other to survive and thrive.  Fénelon focuses on original non-ownership and 
the principle to use property for the well-being of humankind. This focus promotes economic 
prosperity that benefits all.  He concurred with Aristotle that property is not an end in itself. For 
Fénelon, property is as a means of advancing human flourishing materially and morally, as it 
enhances cooperative union.9 Property develops in people an appreciation for the responsibility 
of promoting the public good rather than merely satisfying individual preferences. 
Stewardship of property is an opportunity to contribute with disinterest.10  
The meaning of property distribution is quite different when it is regarded as a gift rather 
than an acquisition. It is something to be shared. This perspective has considerable 
implications for distribution among those in the same country who do not share equal access to 
inheritance or to social, economic, or legal status. Fénelon’s idea of property emphasizes that it 
cannot be considered personal entitlement, gain, or acquisition.  The reason is that goods, 
talents, and opportunity are resources, as gifts, that are almost exclusively beyond personal 
control, except the responsibility of stewardship. The only value of property as a human 
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construct is that it is an avenue for developing donated talents, sharing, and thriving together as 
a community.  This value defines the intent of private property. Talents must be embraced, 
developed, and shared by each individual for common thriving to endure. 
Civic education according to the principles of disinterestedness and amour pur increase 
the degree of successful community thriving.  This is not an education of indoctrination or force. 
It is not a dismantling of personal property, socio-economic status, or inheritance. Civic education 
instills the individual’s discovery of what is ultimately good: unity, responsibility, cooperation, 
and sharing.  This development instills human dignity and integrity.  Fénelon’s idea of love does 
not naïvely dismiss the prevalence of human pride, i. e., egoistic self-interest.  For him, pride and 
flattery were the roots of court society and the honnête homme.  Pride was entrenched in the 
politics, society, culture, church, theology, and economics as the premise for human motivation. 
The politics of virtue had altered into the politics of self-interest. His point is that this pride 
cannot lead to human flourishing and thriving, individually or communally.  Fénelon, unlike 
nearly every thinker of his day, maintained that authentic essence of human motivation is beyond 
self-interest.  One of the most significant points of his political theory is that the fruition of this 
possibility cannot be marginalized if a community is to thrive and flourish. 
Another important aspect of Fenelon’s disinterested idea of property is that value is not 
quantitatively distributive or retributive in Aristotelian terms. It disrupts Aristotle’s system of 
checks and balance in justice.  The meaning of property is not the commensurate exchange of 
actions to produce a subjective effect of worth.   The value of property is defined qualitatively as a 
means of regarding human dignity.  Otherwise, it is worthless.  Infinite esteem for human worth 
that cannot be quantified.  The meaning of property reaches ground higher than a means to a finite 
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personal end.11  
For Fénelon, obligation as the means of commensurate exchange devalues using property 
with dignity. Michel Serres has pointed out the difficulty that Molière’s Don Juan identified in 
the willingness to be obligated and obliged to exchange and give.12 Obligation thwarts virtue, and 
the exchange of tobacco, a prized commodity, exemplified the difficulty: 
How can you become a virtuous, honest man? By offering before wishing, by 
giving before asking, by accepting and reciprocating. How strange an object this 
tobacco is, as it is invested with a power of communication and a unitive virtue 
which leads to virtue, whereby being an evil man, even if you are a great lord, 
consists of despising tobacco, I mean not willing to accept its law, i.e. to be 
obligated and obliged to exchanging and giving. 
 
 Pierre Force points out that the rehabilitation of Molière’s misanthrope, Alceste, was made 
possible in the eighteenth century by the appearance of a concept that is foreign to Molière: the 
concept of human dignity.  Force asserts that “Kant revolutionizes Aristotelian ethics by asserting 
the existence of a value that is not conditioned by the social exchange.”13 While this concept was 
foreign to the ethics of l’homme honnête, its seminal roots were not foreign to the mysticism of 
disinterestedness at the time of Molière. The mysticism of Fénelon and the pietistic traditions of 
Kant’s parents’ gave both thinkers access to the possibilities for disinterestedness in ethics. 
Fénelon’s thought interjects an amendment to Force’s claim that Kant revolutionized the idea of 
human dignity, although Kant’s The Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Morals is more well-
known. Fénelon’s thought equally identifies that the existence of worth cannot be determined by 
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social exchange as a means toward a personal end. Distinctly, for Fénelon, individual worth and 
character are inseparable. Moral dignity is not universalized. In civic society, the moral dignity 
of human worth requires virtuous individual characters who regard each member with 
disinterested esteem. 
Acting, i.e., loving non-egoistically is the core of free will.  The individual is responsible 
for his decisions and actions.  Even if a person denies himself egoistically in his actions, he 
remains responsible for them and their effects.  As such, there is an emphasis on personal 
responsibility that ties an individual to his decisions and actions. There is a distinction between 
Fénelon’s moral theory and that of utilitarian, Kantian, or liberal theories which impersonalize 
moral rules.14 For Fénelon, the authenticity of a moral action emanates from the uniquely disposed 
character of each individual.  His esteem for the individual as a moral agent in relation to civic 
society has sustained the universal appeal of his thought for 300 years. 
Rousseau recognized Fenelon’s idea of disinterested virtuous character as the root of 
human worth in civic society. This was a way to make sense of the varying degrees of love as 
amour propre and amour pur in the experience of being human among others. Rousseau expressed 
this recognition in the following two examples: First, he explained the unquantifiable joy of 
giving when he gave a group of school girls a few chances in a lottery game: “This word spread a 
joy through the whole group which alone would have more than reimbursed me, had I used up all 
my money,”15 Dignity toward others has no limit. The joy that was given exceedingly 
overshadowed any expectation or desire of receiving. Second, in the end of his walk near the 
École Militaire, Rousseau wanted to show his gratitude to a veteran. The two shared an agreeable 
                                                            
14 For a discussion of impersonalization, see: Lawrence A. Blum, “Vocation, Friendship, and Community: 
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15 Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, 9th Walk, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (New York: New 
York University Press, 1979), as cited in Pierre Force, 26. 
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conversation, but Rousseau did not dare to give him money for prized tobacco. He summarized 
his attitude: “I soon consoled myself by thinking that I would have acted against my own 
principles, so to speak, by mixing with honorable things a prize of money which degrades their 
nobility and sullies their disinterestedness.”16  
Rousseau’s disinterested principles of ethics clearly echo Fénelonean heritage. For both 
of them, disinterestedness means that what is morally good is not quantifiable and must be 
gratuitously given.  Virtue and self-interest are distinct.  Disinterestedness is infinitely good, 
because giving is without limit, just as goodness has no limit, and goodness requires 
intentionality.  As Kant concurred, “only good will is the only thing that is unqualifiedly good.”17 
Rousseau decided that giving money to the veteran would manifest some gratitude, but it would 
do so at a price which is lower than the infinitely good.18  
Fénelon explains his property theory in terms of the universal propensity for 
disinterestedness that he interpreted in the ancient human age of gold. An important element of 
Fénelon’s property theory is his rejection of prevalent Skepticism that put limits on the 
metaphysical experience that could be gained from the senses.  His pastoral references to 
simplicity in the agricultural foundation of culture and society point to property as a means of 
thriving in a community as an organic system.  Interdependency is the basis of property.  By 
explaining his property theory in terms beside theological disinterestedness, he established a 
philosophical argument that property is universal. 
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Fénelon’s property theory is practically and ethically based. He correlates the way 
members of a society regard property with the spiritual health and disposition of that society 
toward amour propre or amour pur.   Fénelon’s idea of the relationship between productivity and 
abundance is analogous to the position that love increases love. As one seed produces much fruit, 
abundance is boundless.  For him, resources and production increase as population increases.  “The 
genuine strength and true riches of a kingdom consist in the number of people.”19 The more 
people produce, especially in the area of agriculture, the more there will be to produce. “[T]he 
produce of the earth will always be in proportion to the number of persons who till it.”20 Domestic 
production of agriculture is the supporting foundation for the production of arts for necessary use 
and for export.  Fénelon did not maintain that a zero sum situation exists in regard to productivity.  
Nor did he maintain, as Malthus later would, that population increases geometrically while the 
means of subsistence increases arithmetically. 
Ethically, Fénelon’s concepts of property, production, and abundance support his idea of 
human dignity.  He maintained that every human had the right to the basic necessities of life, 
including food, shelter, and clothing. The dire poverty and destitution that the populace suffered 
as results of war, fiscal burdens, and famine in contemporary France influenced his position 
without a doubt.  Fénelon also maintained that it is a fundamental source of human fulfillment for 
a person to provide his own means of subsistence.  In particular, agriculture is the most fulfilling 
livelihood. There would also be fulfillment when a person uses his God-given talents to produce 
arts that contribute to disinterestedness in society. Use of the talents for the sake of self-
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preservation and disinterestedness in society provide a type of independency that is not contrary to 
being disinterested.  This use “is to be found in that independent wealth which a man derives from 
his own labor, and in the possession of all the necessaries and conveniences of life, as the genuine 
produce of his own field.  Agriculture alone is that labor which supplies all that is of real value 
with innocence and liberty.”21  
Another ethical consideration is that luxury adversely impacts being disinterested. Fénelon 
addressed the question of luxury and morality by maintaining that luxury pridefully leads people 
astray from unselfishness.  He considered the corrective sumptuary measures, but he did not want 
to restrict freedom of action by forcing restrictions.  His position was a compromise between these 
two views. He maintained that restrictive measures are necessary only if the exchange or 
production of items of luxury preclude production of the basic necessities of life.  Such a 
hindrance did not seem likely due to his confidence in the abundance of resources and the ability 
to exceed demand.  Although Fénelon considered prescriptive restrictions on luxury items, the 
weight of his political theory does not rest on them. He upholds dignity, free will, and free action 
to provide for a flourishing community. 
A significant contribution to Fenelon’s theories of property and civic society is found in 
his fable, The Life of Epicurus. One aspect of importance is here is that Rousseau later used a 
markedly similar illustration regarding the anthropological evolution of society. Pre-linguistic 
man learned the advantages of association for hunting and procreation.  Language developed 
expediently. “[A]t first they pointed with the finger to the thing of which they stood in 
need…but gradually, for greater convenience, they invented names.”22 The burning sun gave 
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them the idea of using fire.  Agriculture became an object of attention as men realized the 
process by which seeds fell from trees then later sprouted.  Metal ore was then used to make 
agricultural implements and looms for weaving clothes.  Then, Fénelon explained the origins of 
property and the state: 
[C]ities began to be built, and lands were divided, though unequally, with the best portions 
falling to the lot of those who possessed of the greatest strength or address. They gradually 
made themselves kings, and reduced the rest to subjection, compelling them to build 
citadels for them, to protect them against their neighbors.23 
 
Fénelon continued by explaining how society transformed morally from one of felicity to 
avariciousness. He concluded, like Rousseau afterward in L’orgine de l’inégalité des hommes, 
that the development of the imagination and the arts adversely impacted the fulfillment of human 
potential.  Men became attracted to the brilliance of gold and desired to hoard it.  Social 
association was attenuated as men began to entertain each other. They composed songs to imitate 
birds; the winds among reeds gave them the idea of developing flutes.  Avarice led to cunning, 
force, and the means of gaining superiority.  Wars ensued. Then, war inspired poets and artists to 
delight ears and eyes with false impressions of honor. Finally, peaceful repose prevailed when 
men occupied themselves with perfecting arts that provided for their necessities.  Fénelon 
describes this repose in his theology of pur amour and in Book Seven of Telemachus, where the 
society of Bétique emulates the saints in heaven where “all possess everything in God, without 
having anything of their own.”24 All goods are held in common, including knowledge, virtues, and 
riches. 
Fénelon’s anthropological description depicts a spectrum between two models of civic 
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society.  One is based on avarice, fear, and amour propre.  It is diseased by mercenary disposition. 
The other represents a healthy disposition based on generosity, hope, and pur amour.  In 
Telemachus, the former is Salenté, and the latter is Bétique.  These models are extensions of the 
spiritual nature of man. The degree to which one or the other of these types of civic society can 
prevail is a matter of the degrees of disinterestedness in the leaders and members at large.  
Effectiveness is instantiated with top-down and bottom-up participation. Fénelon claims that 
disinterested property is vital to plenty and prosperity and that commerce is a means of sharing 
them. Commerce is a source of cooperation among neighboring nations when it is respected 
similarly to the equal parts of an organic body that functions as a unit. In this respect, nations 
compose one great body or community joined together by commerce. 
Interdependency is beneficial according to emerging free market principles.  For Fénelon, 
like the Physiocrats who later admired his ideas, interdependency provides the possibility of 
progress and the sense of equality, cooperation, and balance.25 Balance in terms of economic as 
well as political power is essential.  A particular people or nation is inwardly and substantially 
invincible within this body when the population includes numerous people who are disciplined 
and skilled in agriculture and other necessary arts.26 The possibilities for progress and 
productivity, personally and communally, are not limited. On this basis, Fénelon opposed the 
restrictions, taxes, and centralized controls of mercantilism.  According to Fénelon, people know 
and visit one another because no land supplies all that is useful to human life.  “Want invites men 
to commerce in order to supply one another’s necessities. ’Tis therefore that want is the natural tie 
of society between nations.”27 In the same work Fénelon refers to the artful industry of societies of 
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bees that Virgil described.28 This symbiosis supports Fénelon’s ideas of property and commerce 
that oppose mercantilism, presage free trade, and are prescient of the Physiocrats.  For Fénelon and 
the Physiocrats, economic progress can be understood in linear time.  According to Fénelon, the 
success of progress rests in the fulfillment of the king’s duty to sustain and pass on a common 
cultural composure that is parallel to the inward spirituality of disinterestedness. 
Fenelon’s property theory is not about ownership.  Stewardship and sharing define 
property.  Using goods from earnings or inheritance was not the issue.  Property is a means of 
subsistence, of excelling in virtue, contributing to the greater good of the public unit, and living 
disinterestedly.  Property is about the union of the finite individual and the infinite community. 
The issue is how property is regarded, either acquisitively for self-satisfaction or disinterestedly 
for the greater good. In understanding Fénelon’s property theory, it is helpful to consider his 
seminary training and ordination in the Order of Sulpice. This order did not take the vow of 
poverty.  Accordingly, Fénelon acknowledges that earthly resources allow for the practice of 
virtue with respect to doing good for those whom one loves.  Disinterested love requires neither 
renouncing lawful possessions nor abandoning the advantages of any condition of life.29 However, 
it does require using them with moderation, not making of them God and happiness. Property was 
a crucible of the same principle of character development, regardless of a person’s socio-
economic standing or means.   Whether the means to access property stem from labor or 
inheritance, the source of property is borrowed from God. The idea that all is given implies an 
openness to returning as much as to sharing responsibly. 
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According to Fénelon, all any individual owns is his free will. Even talents and resources 
are donated gifts of being, and their development is contingent upon circumstance. Fénelon’s idea 
of property demonstrates his premises that the individual is a custodian or steward, not an owner 
of property.  In the community, the idea of custodial property as a donation included the idea of 
responsible stewardship toward others in use.  With the premise that property is a gift, 
custodianship of it developed character through moderate use and otherwise sharing. 
Custodianship includes the acknowledgement of inheritance, but the primary principle of 
use is moderation and necessity based on station in life.  There is some room for economic 
recognition of social status.  Custodianship is also defined for the purpose of enhancing the well-
being of the community, not private aggrandizement. According to Michael Novak, “Aristocracy 
fosters a certain type of community.  Curiously, aristocratic structures teach human beings a 
communitarian way of life.”30 He refers to Tocqueville, who was familiar with Fenelon’s ideas. 
 
As in aristocratic communities all the citizens occupy fixed positions, one above 
another.  The result is that each of them always sees a man above himself whose 
patronage is necessary to him, and below himself another man whose cooperation he 
may claim.  Men living in aristocratic ages are therefore almost always closely attached 
to something placed out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget 
themselves.  It is true that in these ages the notion of human fellowship is faint and that 
men seldom think of sacrificing themselves for mankind; but they often sacrifice 
themselves for other men…Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the 
community, from the peasant to the king.31  
 
Among aristocratic nations, a man almost always knows his forefathers and respects 
them; he thinks he already sees his remote descendents and he loves them. He 
willingly imposes duties on himself towards the former and the latter, and he will 
frequently sacrifice his personal gratifications to those who went before and to those 
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who will come after him.32  
If donation is the original foundation of resources, then any productivity from them may 
only be regarded as constituent relations that promote common good rather than satisfying 
individual preferences.  Fénelon does deny the intrinsic value that follows from personal 
development of borrowed talents and means.  What he emphasizes is that this development 
inextricably leads to and is connected to the whole. The meaning of property lies in 
relationship.  This view establishes property as a contribution toward abiding community, 
and it dates back to the ancients. It treats property not as an end in itself but as a means toward 
advancing human flourishing and building relations of trust.33 Fénelon intently and clearly 
contrasted his model of property with the trend of economics based on amour propre. 
He cites many ancient thinkers to support his idea of property as shared stewardship. 
According to Solon, “We ought to observe a medium in everything.”34 Thales exhibited 
disinterested sharing when he distributed his gain of the bounty of the Miletus olive harvest 
among all the merchants there.  Thales placed happiness in enjoying health with a competent 
subsistence and not living in sloth.35 Pythagoras’s disciples had no private possessions and put all 
that they had in one common purse.36 Implicit equality is another point from Pythagoras: Fénelon 
emphasized that Pythagoras said that all things are common among friends and that friendship 
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makes all people equal.37 This view of friendship reflected the same principle as his mathematical 
theory: unity is the first principle of all things.38 Here Fénelon connects common sharing with 
unity. For Aristotle, happiness does not lie in corporeal pleasures, honor, ambition, or riches. It 
consists in the exercise of understanding and the practice of virtue.39  
Fénelon’s interpretation of Socrates was a major support for property as stewardship. 
“All antiquity allowed Socrates to be the most virtuous and knowing of all the heathen 
philosophers.”40 Socrates knew of disinterestedness because he did not maintain that it was 
honest to make gain or profit from teaching virtue: Socrates understood giving the gift of fruit 
from a garden.41 Although Socrates referred to heathen gods, Fénelon appreciated his principle, 
“It is the peculiar privilege of the gods to want nothing, so the less we need, the nearer we 
approach to their nature.42 In choosing death, Socrates proved that neither life nor death can 
minimize liberty in contrast to want. He offered insight regarding the non sequitur between 
property as personal preference satisfaction and the sanctity of liberty:  Socrates “inclined them 
as much as he could to temperance, and an aversion to sensual delights, showing them how they 
deprived a man of the most valuable thing he is master of, namely, his liberty.”43  
For Fénelon and Augustine, virtue is more than self-mastery of wisdom in the Stoic 
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tradition of setting limits to human vulnerability to external corruption.44 According to 
Augustine, charity refers to right order.45 With respect to property, right order is moderation. 
Fénelon acknowledged Solon as the author of the “excellent maxim, viz. We ought to observe a 
medium in everything.”46 This idea of medium is consistent with Fénelon’s Suplician 
orientation about the use of property for needs and otherwise for sharing.  
Another way to understand Fénelon’s idea of property is to consider it from the point of 
view of Rousseau’s similar declaration later on, “You are undone if you once forget that the fruits 
of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.”47 Self-possession as self-interest was 
the ethics of l’honnête homme, the wave of the seventeenth century. For both thinkers, the 
problem was not natural resources, but the problems associated with exclusive ownership and 
amour propre.  Exclusivity (acquisition) instead of disinterestedness was the source of 
enslavement. Again, there is pertinence to Rousseau’s disinterested decision not to exchange 
esteem of veterans for money to buy materially-prized tobacco. 
One of the most Fénelonean statements that Rousseau makes is in the beginning of the 
discourse on The Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind.  “Others have spoken of 
the natural right of every man to keep what belongs to him, without explaining what they meant 
by ‘belongs’”.48 Then Rousseau continues à la Fénelon to discuss the matter of belonging in 
terms of amour propre and perfectibility.  Their accounts of the origins of society, including 
property and language, are based on writings of Epicurus similarly enough to support the claim 
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that Fénelon was a direct source for Rousseau in the discourse. Fénelon relied on Epicurus's de 
Rerum Natura in A Demonstration of the Existence, Wisdom, and Omnipotence of God.49 Both 
Fénelon and Rousseau understood very well the problem a person faces in terms of being as an 
individual and in relation to belonging as a member of a community. 
Both Fénelon and Rousseau recognize the important role of disinterestedness in inhibiting 
the way in which social order enslaves. Enslavement occurs when a person seeks status in the 
world.  It occurs when quantifiable exchange is construed as generosity. Disinterested moderation 
is the only sustaining foundation of responsibility, order, and cohesion in institutions.  The 
admittance of private property notwithstanding, only disinterested institutions that regard the 
dignity of each member are sustainable.  Disinterested moderation is the moral mandate that 
government serves the well-being of the people. Especially with respect to leaders with political 
authority and influence, it is crucial to inculcate the worth of the dignity of others in the face of 
vacillations of egoism and self-interest. The key threat to the foundation of existing institutions is 
what type of egoistic virtues could also be inculcated.  Disinterested virtue benefits the people, not 
the power of institutions. Pride, luxury, and aggrandizement are monstrous poisons. 
 Fénelon’s property theory, as a theory of disinterestedness, demands equal respect for 
human dignity.  Human advantages and ambition are not real, certainly not quantifiable. These 
should not raise a person in his own esteem.  All men are equal according to Galatians 3: 26: “Ye 
are all sons….”  In his Discourse on Humility, Fénelon asserts:  “If people have advantages 
superior to others,…this should not raise them in their own esteem; suppose they are illustrious by 
birth, station, form or talents, and have performed good actions, should we not with St. Paul ask 
ourselves like St. Paul, ‘what have I that I have not received?’ and, if I did receive them, why am I 
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vain as if I had not received them?”50 In the circumstances of life such as ethnicity, religion, 
gender, or economic status, there is no difference in the eyes of the whole.  For Fénelon, “No 
employment is mean that is of use.”51  
Fénelon integrates his ideas of community and progress into idea of commerce. Commerce 
maintains equality and balance among neighboring nations and secures common repose.  In this 
respect, nations joined together by commerce, compose one great body or community.  Fénelon, 
like the Physiocrats after him, sees the possibility of progress as in terms of a balance similar to 
the functions of an organic body.52 A particular people or nation is inwardly and substantially 
invincible within this body when the population includes numerous people who are disciplined 
and skilled in agriculture and other necessary arts.53 This is a prelude to Rousseau. For Fénelon 
and the Physiocrats, it was the duty of the sovereign to pass on to posterity in linear time the same 




It is necessary to understand five factors current in Fénelon’s day to have a background 
broad enough to relate the connections in his political theory among property, rhetoric, and civic 
virtue. His idea of property contrasts starkly to the realities of his time. The example of civic 
education by means of rhetoric and leadership tills the ground of virtue. The consistency of 
disinterested words and deeds is essential. 
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The first factor is Fénelon’s assessment of the conditions of life, the state, and the 
economy.  He described France as a destitute hospital full of disease and blamed its ills on the lack 
of virtuous leadership and stewardship by Louis XIV.  The starving rural population foraged like 
animals for roots and berries to survive, according to Fénelon.  Documentation supports Fénelon’s 
bleak description.  France lost 6% of its population, up to 2 million people, due to famine between 
1693 and 1694.  In 1694, there were riots over the price of wheat. According to McEwen, Fénelon 
wrote his indicting Lettre à Louis XIV circa 1694-95.54 Although it remains inconclusive whether 
Fénelon ever delivered this letter, his handwritten copy of it was discovered in 1725 and was later 
published in 1787 by d’Alembert.  
Selected phrases from this letter speak profoundly for themselves without interpretation. 
“For more than thirty years now your chief ministers have been overthrowing the ancient laws 
which governed this State… Reference is no longer made to the State or the laws of the State, but 
only to the King and the King’s good pleasure.”  “For more than twenty years we have suffered 
from devastating wars… Not a single one of our allies remains with us since it was not as allies 
that we wished to have them, but as slaves.” Thus, success does not justify war. In the meantime, 
the people were dying and along with them the fabrics of the family, labor force, and commerce.  
“Cultivation is almost at a standstill, population in town and country is falling, trades of all kinds 
are dying out and producing ever fewer workmen  Commerce is non-existent Thus you have 
destroyed virtually half of the inner strength of the country in order to undertake and maintain 
useless conquests.… [Y]ou do not realize that you are fighting on a ground that sinks under your 
feet, and that you are going to fall, despite all your victories.”55  
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Second, the absolutism of Louis XIV’s monarchy precluded rhetoric as a means of 
persuasive reason and cultural values. Centralized hereditary monarchy, along with the static 
class structure of aristocracy and common populace, were not conducive to the value of ancient 
rhetoric as the inspiring or reasonable means of reaching consensus.  There were instead closed 
chambers and no états généraux.  In antiquity, rhetorical eloquence referred to the use of 
language with an emphasis on public oratory in politics and culture.  The purpose of rhetoric 
was to inspire consensus and action. It flourished in the fabric of societies where debate about 
contentious issues was expected, undertaken freely, valued, and rewarded. As the art of 
persuasion, eloquence as oratory pertained to immediately relevant matters.56 The ancient use of 
rhetoric as an instrument of leadership was diminished under the rule of Louis XIV. Although 
this king never formally took sides in the debates over the via antiqua versus moderna during his 
reign, free debate was not compatible with absolutism.57  
The third factor that provides links among Fénelon’s idea of property, rhetoric, and civic 
virtue pertains to the nature of the Counter-Reformation in France. For several reasons, individual 
reformers with popular followings rather than the institutions of the church and monarchy led the 
Counter-Reformation in seventeenth century France.58 First, the French Catholic Church was 
reluctant and slow to implement the reforms of the Council of Trent (1546- 1564) that were 
designed to address the complaints of the Protestant Reformation. The monarchy and bishops 
suspected that the Tridentate Council reforms were possible encroachments on the independence 
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of the Gallican church with respect to Rome since the Concordat of Bologna in 1516.  The next 
reason is that the lack of institutional leadership in spiritual reform allowed individual reformers 
to develop popular followings.  These reformers responded to the Protestant concerns about the 
lack of inner life in spiritual piety in contrast to ecclesiastical dogma and institutions, such as 
sacraments. Among the leading reformers were Vincent de Paul; Cardinal Berulle; Cornelius 
Jansen; Jean-Jacques Olier; Father Lawrence, also known as Carmelite Nicolas Herman; and 
Fénelon.  Then, as the monarchy began to strengthen during the regency of Louis XIV and 
continued to do so during his personal reign, there was a realization that a reformed Gallican 
church could support absolutism, despite Jesuit ultramontanism.  Both reformers and the monarchy 
came to realize that communication from the pulpit was an instrumental way of advancing their 
respective causes publicly. 
 The pulpit was the primary way Louis XIV communicated to twenty million French 
people.  The cooperation of the church and state was a strategic means of success in unifying the 
principles of centralized monarchical authority.59 Ecclesiastical institutions and political 
absolutism were handmaidens of one another. The pulpit eloquence of Bossuet voiced Louis 
XIV’s absolutism with the same message that hewrote about in Politics Drawn from the Holy 
Scripture. Bossuet, Fénelon’s mentor turned adversary in theology and political theory, defined 
French absolute monarchy as the divinely ordained succession of hereditary absolute kingship 
since the Old Testament kings.  Bossuet did so by conflating the person and institution of kingship 
divinely.   His preaching style was consistent with the ceremonial nature of sermons and formal 
method of oratory in the Catholic Church prior to the Reformation. Fénelon, on the other hand, 
contended that the institution of kingship is divine but that the role of ancient law and the 
                                                            




personhood of the king are crucial to imbue disinterested virtue in civic society. The heart of 
Fénelon’s pulpit oratory is inspiring the perfectibility of the human person, including the king, and 
Fénelon criticized pulpit oratory that supported absolutism. 
These preachers are talking Latin in French….You could follow them for twenty 
years without getting to know the meaning….Most of their sermons are 
philosophical reasons…..Often the Bible is quoted only as an afterthought, as a 
matter of convention or as a rhetorical ornament. In that case it ceases to be the 
word of God and becomes the word and the invention of men.60 
 
Fénelon saw the purpose of the preacher as inspiring, engaging, and motivating each member of 
his congregation.  Three principles guide the way to impart the message.  First, the preacher must 
be attentive to the qualities of the people in the assembly because each person contributes to the 
overall character of the gathering.  A preacher must speak in a way that inspires the character of 
all. For this reason, Fénelon did not deliver prepared sermons, except on some feast days.  
Second, a preacher must remain faithful to the meaning of the message with a simple transport 
that persuades without erudition or scrupulous trappings.  Finally, he must remain devoid of 
selfish motivations such as laud or privilege in his delivery. Fenelon’s principles of homiletics 
also apply to civic discourse.  Homiletics and civic discourse share the purpose of bringing people 
together to consider meaningful common concerns. Affirmation of common concerns flows from 
common access and consideration of them.  The purpose of discourse is to instill virtuous actions. 
The third aspect that connects Fenelon’s property theory, rhetoric, and civic virtue is that 
they engender equal access to and regard for each person’s inner life. This encouragement stems 
from the intent and effect of discourse as a means of equal access and respect.  As a leader of 
spiritual reform with a focus on inner piety, Fénelon observed the lack of purposeful public 
dialogue in late seventeenth century France within politics and ecclesiastics.  The inner life carried 
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with it the meaning of equal regard for others.   This regard carried with it a respect for the dignity 
of each person, regardless of social or economic status. The reform of the inner life was 
egalitarian, because it respected each person’s capacity for inner experience.  Fénelon contrasted 
the purpose of eloquence in contemporary France to ancient Greece: 
The Greeks had a long tradition of a kind that we lack….Among the Greeks everything 
depended on the people, and they depended on the spoken word. In their form of 
government, fortune, reputation, and authority were connected with the persuasion of the 
multitude…Eloquence was the great activity in peace and war…Eloquence has no similar 
power among us.  Public assemblies are only ceremonies and spectacles.  Few monuments 
of a vigorous eloquence remain, neither from our ancient parliaments, nor our Estates 
General, nor our assemblies of leading citizens. Everything is decided secretly in cabinet 
councils or in some private transaction.  Thus our nation is not prompted to make the same 
effort as the Greeks to rule by the spoken word.61  
The fourth context for the linking of Fénelon’s ideas on property, rhetoric, and civic virtue 
is the late seventeenth century Battle of the Books in France.  The above quote from Fénelon’s 
Letter to the French Academy clearly states Fénelon’s position in this battle.  It is a stark contrast 
to the singular words of Charles Perrault: “But when Louis undertook to move by himself alone…. 
[t]he purity of laws is everywhere reestablished.”62 These summary words described the system of 
divine right absolutism.  Perrault intended his words to represent the new sciences of geometric 
design, mathematical purity, order, and rationality. Singularity represented precise and 
predictable surety.  Institutions based upon these empirical principals promised authority.  
Perrault, as the leading modernist, actually sparked the late seventeenth century  battle between 
the ancients and moderns in France. 
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There is one commonality between Perrault and Fénelon: the importance of the king to 
demonstrate by example.  Notwithstanding, Fénelon dismantled Perrault’s statement by 
reclaiming the authority of the ancient customs and laws of France and by separating the human 
person and divine institution of kingship. Fénelon’s idea of perfection by example was the basis of 
this disentanglement.  If the person of the king is divine, he can neither strive for moral perfection, 
as every other human being must do, nor demonstrate it to others. Perfectibility by free will is the 
only way to develop and exemplify disinterested care for others, and it is the way for a leader to 
inculcate rather than indoctrinate or enforce. “A king, however wise and good he may be, is still 
only a man. Both his understanding and virtue must be limited and imperfect. Scarcely has he 
repaired one fault when he falls into another. Such is the condition of kings who are the most 
enlightened and the most virtuous.”63 Moral disposition is discovered in the experiences of 
personal frailty and imperfection.64 True greatness lies is in acknowledging and repairing faults, 
because the examples of perfectibility advance respect and authority. 65 
Members of a community will be inspired to emulate the example of unselfish leadership. 
Moral perfectibility toward others bonds members of a political society, including its leaders, to 
political authority. It bonds them to authority that serves the well being of the people according 
to law and custom. Perfectibility according to the free will of each individual in political society, 
including the king, is the heart of Fénelon’s political theory. The foundation of viable authority 
is the non-institutional and non-juridical one of unselfishness. 
Perrault had dismissed customs of the ancients along with their wisdom, culture, and 
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institutions. Barbaric behaviors represented moral and intellectual inferiority. For Fénelon, 
these same representations indicated the freedom and complexities of human existence.  “I 
cannot doubt that the religion and manners of the Homeric heroes have great faults. It is natural 
that the poet’s depiction of these faults shocks us.”66 However, he asserted, the lessons have 
moral value. In Fénelon’s system, the ancients offered valuable insights into the complexities of 
human experience that are not in conflict with those of the new sciences. The value inherent in 
the contributions of the ancients lies in the supra-rational realm of inspiration and persuasion. 
Fénelon readily admits that rhetoric can be used properly according to disinterestedness or it can 
be misused pridefully. He understood Plato’s criticisms in Gorgias of using rhetoric as deceptive 
flattery.  According to Fénelon, orientation toward a preference for others is the distinguishing 
key to proper use.  The ancient polis was based on valuing community.  For Fénelon, who 
deferred to the free will of the individual, any institution that did not respect individual free will 
as the basis of community was untenable, both institutionally and morally. 
Neither the scholastic method of dialectic nor the sixteenth-century revisions of Pierre de la 
Ramée, also known as Ramus, and Talaeus were adequate to communicate the new science of 
experimentation.  Bacon and Descartes demonstrated that tropes, figures, style, and delivery  were 
inadequate to explain the new sciences that involved probability, experimentation, and attention.   
The Port Royal Logic of Antoine Arnauld revised Ramus’s neo-scholastic system of dialectic and 
logic when Fénelon was eleven years old.   Thirteen years later, Bernard Lamy amended Arnauld’s 
consideration on logic to consider rhetoric in De l’ art de parler. For Lamy, the art of speaking is 
not only useful, but necessary, “as it contributes to the discovery of truth; as it forces it from the 
                                                            




bottom of our thoughts where it lay concealed; as it disentangles it, and displays it to our eyes.”67 
Four years later, when Fénelon was about 28, he began a project that continued the rest of his life: 
to revise the principles of communication to provide meaning and interpretation to scientific 
knowledge, spirituality, and politics. 
Fénelon’s major contribution to the Battle of the Books was to affirm the roles of 
inspiration, persuasion, and aesthetics in disinterested civic life.  To develop his principles, 
Fénelon incorporated the ancient arguments about the proper use of rhetoric, and he relied upon 
Plato, Demosthenes, Cicero, and Augustine.  Descartes’s method of doubt focused on 
attentiveness to clear and distinct ideas and discounted what was not in accord with the faculty of 
reason.  Descartes’s method ultimately led to the idea of the eternal, but his reliance on la pensée 
limited his ability to grasp the moral meaning of eternity, unlike the ancients.  In contrast to 
Descartes, Fénelon’s ideas were more similar to Bernard Lamy, who accepted rhetoric, and 
Bacon, who accepted imagination.  For Fénelon, there is a role for imagination, inspiration, 
persuasion, and rhetoric is every area of life. 
One final aspect of Fénelon’s training and perspective cannot be overlooked in the 
development of his ideas on property, rhetoric, language, and education: his Sulpician orientation 
toward spiritual and ecclesiastical life.  The Order of Sulpice emphasized the role of the 
Incarnation in inner spiritual life as the human person lives in the image and likeness of God. For 
Sulpicians, the Incarnation completely integrated finite and infinite, the flesh and the Logos. The 
Incarnation affirmed the goodness of human needs for physical and spiritual nourishment. 
Moderation and humility were the key virtues necessary to experience this integration unselfishly. 
Sulpicians were not a regular order of the Catholic Church that took the vow of poverty. Hence, 
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they did not deny property and the use of talents, but rather emphasized the moderate use of them 
for the needs of life and humble disappropriation of them otherwise. Local parish priesthood, not 
ecclesiastical institutions, was the Sulpician focus of the vocation of ministry. The priest was 
personally involved in the spiritual development of individual parishioners through prayer, 
penitence, and the exegesis of sermons. Sulpicians were influenced by the inner piety of Francis 
de Sales and held that spirituality was a matter of personal communication.  The sacrament of 
penance was an important means of personal communication to reconcile the person to his true 
good by letting go of the distractions of scruples, anxiety, fear, and guilt that were associated with 
mercenary love, including any mercenary love of God.  Penance was not a means of instilling 
fear of judgment, invoking punishment for sins, or bargaining for atonement. 
Fénelon’s Sulpician training placed an emphasis on parish priesthood and the pulpit as an 
important means of communication. His principles for preaching, Dialogues on Eloquence, 
describe a modern style of rhetoric. He dismissed the cumbersome tropes and metaphors of the 
fourth part of Ciceronian rhetoric, which were carried forward in the Scholastic system of Ramus.  
Fénelon favored phrases that express everyday experience in everyday language instead of 
ornamental style that focuses on doctrine and dogma. 
Exegesis, the theological explication of the meaning of Biblical text, was one method of 
communication that developed in the seventeenth century.  Exegesis countered the formal 
scholastic methods of constructing style and addressed Protestant developments in the area of 
spiritual communication. The verbal or cognitive connection with the audience prevailed over 
structure of presentation. This method allowed a wider access and receptivity to the message in an 
egalitarian manner that was consistent with the mission of the parish priest to instill the inner life 
in parishioners through personal relationship. Exegesis was instrumental in the inter-personal 
relationship of the priest and parishioner either in the confessional or pulpit to assist the individual 
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parishioner’s inner reflection about and response to the message at hand. Exegesis augmented the 
individual’s discovery of meaning in the inner life. This discovery, in turn, helped the person live 
with disinterested virtue. 
Positive theology is the term that Bremond gave to the focus on meaning in preaching 
rather than formal construction and the one that Gouhier followed in Fénelon philosophe.68 The 
Sulpicians practiced this type of theology rather than speculative philosophical speculation, 
which focused on preaching style of tropes.  For the Suplicians, biblical and patristic teachings 
encourage the inner spirit, not ecclesiastical dogma and style.  Preaching focused on inspiring 
spiritual life, not on delivering a sermon according to set rules.  Personal meaning and 
relationships were emphasized rather than outward tradition and ceremony. This very local and 
personal focus of the Sulpician pulpit gave it the ability to side step ecclesiastical and 
monarchical interests.  This personal focus loosened the hold of authoritarianism. 
Fénelon’s first assignment after his ordination reflects his focus on meaning in 
communication.  This assignment was educational in terms of Catholic catechesis and pastoral in 
terms of the spiritual nurture of Protestant women who had converted, mostly under pressure, 
from Protestantism to Catholicism.  Fénelon dutifully engaged in the assignment, but his 
reflections thereafter conclude in its futility. He concluded that personal convictions are 
determined by inner disposition, perception, and interpretation instead of formalities, including 
dogmas or rituals of church or state. Convictions cannot be indoctrinated by fear. Fénelon 
realized the futility of forced religious conversion as well as the collaboration of the Gallican 
Church and the monarchy of Louis XIV to bolster absolutism in the institutions of the church and 
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Fénelon explained his position in a letter to the Duke of Burgundy, his student and second 
in line to the throne:  “Above all things, never compel your subjects to change their religion.  No 
human power can force the impenetrable entrenchments of liberty in the human heart.  Force can 
never persuade men; it can only make hypocrites.  When kings interfere with religion, instead of 
protecting it, they enslave it. Grant to all a religions a political toleration… ” Fénelon resolved 
that participation in education and association will occur only by the motivation of a person’s free 
will.  He distinguished indoctrination from inculcation. The former involves fear or force while 
the latter involves aesthetic inspiration and rational persuasion. He then concluded that a ruler 
can do nothing without consent and that the purpose of a ruler is to be the executor and moderator 
of laws according to a paternal model.69  
Disinterested Virtue as Public Morality 
 
“Persuasion and a good example…are the arms of virtue.”70  
 
Public morality depends upon personal morality, especially in political leadership. The 
genuinely disinterested example of a political leader is the primary means of instilling public 
morality consistently and pervasively. Fénelon prefers the personal rule of kingship as the best 
form of government because a person must instill civic virtue as an authentic exemplar of 
disinterestedness.   The purpose of political authority is to provide for the welfare of the people 
physically and morally. This provision entails the example of the individual care for others prior 
to the self.  Disinterestedness in this provision is the anchor that others are then inspired to 
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emulate in civic society. Disinterested leadership creates binding authority because people 
willingly relate to it.  The ability of political and social institutions and economies to thrive and 
contribute to posterity depends on developing personal dispositions of pur amour. 
The possibility of progress according to disinterestedness is inversely proportionate to fear, 
aggrandizement or force.  “There should be unchangeable written laws sacred to the whole nation 
from which those that govern should derive their authority.”71 Fénelon emphasized the 
consequences of violating the disinterested purposes of political authority and fundamental law. 
"Absolute power degrades every subject to a slave.….There will come a sudden and violent 
revolution, which, far from moderating their excessive authority, will destroy it without 
resource.”72 The bond of authority that rests in public morality will unravel. As Tocqueville, 
Ernest Renan and Émile Littré later concurred, Fénelon predicted the events of the French 
Revolution.  Fénelon “avait écrit notre histoire avant qu'ils se fussent accomplis.”73 Fénelon was a 
prescient thinker with respect to the seeds and unfolding of the French revolution. 
Individual responsibility for unselfishness applies to the personal ruler and each member 
of civic society.  Certain questions about this responsibility underlie the foundation of Fénelonean 
political theory. How does individual reconcile autonomy and association?  What is source of 
human motivation?  What is the role of indifference toward selfish interest?  Politics is personal 
on the basis of Fénelon’s idea of interest. Disinterestedness creates personal experience that is 
outside of time and space because it is not dependent upon these dimensions of existence. 
Detachment from personal happiness, satisfaction of desire and utility creates the non-egoistic 
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experience where one can respond affirmatively with ascent and assent to the responsibilities of 
membership in a political community.  Being political is contributing responsibly to others. Amour 
pur and ontological being as infinite prompt a morality of disinterestedness toward self and regard 
for others. 
Fénelon precisely links his theology, metaphysics, and political theory in many of his 
writings.74 He explains that the disinterested individual regard of one individual for another is the 
foundation of the collective identity and bond in a community.  Being a friend is an act of 
perfectibility.  Lettres et opuscules spirituels XXIII makes this connection poignantly by referring 
to the ancients, particularly Plato and Cicero.75 In this writing, Fénelon situates the idea of 
friendship in the Beautiful and Good – the Perfect.  He explains that the Perfect as the sole love of 
Perfect, Good, Truth, Beauty, and Infinity, is altogether one in the same   Being is perfection. 
Herein lays Fénelon’s definition of being as ontological.  Fénelon also Platonically interprets that 
perfectibility (amour pur for the former and philosophy for the latter) draws the soul from the 
world of that which becomes to the world of that which is.76 For both, education plays a crucial 
role in turning the soul from darkness to light.77  
Fénelon quotes de Officis: “si nous pouvions voir de nos propres yeux la beauté de la 
vertu, nous serions ravis d’amour par son excellence”.78 He also credits Cicero as one with the 
ideas that friendship is to be valued in itself without seeking advantages and that it can only be 
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experienced by men of like mind.79 He allows the point of Horace, although an Epicurean, that 
men experience happiness as a result of the perfection of virtue, not riches or utility.80 Socrates 
exemplifies the disinterested principle that binds one to virtue beyond the interests of the self. The 
integrity of the soul remains when it exists finitely in the body and infinitely in truth. So, 
temporal life is inconsequential in comparison to eternal truth.  Because law and justice are the 
temporal manifestations of infinite truth, Socrates chose to die to preserve ultimate integrity rather 
than be in discord with these manifestations. In this act, he preserved universal justice as well 
demonstrated the personal integrity of moral being and doing. 
Socrates portrays a man who devotes himself to authority of the magistrates and law by 
dying rather than silencing them in prison. “This idea of the perfect disinterestedness reigned in 
the policy of all ancient legislators. They preferred that law is the foundation of community in a 
country and that one should prefer the public to oneself, not from any expectation of interest, but 
only from the love of disinterested order, which is beauty, justice and even virtue.”81 Pythias and 
Damon wanted to die for another during the rule of Denys the Tyrant. Sacrificial heroes are 
among those who act disinterestedly. The martyrs of the upcoming French revolution descend 
from this Fénelonean line of thought. 
Amour propre occurs in the illusion of the cave, a maddening illusion of shadows that 
even pays tribute to disinterested virtue with subtle attempts that appear to strive for it.  The 
masquerade of amour propre to imitate amour pur affirms the authenticity of the latter as virtue.82 
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Fénelon concurs with Plato’s philosophy that “love of the beautiful is the good of man.”83 There 
is an inspiring movement of transport, sortir de soi, to love what is beyond itself, beautiful 
infinity. This love is in the origin of man, and “sa perfection est tellement de sortir de soi par 
l’amour, qu’on aurait honte d’avouer qu’on n’aime personne sans y mêler quelque motif 
interesé.”84 Fénelon’s political theory is about the quest of the good man to seek the disinterested 
civic virtue with freedom of conscience. This was later the quest of Rousseau. 
 Télemaque is designed Platonically.85 It is a quest for Télemaque to gain education by 
experience to move from the darkness of illusions to the light of absolute reality. Rousseau, who 
also favored education by experience, later encouraged Émile to carry the book as a guide for his 
own journey.  Fénelon emphasizes the virtues that are necessary for being a disinterested person, 
the prerequisite for being a good king who will act on behalf of all. Télemaque focuses on the 
same four virtues as the Republic: courage, wisdom, self-control, and justice. Télemaque’s 
journey, with the help of the wisdom of Mentor (Minerva), starts in the cave of the illusions of 
self-interest and ends outside in the light of truth. At one point, Minerva pushes him outside of 
his passions after he almost gives in to self-interest on the island of Calypso. 
Télemaque gains through experience, not discursive reason, the self determination to do 
good for others and resist pride. Evidence of his perfectibility includes turning toward justice 
through the lessons of trials and tribulations.  He recognizes at the end of Book III of Télemaque 
that the wisdom that the heart loves only justice. Personal and civic virtues coincide in 
disinterestedness. A framework for understanding Rousseau is provided by Fénelon’s recognition 
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of the alienation from the authentic self that results from amour propre and the dispossession of 
egoism that leads to association.  For both Fénelon, the natural self and the moral self are good. 
Both seek to sustain the goodness of the natural self by inculcating the moral self.  They both 
understand that amour propre fosters distractions in society, such as luxury.  Rousseau  is often 
accused of being a contradictory thinker, but the ideas of the social contract, the General 
Legislator, the education of Émile, and the Solitary Walker can be better understood in light of 
Fénelon. The next chapter is instructive in this regard. 
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Chapter 6:  Fénelon and Rousseau 
 
The Political Theories of Fénelon and Rousseau: 
Paradoxes of Transcendence, Perfectibility, and Atonement 
 
 
“As soon as a man needs a companion he is no longer an isolated creature, his heart is no longer 
alone.”1  
 
Despite the instruction that turned Émile into an extraordinary person, according to 
Rousseau’s description in the first four books of Émile, the realization comes in Book Five that 
hardly any individuals live in singularity.  Here enter Fénelon and Telemachus with guidance on 
how being human imperfectly includes imperfect association. In his Notes sur “De l'esprit” 
d'Helevétius, Rousseau wrote, “Si l'auteur ne croit pas qu'un homme puisse sentir la supériorité 
d'un autre dans son propre genre, assurément il se trompe beaucoup....Fénélon l'emportoit sur 
moi à tous égards; cela est certain.”2 “Je lui trouve aujourdui les traits du Mentor d’Émile.”3 
Bernardin St. Pierre's autobiography of Rousseau reports that Rousseau preferred “Fénelon par 
dessus tout” and that Rousseau proposed that the later years of the reign of Louis XIV would 
have been called “le siècle de Fénelon mieux qu celui de Louis XIV, si les guerres ne fussent 
venues.”4  
Fénelon and Rousseau shared fundamental premises and parallels in the design of 
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significant aspects of their respective political and social theories.  Frameworks for both thinkers 
were the issues of human motivation, isolation and association, independency and 
interdependency, and the purpose of government according to the good of the people. This 
section will bring to light the relevance of Fénelon’s theological, moral, and political concepts to 
Rousseau’s political theory. 
Both theorists regard teleology in non-eschatological terms.  Teleology is oriented toward 
reaching out to another each moment, not a linear time line.  For both, disinterestedness is the 
key to civic virtue.  Book Five of Émile reveals the common focus of Fénelon and Rousseau on 
the individual’s internal navigation of the dilemmas of inner life and association. Rousseau’s 
position is that the wisdom of Mentor in Fénelon’s Âge d’Or is the individual journey of 
transformation and perfection of Émile in Rousseau’s time. The spiritual message of inner 
responsibility for the journey is the same, although Fénelon’s is expressed in mythological while 
Rousseau employed psychological terms. It is the individual who must navigate the 
transformation in both cases. 
 Henri Gouhier has made the connection between Book Two, Chapter 7 of the Social 
Contract, “Gods would be needed to give laws to men,” and Book 10 of Telemachus, “Men.are 
also much to be pitied, in that they are obliged to submit to the government of a man such as 
themselves; for to reform mankind would require gods.”5 Reform must be inculcated by Mentor 
or the General Legislator for the sake of association, peace, and a flourishing society. Both 
thinkers recognized that revered example unifies beyond the self. 
Political theory scholars have regarded Fénelon as a political reformer who opposed 
                                                            
5 As noted in Henri Gouhier, “Rousseau et Fénelon” in Reappraisals of Rousseau: Studies in Honour of R. A. 
Leigh, ed. Simon Harvey et al. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 285. See Rousseau, On the Social 
Contract,  trans. Judith Masters, ed. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martins Press, 1978), 68; Fénelon, Telemachus, 
Son of Ulysses. ed. and trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 158. 
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Louis XIV and as a champion of ancient civic virtue.  They have touched upon his ideas against 
luxury and in favor of agrarianism and free trade.  Fénelon’s beliefs in the inalienability of 
human liberty and in the natural propensities of man for goodness, for perfectibility, and for 
association motivated by inspiration and rational choice are cornerstones of his political theory. 
These are also cornerstones of Rousseau’s political theory.  The political theories of both 
philosophers are strongly influenced by ancient Greek virtue. Moral civic education and 
transcendence of the individual toward a higher good are the means of human fulfillment. The 
state is the facilitator. 
The name of Fénelon is cited many times over the course of eight of Rousseau's works: 
Chronologie universelle, ou Histoire générale des temps; Émile; La Nouvelle Héloise; Les 
Confessions; Rousseau Juge de Jean Jacques; Polysynodie de l’abbé de St. Pierre; Poesis; and 
Notes sur “De l'esprit” d’ Helevétius. Télémaque is cited numerous times.  In these same works 
there are at least 89 passages which directly relate to the works and ideas of Fénelon. For 
example, the wording of Rousseau's discussion in Émile on the ethic of honnêteté is taken almost 
verbatim from Fénelon's dialogue on Socrates, Alcibiades, and Timon in Dialogues des morts. 
There is clear evidence that Rousseau had read many of Fénelon's works.  In addition to 
Télemaque and the Dialogues, Rousseau had at least read Fénelon's Refutation du système du 
Pére Malebranche sur la nature et la grâce, Traité de l’existence et des attributs de Dieu, Lettres 
au Pére Lami sur la grâce et la prédestination, and Abrégé des vies des anciens philosophes. As 
Patrick Riley attests in The General Will before Rousseau, Rousseau had also read the most 
important seventeenth century theologians on the debate between the general and particular will 
of God.6 Malebranche and Fénelon were the strongest proponents of each position, respectively, 
                                                            
6 Patrick Riley, The General Will before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic (Princeton, 
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and the most strongly opposed to each other.  Moreover, Rousseau was interested in and was 
knowledgeable about the Quietist debate and Fénelon's role in it. As a matter of fact, Madame de 
Warens, Rousseau’s Catholic benefactor and intimate friend, observed quasi-Quietist religious 
practices.  Rousseau was associated with her during the years of his self-tutelage and conversion 
to Catholicism.  There are too many similarities between the two philosophers and their ideas to 
overlook them. 
However, no recent literature has attempted to explain the relationship between the works 
of the two men in depth. One known effort was made by Ernest Seilière in his book, Madame 
Guyon et Fénelon précurseurs de Rousseau (Paris 1918), to explain at length the influence of 
Fénelon upon Rousseau.7 Albert Chérel devoted an important chapter in his book, Fénelon au 
XVIIIe siècle en France (Paris, 1917), to the relationship between Fénelon and Rousseau.8 Judith 
Shklar wrote Men and Citizens (1969), and Riley gave attention to the relationship between the 
two in several critiques, including his monograph, Rousseau, Fenelon, and the Quarrel between 
the Ancients and the Moderns.9 Although it is but a few pages in length and although the focus of 
this dissertation pertains to French thought, Riley’s critique of Fénelon and Leibniz in Leibniz’ 
Universal Prudence raises important questions to evaluate.10  Notable and more recent French-
language scholarship includes “Rousseau et Fénelon” by Gouhier (1980) and “d’Homère à 
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Fénelon à Rousseau” (1999) by Laurence Mall.11 In 2011, Benjamin Thompson and Robert 
Lamb reaffirmed that the Fénelonean provenance of disinterestedness is compelling in 
Rousseau.12 The need for further explanation does not reflect a lack of significance. This chapter 
will help scholars continue to unpack this relationship further.  It will do so by explaining the 
aspects of Fénelon’s theology, moral philosophy, and political theory that provide a systematic 
reference point for Rousseau. 
One important factor has been lacking in these efforts to correlate Fénelon and Rousseau: 
an explanation of Fénelon's political thought, particularly how it emanates from his theology, 
metaphysics, and moral philosophy. All of Fénelon's political ideas proceed from his central 
concepts of the free will and the interdependent nature of humans.  Fénelon's ideas regarding free 
will and the influence of mysticism infused all of his thought and concepts of the liberty, 
integrity, and potential of individuals.  Such ideas were radical in late seventeenth century 
France.  He anchored his philosophical and theological principles with a political meaning that 
resonated powerfully in the next century.  Fénelon concluded that the individual, especially the 
ruler, is the essential and moral component of civic society.  State and society are necessary 
ramifications of the free will of the individual to make choices in his environment and to fulfill 
himself in so doing unselfishly.  Disinterestedness became a foothold of association for the good 
of the people. 
A prerequisite for a comprehensive comparison of the two philosophers' political ideas is 
a thorough understanding of Fénelon’s system of thought. Even where their conclusions differ, 
                                                            
11 Gouhier, op. cit.; Laurence Mall, “d’Homère à Fénelon à Rousseau” Studi francesi, vol. 43, no. 1 (1999), 
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12 Benjamin Thompson and Robert Lamb, “Disinterestedness and Virtue: ‘Pure Love’ in Fénelon, Rousseau 
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258  
common frameworks of consideration can be identified.  The result of the comparison will be 
that their political ideas are based on similar questions of moral philosophy and are guided by 
similar concepts of teleology.  The commonality stems from the fact that both philosophers were 
concerned about two central problems. 
The first problem is the question of how the natural goodness of human nature can 
develop in civic society, despite the corrupting influences of society. Both men understood 
relational nature as well as free will. They sought to balance association and the isolated 
alienation that stems from the selfishly-oriented individuality of amour propre. Rousseau 
empathized with Molière’s Alceste’s misanthropic struggle in the face of Celimène’s gossip. 
Both Fénelon and Rousseau developed their ideas as they considered human motivation as well 
as independency and interdependency. 
Rousseau best states the second problem: “…to find a form of association which will 
defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in 
which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as 
before.”13 Both philosophers considered the implications of this problem spiritually, 
psychologically, and temporally.  In order to substantiate the common design of the two 
philosophers’ political theories it is neither necessary nor within the purview of this dissertation 
to prove that Rousseau's arguments on each and every common premise derive directly from 
Fénelon.  Rousseau lived a generation later than Fénelon.  He had at his disposal the resources of 
his own intellect and the evolution of philosophical ideas. The purpose here is to substantiate the 
way the foundation of Rousseau's argument is very Fénelonean in character and logic and in so 
doing explore the foundation of the older man’s social and political theories. 
                                                            
13 Rousseau, Social Contract (1973), 174. 
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Within a more general scope, this dissertation demonstrates that Rousseau was not 
influenced only by Locke, Montesquieu, and Plato.14 His ideas were also steeped in the generation 
of French thought which preceded him at the end of the seventeenth century. As Riley stated, 
“One can approach Rousseau as the outgrowth of a distinctively French tradition....Rousseau the 
heir of France is little known outside of France.”15 Rousseau's thought continued to address the 
great philosophical debates of that tradition about metaphysics, science, theology, politics, and the 
superiority of the ancients to the moderns.  While Riley has traced the development of the concept 
of the general will to Malebranche via Montesquieu, much remains to be documented.  A brief 
outline of the common premises and design of the political theories of Fénelon and Rousseau 
follows. Both philosophers observed paradoxes in human existence and attempted to conceive a 
political arrangement which would enhance inner peace within civic association. The logic of 
their theories unfolds in the attempt to reconcile three paradoxes. These paradoxes were explained 
specifically with respect to Fénelon’s concept of free will in Chapter One: 
Paradox One: Libre arbitre reflect human imperfection; and yet, it is also the means of 
perfectability; 
Paradox Two: Society is necessary due to mutual need but it is also a source of dissension 
and the corruptibility of human nature; 
Paradox Three:  One must lose oneself to find oneself. 
Both theorists develop their systems of thought by attributing several characteristics to 
the human genre.  These characteristics necessitate a place of special integrity and dignity in the 
order of the universe for each person. The characteristics include goodness, perfectibility, 
morality, rationality, freedom of choice, and sentimentality. 
The initial paradox can be resolved by several premises.  The first premise is that human 
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nature is innately good. Rousseau explains his argument in the Discourse on the Origins of 
Inequality. It is developed by a hypothetical anthropological analysis and contra Hobbes.16 
Rousseau is emphasizing the original unity of self-love which is lost in relations with other 
men.17 “Amour de soi and pitié constitute the fundamental characteristics of human nature and 
justify speaking of man as naturally good rather than bad because they provide a basis for the 
acceptance of mutual justice as the rule of conduct in society.”18  
Love of oneself [i.e., amour de soi or Fénelon’s amour nôtre) is a natural sentiment 
which inclines every animal to watch over its self preservation, and which [is] directed in 
man by reason and modified by pity. Amour propre is only a relative sentiment, 
artificial, and born in society, which inclines each individual to have a greater esteem 
for himself than for anyone else, inspires all the harm they do to one another, and is the 
true source of the “sense of honor.”  
Fénelon's argument is that human nature is good because God is good and because God created 
humans in His likeness.  In other words, God endowed the human genre with innate goodness. 
“There is nothing therefore, so precious in man as the good will, benevolence, or volition to 
good.  It is this which sets a value upon all his other faculties. It is, as it were, ‘the whole 
man.’”19 Fénelon would agree that self-preservation is consistent with natural goodness as the 
will of God for creation.  To recall Fénelon’s disagreement with Bossuet, there is a type of intéret 
nôtre that is not necessarily sinful or mercenary.  Rousseau would also agree with Fénelon that 
the mercenary amour propre (inner pride) manifests itself destructively in political society 
through the aggrandizement of luxury and ownership. The second premise which Fénelon and 
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Rousseau share is that humans have liberty which is inalienable. That liberty is based upon free 
will. Liberty is the free agency (libre arbitre) of the individual to make moral choices as the 
source of his actions. 
To discuss Rousseau's ideas on individual liberty and free agency in terms of the 
theological debate about the general and particular wills of God during the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries is enlightening. This debate was one of the most relevant issues of 
that time in regard to the development of political thought. Both concepts stem from the 
theological question regarding whether the nature of God’s will is to save all souls in general or 
some souls in particular. Riley traced the political transformation of volonté générale by way of 
Malebranche. The transformation of the theological into the political connotation of the general 
will culminated in Rousseau’s thought.  According to Riley, Rousseau used the term volonté 
générale to signify the political arrangement of equal citizens under the rule of laws which 
encompass the bien public.  However, neither this political connotation of the general will nor 
Riley accounts for Rousseau’s concepts of the moral foundation of the state; the educative 
function of the state; Rousseau’s concept of society; or the critiques of the arts, sciences, and 
luxury.  They do not account for Rousseau’s ideas on human nature, liberty, or motivation.  Nor 
do they fully account for Rousseau’s efforts to reconcile the tension between freedom and 
association, viz. the individual and public good. 
The historical development of the concept of particular will accounts for these aspects. 
Considering Rousseau’s political theory against the background of the particular will and the 
general will makes evident a political synthesis and reconciliation of a prior theological question. 
His works reflect the two sides of this debate. Fénelon’s theological, philosophical, and political 
ideas illuminate the aspects of the tradition of the particular will in Rousseau's concept of free 
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will.  Both theorists are concerned with the question of dependency and interdependency. 
Fénelon's concept of libre arbitre is radical autonomy of free will. He developed his 
ideas on the free will in three arenas: philosophical, religious, and political. In the first arena 
Fénelon argued against the ideas of Spinoza, Malebranche, and Jansenism.  Fénelon considered 
them respectively as materialistic, rationalistic, and spiritually deterministic. He vigorously 
defended the concept of the free will (volonté particulière) of God as well as of the individual 
against all of these positions. Neither nature nor rationality nor concupiscence can countermand 
free will.  Not even the will of God can force the acceptance of grace by anyone. As explained in 
the chapter on free will, Fénelon’s concept of free will is not affected by the theology of 
predestination in eschatology.  Moral responsibility for action exists because each act of will 
counts in the present. 
According to Fénelon, God and people have free wills. “I am free in my will, as God is in 
his.  It is in this principally, that I am in his image, and resemble him.”20 Acts of free will that 
occur in each moment of human time do not preclude God’s providence from the point of view of 
eternity that includes all time.  In the second arena Fénelon defended himself against the attacks 
on his views about quietism.  He also propounded his positions about amour pur, amour de soi, 
and amour propre for the attention of salon discussions regarding these types of love and against 
the principles of Abbadie.  His positions were a critique of royal court culture. The free will even 
has the power to surpass l'amour propre, according to Fénelon.  In the third arena Fénelon 
criticized Louis XIV.  Fénelon censured political aggrandizement as a transgression against 
human dignity. From all angles, his concept of free will secures an individual who is committed 
to and responsible for civic virtue. 
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Rousseau's concept of free will is most clearly explained in The Creed of a Priest of 
Savoy.  He does not support the Fénelonean concept of the volonté particulière of the will of 
God.  But, his work reflects the Fénelonean concept of the free will as free agency, the essential 
aspect of the libre arbitre of the individual (and the Creator) in Fénelon's theory. Rousseau and 
Fénelon agreed that free agency distinguishes man from beast. The essential point of agreement 
is that moral action by free agency is a key component of human nature, individual liberty, and 
human association.  This is why “to renounce liberty is to renounce being a man.”21  
When one considers Fénelon and Rousseau’s voluntaristic concept of free agency, it is 
important to take into account that neither philosopher was a determinist or empiricist. Also, 
Rousseau had doubts about the rationalism of the Malebranchean order. Unfortunately, Rousseau 
did not specifically address the issue of whether Malebranche's occasionalism was a form of 
rational determinism, according to which the movement of man must be determined by God so 
that the perfection of His creation (and consequently of Himself) will not be compromised. 
Nonetheless, free agency is akin to Cartesian dualism of thought and extension for both Fénelon 
and Rousseau.  This dualism, in turn, leads to a dualism, i.e., double meaning of the general will. 
The following is an expansion of this proposition. 
In the Creed of a Priest of Savoy Rousseau argues against materialism, empiricism, and 
determinism.  The wording and argument are extremely similar to Fénelon’s Du libre arbitre de 
l’homme and Traité de l’existence et des attributs de Dieu. Rousseau enumerates certain articles 
of faith in his argument. 
A will moves the universe, and animates nature....The will is known to me by its acts, 
not by its (material) nature....”22  
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22 Rousseau, The Creed of a Priest of Savoy, 14. 
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If the movement of matter reveals to me a will, the movement of matter according 
to certain laws reveals to me an intelligence; that is my second article of faith. 
Acting, comparing, choosing, these are the operations of an active and thinking 
being: there that being exists.23  
No merely material entity is active in itself, and I am....I feel it, and that feeling 
which speaks to me is stronger than the reason which combats it. I know what the 
will is only through experiencing my own will, and what the understanding is no 
better known to me. When I am asked what the cause is which determines my 
will, I ask in turn what the cause is which determines my judgment. It is clear 
that these two causes are only one; and if you understand clearly that man is 
active in his judgments, that his understanding is only the power of comparing 
and judging, you will see that his liberty is nothing other than a comparable 
power....Man is therefore free in his actions, and as such animated by an 
immaterial substance; this is my third article of faith....God has made him free so 
that he might do, not evil, but good, by choice. He put man in a position to make 
this choice by using properly the faculties with which he is endowed. To protest 
because God does not prevent man from doing evil is to protest against his having 
placed over his actions the morality which ennobles them, against his having 
given man the right to virtue.24  
 
Several points follow from this position. Man has the right to and capability for virtue. Free will 
puts each person in control of his existence and actions. As the moral force behind actions, free 
will is the foundation of moral meaning.  Free will is the motive force behind actions.  Morally 
good actions that are taken without constraint or necessity are what ennoble man.  Physical laws 
are contrary to liberty.  Libre arbitre is a function of spirituality, and at the same time it is a mark 
of both human perfection and imperfection.  The idea that free will is a mark of imperfection is 
Augustinian and Thomist.  The rationale is that failure to choose good is a result of sin.  The will 
ignores its proper vocation.25 The virtuous choice ennobles a person’s perfectability; the contrary 
choice reveals the lack thereof. Liberty is “indifferent,” a scholastic and Cartesian term.  It 
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signifies that the will is not indeclinable, an Augustinian term, viz., it is not irresistibly inclined in 
a certain direction but that it has the power to incline itself to one side or the other.26  
Malebranche, on the other hand, claimed that the grace of God's volonté générale inclines 
the will irresistibly.  Grace is the subject, and will is the object. Fénelon claimed this to be 
confused.  Will is the subject, and grace is the object, he maintained. Grace can only pose itself 
in juxtaposition to other objects which the will desires, and there is independence in the power to 
act.27  
It is important to look at the impact of these two opposing positions in regard to the 
volonté générale in Rousseau's thought, under the assumption that Rousseau follows Fénelon's 
argument closely.  An additional assumption is that the impact of the volonté générale upon free 
will is analogous to that of physical laws or grace upon free will. Volonté générale is the object, 
not the subject. It is chosen of free will. Neither physical laws, grace, nor political laws 
naturally govern choice. People can deny grace.  They can choose to try to defy physical laws. 
Likewise, the role of volonté générale in the life of an individual emanates from will and choice. 
Here is the basis of Rousseau's idea that laws are something that individuals must prescribe for 
themselves. This logic reveals the problem with comparing Malebranche and Rousseau in regard 
to the general will.  If human beings are only the occasional causes of their own actions while 
God must act as the sole veritable cause générale in order to preserve His perfection, and, if a 
person cannot really will anything, since the mind as a thinking substance cannot modify the 
body as extended substance, then one cannot have a general will because one cannot have any 
will at all, except as a Malebranchean (or Jansenist) immanence of the will to consent to a 
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delectable subject.28 There can be no indifference, no deliberation, no choice, and thus no 
virtuous act. Rousseau's political philosophy of civic virtue cannot rest on such a foundation. 
Association and virtue must be freely and disinterestedly elected. There must be a volonté 
individuelle in particular if there is to be a volonté générale.  Thus, the applicability of 
Malebranchism to the general will must be limited. 
 Despite this limitation, Rousseau’s idea of the general will reflects the character of those 
contemporary opponents, Malebranche and Fénelon.  As much as Rousseau’s philosophy is one 
of paradoxes, it is also one which attempts reconciliation. The individual will and the general 
will do not deny one another.  In this respect, the general will has a dual meaning. Its genesis is 
Fénelonean in character. In other words, the part that deals with association is Fénelonean. 
Virtuous and moral actions of the will ennoble and enable relationship. In the terminology of 
logic, the individual who becomes a citizen upon his assent to associate is the active subject and 
the State is the passive object.  The radical autonomy of free will is the cause réelle.29 This 
aspect emphasizes the fact that the individual must prescribe it to himself in order to remain free 
after association. 
The part that deals with the rule of law is Malebranchean. In this case, the Sovereign is 
the active subject, while the individual is the passive object in his capacity as a subject under the 
rule of law. The general will in this tradition is analogous to the position of natural law in natural 
right theories or physical law in determinist/materialist theories. In sum, the dual role of the 
individual in the general will as both subject and object puts him completely at one with his true 
nature. This atonement makes possible his perfection. 
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To explain the dualism further, it is worthwhile to consider that the two terms of volonté 
générale – will and generality – represent two main strands in Rousseau’s thought. One meaning 
reflects Malebranche’s thought. Generality stands for the rule of law. It signifies the political 
organization of equal citizens according to the rule of law which comprises the public good. Riley 
has traced the development of this aspect to Malebranche. The Fénelonean character of 
Rousseau's thought contributes to the second meaning. Will stands for the conviction that “civil 
association is the most voluntary act in the world” and that “to deprive your will of all freedom is 
to deprive your actions of all morality.”30 The general will emanates from the association of 
individuals. It is a matter of will in the sense that individuals freely assent to associate. It is 
general in the sense that it is the collective character of a people, not an aggregation of 
individuals wills.  It signifies the marriage between the identity of the community and that of the 
individual. The general will is their way of life, their character.  It represents the individual’s 
choice to transcend beyond himself and toward the common good. It generates the individual's 
receptivity to civic education. In this manner, association then lends itself to moral perfection in 
the sense of identification of oneself with a higher good, the general will in the case of Rousseau 
or the will of God in the case of Fénelon. 
 At this point it is possible to move to the next premise.  The third building block is 
teleological. The end of temporal life is moral perfection.  Humans have the quality of 
perfectibility.  Fénelon stated, “As to will is a greater perfection than barely to be: so to will good 
is more perfect than to will.”31 Rousseau also recognized the capacity for perfectibility: “The 
human genre is perfectible; man can transform himself.  Perfectibility is the only faculty that is 
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31 Fénelon, “As a Superior Being is the Cause of All Modifications of Creatures, So This Impossible for A 
Man’s Will to Will Good, by Itself, or of Its Own Accord,” Demonstration, section 65, 166. 
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undeniably unique to humans and develops all other human faculties.”32 Fénelon and Rousseau 
identified the will as the source of virtue and vice.33 When man wills good, he is a moral being. 
His ultimate purpose is to be a morally good being.  Life is a constant process towards the 
perfection of himself and his genre.34 Perfection is disinterested action toward moral goodness. 
Four corollaries relate to the faculty of perfectibility. The first corollary is that choice 
based on free agency is the source of morality. As the preceding quote indicates, Fénelon 
understood the difference between being innately good and acting morally.35 To quote him 
further, free will is “the foundation of all government, of all instruction, and of all rules of 
conduct.”36 “Deprived of this liberty, all human life would be thrown into confusion, and there 
would be no longer a trace of order in society. If men are not free, in what they do of good or 
evil, good is no longer good, and evil no longer evil.”37 Rousseau followed this line of thinking 
in his statement, “to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts.”38 
Rousseau also echoed, “perfectibility is the only faculty that is undeniably unique to humans and 
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develops all other human faculties.”39  
The second corollary is that moral perfectibility involves deliberate rational choice and 
intentional action.  Aristotle's concept of proairesis, to choose one thing before another, is 
relevant.40 To Aristotle, Fénelon, and Rousseau moral perfection entails the deliberate desire to 
perform the function of human beings properly, that is, to perform it voluntarily in the full 
awareness of possible alternatives that, however, are rejected in deciding to act the way one 
wills. Decisions are derived through a process of deliberation.41 No action can have moral 
value without this process.  
The third corollary is the role of sentiment in moral perfection.  To Fénelon and 
Rousseau morality is a matter of the heart.  According to Fénelon, “Pour le sentiment, je m’en 
tiens à Descartes qui dit souvent que les sentiments ne sont que des perceptions de l’âme.”42 
Rousseau is a great apostle of sentiment, especially inspiring perceptions beyond the self. Both 
Fénelon and Rousseau regard sentiment as conative life experience. In his Tenth Walk, 
Rousseau felt this type of sentiment as affinity, attachment, and admiration for Madame Warens 
and Fénelon: “The rural solicitude in which I passed the flower of my youth, the study of good 
books to which I completely gave myself up, reinforced in her presence my natural disposition to 
affectionate feelings and rendered me devout almost in the manner of Fénelon.”
43   Rousseau 
placed Madame de Warens in heaven and near Fénelon.  This uplifting sentiment of affinity is the 
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basis of association in civic virtue.  These were affective relationships for him.  
Rousseau referred to sentiment as feeling, the acknowledgement of what he sought in all 
of the walks: relevance and engagement.  Rousseau not only perceived experience; he also felt 
relevant and engaged. All of these experiences are in accordance with Fénelonean fundamental 
meaning of sentiment. The moving force of the general will is human inspiration. In the original 
draft of the Social Contract, the general will remains purely rational.  “No one will dispute that 
the General Will is in each individual a pure act of the understanding, which reasons while the 
passions are silent on what a man may demand of his neighbor and on what his neighbor has a 
right to demand of him.”  However, Rousseau also felt that the will needs a motive power. “If 
natural law,” he writes, “were written only on the tablets of human reason it would be incapable 
of guiding the greater part of our actions; but it is also graven on the heart of man in characters 
that cannot be effaced and it is there it speaks to him more strongly than all the precepts of the 
philosophers.”44 Here is Fénelon’s emphasis on character and the heart.  Rousseau maintained 
that all social virtues flow from the sense of compassion.45 “We have reached the moral order at 
last...If this were the place for it I would try to show how the first impulses of the heart give rise to 
the first stirrings of conscience, and how from the feelings of love and hatred spring the first 
notions of good and evil.”46 “The first sentiment of justice is inborn in the human heart.”47 This is 
the Fénelonean concept of perfectibility. 
He echoed Fénelon’s sentiment, “If I truly love, it will be impossible to conceal my love. 
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Love wants to be active.”48 Of all the human qualities, the most important one is love, charité. 
Fénelon referred to 1 Corinthians 13. “[I]f I have no love, I am nothing.”49 “Charité animates all 
the virtues, and directs their several acts.”50 Goodness and virtue are matters of the heart. The 
abilities to do good and be virtuous emanate freely from the heart. Thus, the most important 
enabling human characteristic is one of inspiration and spirit, not reason: 
All virtue consists essentially in the good will...“The kingdom of God is within 
you.” It is not a question of knowing much, of having great talent, nor even of 
doing great things. We only need to have a heart and to desire the good. Outer 
works are the fruits and the inseparable consequences by which we recognize true 
devotion. But true devotion, the source of these works, is all of the heart.51  
The fourth corollary of moral perfection is that it is a matter of activity, not passivity. 
Fénelon and Rousseau criticized practices of organized religion that focus on fostering worry 
about judgment in the next world rather than instructing people how to live in the temporal 
world. They were aware that ceremonial aspects of religion can distract from the inner life when 
there is a lack of commitment to perfectibility of the heart. They both criticized certain forms of 
quietism for the passivity implied in the state of disinterested contemplation. Fénelon criticized 
Molinos, and Rousseau criticized all except Fénelon. 
The fourth premise shared by Fénelon and Rousseau is that choice is moral in relation to 
others.  Human existence is relational.  Aristotle is relevant again in this regard. People are 
social and political beings who realize their nature fully only in that state. “Moral action is 
impossible outside human society, for actions are virtuous or not when they are performed in 
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relation to one’s fellow men.”52 “Society could be accounted for, and justified, only as a means 
of enabling men to advance to a higher level of achievement than could be arrived at in its 
absence. It had to be regarded as a necessary means to the development of the moral 
potentialities of man's original nature.”53 In order to fulfill the highest good of moral perfection, 
people must act in association with one another. Fénelon and Rousseau extend beyond the 
Aristotelean idea of arete because the goal of personal excellence per se does not account for the 
basis of association, as Rousseau realized in Book Five of Émile.  There are several corollaries in 
relation to this premise of association as the basis of perfectibility. 
First, civil association is voluntary. According to Rousseau it is the most voluntary act.54 
He observed, “a people is a people before it gives itself [to a king]...It would be better to examine 
that by which it has become a people; for this act...is the true foundation of society.”55 Man has 
a natural propensity toward association due to amour de soi and pitié. According to Fénelon 
civil society is a natural course of evolution which is patterned after familial relations. 
Society is inevitable for both philosophers because association is based on mutual need. 
This is the second corollary.  Both provide hypothetical anthropological accounts to describe the 
mutual need which brings men together. Both descriptions are based upon Epicurus. Because 
the accounts in “Epicurus” in Fénelon's Lives of the Ancient Philosophers and the first part of the 
Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality are so similar, it has been suggested that 
Fénelon was the immediate source of Rousseau's account.56  
Paradoxically, society is also the source of corruptibility. Rousseau and Fénelon find the 
cause of psychological, spiritual, and physical maladies of the individual to be the vices of 
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civilized existence.  The more one lives in conformity with the simplicity of disinterested nature, 
the less one is subject to ill.  Both appreciate the civic society of l’âge d’or. The less one lives in 
conformity with this nature, the more one is prone to such internal states as intemperance, 
impatience, fear, and inquietude, all of which lead to psychological, physical, and societal ills. 
The focus of the argument is particularly upon the negative impact of luxury to the inner 
character of the individual. Luxury affects the heart. It is most effectively rooted out by 
education rather than sumptuary law.  The argument extends to the impact of luxury upon the 
well-being of civil society and the state as well as the individual.57  
Rousseau's general will is irrevocable.  To Fénelon surrender of a person’s selfish will to 
God must be absolute with each action and within each moment.  Perhaps the most important 
commonalty between the two philosophers is the paradox that a person must lose himself in order 
to find himself.  The paradox is parallel to the biblical scripture in Matthew 16:25: “For whoever 
wants to save his own life will lose it; but whoever loses his life for my sake will find it.”  
Fenelon's explanation of this paradox is that the will of God as Unitive Goodness is the authentic 
will for the individual.  “I am the way, the truth, and the life” means that the path of seeking 
amour pur is the only way to human fulfillment.  An individual must relinquish by freely 
surrendering his egoistic will to the will of God as the means to discovery, transformation, 
transcendence, and perfectibility.  The libre arbitre which was given by God with no strings 
attached must be reunited with the donor in order to achieve perfectibility. 
How does our will become good? By conforming itself with no reservations to 
that of God. What does self-renunciation mean unless it means to give all right 
over self, with no reservations? St. Paul also told us, “You no longer belong to 
yourselves.”58 Thus whoever works to let go of himself...cuts at one blow the 
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root of all his vices, and finds in the simplest renunciation of himself the seed 
of all virtues....The more we give ourselves up the more we find peace, and this 
peace so enlarges our hearts that we are ready for everything....We must lose 
ourselves if we want to find ourselves again in God.59  
 
Rousseau secularizes the paradox. God is replaced with the General Will. A person must 
relinquish his natural freedom to gain moral freedom. 
What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right 
to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting….We might, over and above 
all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone 
makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, 
while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.60  
For both Fénelon and Rousseau it is necessary to amend natural liberty, the natural 
inclination of the individual for self-preservation (intérêts particuliers), to become truly master 
of oneself.  As Fénelon declared in his defense against Bossuet over the relationship between sin 
and interest, there is a type of interest that is not mercenary. In the case of Fénelon, a person 
relinquishes mercenary interest and thereby opens his will to the unifying will of God. In the 
case of Rousseau, one relinquishes natural liberty to the general will.  Rousseau carries the 
formula further when he says that anyone who refuses to participate will be forced to be free.61  
The result is the same to both philosophers:  moral liberty, i.e., the transformation of the 
individual toward perfectibility. 
This paradox is central to both philosophers.  It is their solution to the fundamental issues 
of their political theories: It is the means of maintaining the inalienability of individual liberty 
even though that liberty is transcended for the sake of association and perfectibility. Individual 
liberty is maintained because the act to transcend one's volonté particulière in the sense of 
intérêts particuliers is a voluntary one motivated by character and deliberated by reason.  Each 
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act includes the understanding that one is acting in favor of his own good.  In regard to the other 
problem, both philosophers see this paradox as the means to atonement. Humans can be at one 
with their innate good nature even in the face of the corruptible aspects of human association, if 
they embrace a higher good, namely, the will of God in the case of Fénelon or the General Will 
in the case of Rousseau.  In this manner, atonement reconciles another paradox in the works of 
both philosophers.  Association in civil society is both the means to moral perfectibility as well 
as moral corruptibility. The individual's act to embrace a higher good enables society to move 
beyond particular interests and to facilitate the development of both the individual and the public 
good. This arrangement allows a Fénelonean outlook for the Rousseauean task of allowing a 
man to obey himself alone while uniting himself with all.62  
The final premise pertains to the role of state. The state is the primary facilitator of the 
good, both physically and morally. The state is legitimate if it provides for the well-being of the 
people in both of these respects. The state is the provider of all right. Every man naturally has a 
right to everything he needs.63 The civil right to property is recognized to facilitate this end.  
What is the end of political association?  Fénelon and Rousseau answered almost identically:  the 
preservation and prosperity of its members.  And what is the surest mark of their preservation 
and prosperity?  It is their numbers and population.64 
The essential mission of the state is ethical. It is a moral force based on the principle of 
disinterestedness. It is the expression of moral will.65 Its purpose is to inculcate moral virtue 
through civic education. The mutual interest of Fénelon and Rousseau in Plato reveals itself in 
both Télémaque and Émile.  Télémaque contains references to the Laws. The Aristotelean 
concept of practical virtue is fundamental as well. Aristotle, Fénelon, and Rousseau maintained 
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that moral virtues are achieved by consistent practice. Experience creates a habit of action. 
Fénelon and Rousseau also relate to the inner journey in Augustine’s Confessions. The 
educational theory of Fénelon and Rousseau is the culmination of their shared logic. Civic virtue 
is inculcated by Mentor and the General Legislator. 
Fénelon and Rousseau's political theories are theories of civic virtue. They followed a 
similar path, but ultimately their paths do separate.  They sought different means to their 
common end.  They developed different concepts of obligation, sovereignty, and government. 
Fénelon maintained faith in the virtuous example of a Christian philosopher king who provides 
for le bien public and would rule according to ancient law under the moderation of a virtuous 
aristocracy. Rousseau no longer maintained faith in res publica Christiana.  He opted for the 
political organization of equal citizens who share in the sovereign authority of the state, which 
operates according to the rule of laws which the people prescribe to themselves. 
Neither Fénelon nor Rousseau is the inconsistent thinker they are sometimes considered 
to be. Their approach to issues rested on five consistent beliefs – disinterestedness, the 
inalienability of human liberty, the natural propensity of man to goodness, the possibility of 
perfectibility, and the interdependent aspect of human nature.  Their educational, religious, 
ethical, and political ideas were inspired by a consistent attitude, albeit an attitude of three 
paradoxes: Libre arbitre is an indication of human imperfection, and, yet, it is also the means of 
perfection. Society is necessary due to mutual need, but it is also a source of dissension and 
corruptibility of human nature.  As a result, one must lose oneself to find oneself. These 
paradoxes led the two philosophers to attempt to bring harmony and order to human existence 
with similar political theories of transcendence, perfectibility, and atonement. In the end, both 
realized the need to inculcate civic virtue through having either Mentor or the General Legislator 
in political authority for the sake of flourishing association. 
There is a vital quote to explain in order to better understand the backboard that Fénelon 
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provided for Rousseau’s thought: It is a lengthy one regarding the tutorship of Émile: 
Then I make him read Telemachus while proceeding on his journey. We seek the 
happy Salente and the good Idomeneus, made wise by dint of misfortune…. 
[L]et us leave the readers to imagine our travels – or to make them in our stead 
with Telemachus in hand, and let us not suggest to them invidious comparisons 
that the author himself [Rousseau] dismisses or makes in spite of himself. 
Besides, since Émile is not a king and I am not a god, we do not fret about 
not being able to imitate Telemachus and Mentor in the good that they did for 
men. No one knows better than we do how to keep in our place, and no one has 
less desire to leave it. We know that the same task is given to all, and that 
whoever loves the good with all his heart and does it with all his power has 
fulfilled his task. We know that Telemachus and Mentor are chimeras. Émile 
does not travel as an idle man, and he does more good than if he were a prince. If 
we were kings, we would no longer be beneficent. If we were kings and were 
beneficent, we would do countless real evils without knowing it for the sake of an 
apparent good that we believed we were doing. If we were kings and were wise, 
the first good thing that we would want to do for ourselves and others would be to 
abdicate our royal position and become again what we are.66  
 
One glaring point to explain is Rousseau’s claim that Mentor and Telemachus are chimeras.  
Here is what Rousseau means.  Kingship according to Mentor and Telemachus are chimeras, but 
the wisdom of mentor to human persons in civic society is not. Rousseau had given up on 
Fénelon’s position of reclaiming the French monarchy according to the early laws of the ancien 
régime, which separated the divine institution of kingship from the human person of the king. 
To consider a previous discussion here, Bossuet conflated the person and institution of 
kingship to present the most complete theory of divine right monarchy. Fenelon’s whole basis of 
reform was due to the fact that he realized that the king is subject to amour propre, as the court 
society exhibited, just like every other human being.  Fénelon favored returning to the king as the 
embodiment of the rule of law according to ancient custom and traditions. Fénelon’s reforms 
were based on a return to the ancient rule of law and the inculcation of virtuous leadership and 
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further on the insistence that a man as King cannot be God. So, both Fénelon and Rousseau 
recognized that the Greek Goddess Minerva per se is a chimera, but what Minerva represents, the 
wisdom of disinterested virtue, is a chimera for neither thinker.  Disinterested virtue is, to the 
contrary, the common key both hold in their political theories. Fénelon maintained that the 
example of an imperfect human ruler toward the perfectibility of disinterestedness is vital to the 
development of civic virtue. Rousseau abandoned the idea of kingship as the type of institutional 
political authority to bring about civic virtue.  Although he turned to the idea of social contract, 
he also realized the need for the Legislator to represent the wisdom of Minerva. This evolution 
from Fénelon to Rousseau traverses a common footprint. 
Fénelon and Rousseau share the exact same concept of the human experience of 
happiness. It is the peace that comes from loving and doing good.  Doing good occurs in 
association with and toward others. Rousseau’s example of disinterestedness and tobacco is a 
perfect example.  Despite their different ideas of the best means of political authority to achieve 
this, they both remain steadfast to the importance of civic virtue and education in the fruition of 
inner peace.  They both understand the Apostle Paul’s lament that people do not do the good 
they want to do.  Fénelon wrote to his student and heir to the French throne, the Duke of 
Burgundy, of the ill effects of amour propre. Rousseau retreated to his solitary walks to 
evaluate his ideas after they were criticized.  Yet, neither Fénelon nor Rousseau gave up on 
perfectibility.  They realized that civic association depends upon how each individual regards 
free will, love, and civic virtue.  Civic association depends on the free responsibility of 
individuals for others.  Formal law alone is not sufficient for a thriving, flourishing, and viable 
community. 
It is now possible to assess why Fénelon and Rousseau are honored side-by-side on the 
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facade of the Panthéon. Their shared principle of disinterestedness ennobled them both. 
Disinterestedness, the regard for human experience outside of the self, allows civic association 
along with human foibles.  It is a beacon of individual commitment, as symbolized by legitimate 
political authority, to the greater good.  “Good social institutions are those that… transport the I 
into the common unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a 
part of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole.”67 Both thinkers integrated the idea 
of the will as absolutely free and the ideas of ancient republicanism to bring about moral unity 
voluntarily. They strove to create a state of wholeness for independency and dependency where 
man, “while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone.”68 Sortir de soi can only come 
from within each person. 
After Rousseau evaluated the idea of chimera for the benefit of Émile, Rousseau added 
instruction regarding where a person might be most free.  At this point, Émile had left Paris with 
Telmachus in hand and had yet to discover the lessons of passions of Eucharis in Calypso, as 
Telemachus had done during his journeys with Mentor. After Rousseau mentioned London, 
Madrid, Corsica, and Geneva, Rousseau concluded for Émile’s benefit, “Freedom takes no form 
of government.  He (a person) takes it with him everywhere.”69 Less than satisfactory results in 
geographical places led Rousseau to focus on the inner self in concert with Fénelonean civic 
distinterestedness.  “You were bound to nothing other than the human condition (of innate 
goodness), and now you are attached to all of the attachments you have given to yourself.”70 
                                                            
67 Rousseau, Émile, trans. Bloom, 40. 
 
68 Rousseau, Social Contract (1988), 23. 
 
69 Rousseau, Émile, trans. Bloom, 473. 
 
70 Ibid., 443. 
 
280  
The vile man bears his slavery in himself; Oh, Emile, where is the man who owes 
nothing to the land in which he lives? Whatever that land may be, he owes to it the 
most precious thing possessed by man, the morality of his actions…there would 
have been no merit in his goodness, he would not have been virtuous, as he may be 
now, in spite of his passions… The public good …is a real motive for him. He 
learns to fight against himself and to prevail, to sacrifice his own interest to the 
common weal. It is not true that he gains nothing from the laws; they give him 
courage to be just, even in the midst of the wicked. It is not true that they have  
failed  to  make  him  free;  they  have  taught  him  to  rule  himself.71 
                                                            





“Platon fait dire à Socrate, dans son Festin, ‘qu’il y a quelque chose de plus divin dans celui qui 
aime que dans celui qui est aimé.’”1  
 
This dissertation has demonstrated that Fénelon’s concepts of free will and love construct 
the foundation of his idea of civic virtue and that they are the source of significance, consistency, 
and relevancy in all of Fenelon’s work, including his political thought.  His political thinking 
stems from his concept of the will on the basis of ontology (being) rather than epistemology 
(reason).  His idea of pure love brings to a head the consideration of whether happiness has 
anything at all to do with appetites that emanate from passions, senses, or even reason.2 
Removing appetite from the issue of happiness left room to consider being as relating outside of 
and beyond individual significance. For Fénelon, it is possible for humans to love disinterestedly, 
an essential quality of which is to act without expecting any particular results or reward; acting 
with disinterest is acting unselfishly.  Personal happiness, satisfaction of desire, and utility do not 
factor into the way Fénelon conceives of the idea of interest. For him, interest emanates from 
being drawn into the midst of a community and from consequently caring for others, and his 
political theory is based on the principle of disinterestedness. This emphasis differentiates his 
political ideas from the Anglo-American tradition of liberal theory based on self-interest, 
individual liberty, the protection of rights of the individual against the state by contract, and 
elected government.  
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Fénelon made a unique and undeniably important contribution to late seventeenth- century 
French thinking about what it means to be an individual from a metaphysical and moral 
standpoint. He focused on moral motivation based on intuitive awareness beyond reason or the 
senses. and he does not identify virtue, worth, and dignity on the basis of rationally or sensate- 
based ethics because there is human access to the impressions of reality beyond these realms to 
inform virtue. 
As a Christian contemplative mystic, an archbishop of the Catholic Church, a Duke, and a 
member of royal court of Louis XIV, Fénelon’s based his political theory on mysticism; thus it 
stands in contradistinction to many of his contemporaries’ currents of thought. He questioned 
whether Descartes’s concept of cogitatio limited the capacity of the will, especially in the pursuit 
of moral goodness, by limiting infinite experience to what is not contrary to reason. Fénelon’s 
theory also stands in sharp relief against the Jansenist eschatological focus on the corrupted will, 
which, according to Fénelon, dovetailed with the prevalent movement of his day to replace virtue 
with self-interest as the motivation of moral action.  His ideas contrasted with the pessimism of 
Pascal, what Fénelon interpreted to be Malebranche’s rational determinism, the determinism of 
natural deism in Spinoza, Skeptic doubt, and Stoic individualism.  Fénelon was a voluntarist 
whose theory rested of the primacy of ontological relationship rather than rational understanding. 
One potential of mysticism is movement towards transcendence.  Contemplative 
experience brings a person to a point where the individual stands alone in temporal life without 
temporal attachments.  At this point the individual experiences being without being an end in 
himself. However, this, somewhat counter-intuitively, does not mean that the purpose of being 
human is to remain detached. It is instead to turn then toward human fulfillment by caring about 
the welfare of others in civic society.  The fulfillment of meaning and purpose in life involves 
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connecting voluntarily to what is outside the self.  Freedom entails not being enslaved to pride. 
Fénelon associated pride, i.e., amour propre, with luxury, aggrandizement, poverty, war, the 
culture of l’honnête homme, mercantilism, and political absolutism. His ideas of 
disinterestedness and perfectibility resonated in Rousseau’s thought and throughout eighteenth- 
century France.  This conceptual system leaves room for individual and social improvement, and 
there are emphases on ownership of consciousness and action toward the well-being of others. 
Two metaphysical references that Fénelon makes in his work, On the Immortality of the 
Soul, offer very poignant inferences to explain his idea of disinterestedness in civic virtue. These 
two references imply the way in which an individual relates to others in a community according 
to the dynamics of infinite possibility.  First, Fénelon refers to Heraclitus. “The soul goes out of 
the body as lightening from a cloud, because it is never clearer in its conceptions, than when freed 
from matter.”3 The relevancy of this reference to Fénelon’s theory of the person is that the 
integrity of the individual remains in sortir de soi when the person experiences himself in 
relationship with infinity rather than within the limitations of acquisitiveness. In this state of 
being, a person is more concerned more with what is he is part of than with himself. 
Fénelon’s reference to Lucretius’s de rerum natura also ties his idea of union and 
relationship. Here follows an explanation of two segments from a lengthy quote. First, Fénelon 
affirms his idea of infinity as unlimited possibility:  “[F]or since the sum of space is unlimited 
outside beyond these walls of the world, the mind seeks to apprehend what there is yonder, to 
which the spirit ever yearns to look forward, and to which the mind’s immission [sic] reaches in 
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free and unembarrassed flight.”4 The individual is eager to expand his horizons to incorporate 
what is beyond himself.  The second segment establishes the idea of relationship from a 
metaphysical standpoint. 
Death does not extinguish things in such a way as to destroy the bodies of matter, 
but only breaks up the union amongst them, and then joins anew the different 
elements with others, and thus it comes to pass that all things change their shapes 
and alter their colours and receive sensations and in a moment yield them up; so 
that from all this you may know it matters much with what others and in what 
position the first beginnings of things are held in union and what motions they do 
mutually impart and receive.5  
 
Fénelon incorporates an ancient approach to rhetoric that influenced the concept of the 
rhetoric in the Greek and Roman civilization.  Fénelon looks to Homeric civilization and the 
communication of values of participation.  As George Kennedy pointed out, “because Homeric 
poems were the textbook out of which the Greeks, and later the Romans, learned to read and 
were venerated almost as the bible of the culture, the attitude toward speech in the Iliad strongly 
influenced the conception of the orator in Greco-Roman civilization.”6 Fénelon’s Telemachus is 
his version of the Iliad for the seventeenth century. According to Vivente, “Homer plunges us 
into the very essence of character.”7 The plunge reaches the depth of participation in communal 
values and how the rhetor imbues and instills those values disinterestedly as a matter of abiding 
habit.  Abiding habit indicates the immersion of the rhetor in the character of the community and 
                                                            
4 Lucretius, de Rerum natura, bk. 6, vol. 1, trans. H. A. J. Munro, 4th  ed., (London: Deighton Bell & Co, 
1893), 113. 
 
5 Ibid., 114. 
 
6 George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 10, as cited in  Marcia Kmetz, Shane Borrowman, and Robert 
L. Lively, ed., Rhetoric in the Rest of the West, (Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 24. 
 
7 Paolo Vivante, Homer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 45, as discussed in Kmetz, Borrowman, 




his ability to express its corporate meaning to others.  The Homeric community was a place of 
habit where action, lifestyle, and speech were intricately connected.8 Rhetoric was a means for 
bringing to light the meaning and purpose of communal values. Public discourse brings together 
intent, meaning, and action in community.  This was the heritage of the aoidoi.9  
Fénelon’s ontology is referred to as his metaphysics of Exodus because he bases it in on 
the words of Exodus 3:14: “I am who I am.”  As Fénelon maintains, “He is Being; or, to say it 
better by saying it more simply, he is.”10 According to this ontology Fénelon circumvents the 
need for further proof of the existence of God.  God is arbitre, all will, and man, in his likeness, 
has libre arbitre to access and act according to God’s will.  Will is a presence and not a 
representation, so there is no need to search for God in terms of cause and effect.11 The cause is 
present in the effect.  Infinitely perfect being is at the same time its own cause and object. Fénelon 
compares his ontological argument with other methods: “All these way[s] of going to You, or 
rather of find[ing] You in me, are tied and intertwined with one another.”12 He amplifies, “I find 
you at every turn.”13  
The reason for emphasizing Fénelon’s idea of ontology in this conclusion is to integrate 
his ideas of motive and interest in will.  Instead of a concern with cause and effect, Fénelon is 
concerned about the spring that moves action, will. He does not focus on deontology, but the 
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10 Fénelon, “Démonstration de l’existence de Dieu,” Œuvres, vol.2 (Gallimard, 1983), in “Proofs of the 










character of the will when it comes to human action.  Because the will has supra-sensate and supra-
rational access to Infinite Good, the human will can act in concert with Ultimate Good. The 
human will is responsible for the motives and interests of its actions. The idea of interest 
concerns being in the midst of a relationship with another. External causes and effects are not 
responsible for them, but the character of the human will is. 
The idea of perfectibility is crucial to Fénelon’s concept of love in the ascendance from 
various degrees of amour propre to amour pur. 14The perfectibility of love varies according to 
degrees from mercenary, or pridefully acquisitive, to pure, i.e., devoid of selfish motive. 
Perfectibility begins with personal reform that allows the soul to relinquish amour proper and 
embrace amour pur. While few achieve the highest state of perfection during temporal life, it is 
possible, and all are capable of perfectibility and response to civic education. 
Matthew Mendham’s claim as recently as 2011 that Rousseau probably coined the term 
"perfectibilite" indicates that much research needs to be done.15 Mendham cites the works of 
Wokler.  One approach to the idea of perfection in political theory is to consider whether 
man should be perfect, and if so, what are the qualities of it to be attained and how is it to be 
attained. Descartes tied moral perfectibility to good judgment. Fénelon, instead, ties together the 
unlimited free will of God’s creativity, infinity, and perfectibility. The essences of man are love 
and free will, which are in the likenesses of these capacities in God. Everything else, including 
his reason, is donated, borrowed, or finite gifts to man from God. Because these essences of 
the soul are infinite, moral perfection is achieved in the will, not primarily through reason. 
Supra-mortal experience informs the will along with reason and conation, according to Fénelon.  
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15 Matthew Mendham, “Gentle Savages,” 185.  Mendham cites the authority of Robert Wokler, “Perfectible 




Fenelon and Rousseau recognize that human possibilities are great and pure while social and 
cultural conditions detract from their development. 
In Fénelon’s system of thought, Neo-Platonism and Augustinianism link aesthetics, 
transcendence of the will, infinity, and morality. “Man, who does not bring himself about, is not 
made to seek after himself, but to exist solely for Him who has made him. His glory and his 
perfection consist in going out of himself, in forgetting himself, in losing himself, in being 
swallowed up in the simple love of infinite beauty.”16 As Pryce describes this passage, “the 
individual  is  hungry  for  spiritual  transformation  with  freedom  of  conscience.”17 This 
transformation includes disinterested moral being. 
In the tradition of contemplative mysticism, perfection is achieved when the heart and 
will set aside selfish interest to make room for enlargement. This enlargement is possible when 
the person removes barriers that are present when he makes himself an end in himself. 
Perfectibility makes room for caring about the needs of others first. In this process of 
rearrangement, self fulfillment and perfectibility are achieved by sortir de soi and receiving what 
is larger than the self.  Here is the ontological basis of civic association as a relationship among 
disinterested people. Civic association and its viability rely on the possibility of the free will of 
each member to be disinterested.  In that each person holds the potential and responsibility for 
disinterestedness in the community, Fénelon’s theory implies inherent equality, dignity, and 
worth of the individual. Fénelon does not discount the dignity of man’s innate goodness. Fénelon 
posited a connection between man's goodness as a naturally imbued quality and moral action in 
civic society. Because man is good, he is has the potential for being morally good. “There is 
                                                            
16 Elaine Pryce, “Upon the Quakers and the Quietists,” Quaker Studies, vol. 14, no 2 (2010): 215, cf. 
Fénelon, “Sur le pur amour,” vol. 1 Œuvres de Fénelon (1835), 309, as translated in the introduction of Patrick 
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17 Pryce, ibid. 
 
288  
nothing as precious...as the volition to good.”18 The qualities of innate goodness, worth, dignity, 
and the potential for moral goodness legitimate safeguarding him from political domination. 
Here enters Rousseau.  In the beginning of the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, he declares 
perfectibility to be the only undeniably unique faculty in all humans. 
The idea of perfectibility includes the idea of reform. Writ large, reform is the caring in the 
community for others and the idea that the purpose of government is to provide for the well- 
being of the people.  Fénelon and Rousseau were both reformers.19 Future radical reformers, 
including those of the French Revolution, followed in their footsteps of considering perfectibility. 
Fénelon and Rousseau both focused on the relationship between innocence and 
corruptibility within the context that the essence of human nature as good. The term Age of Gold 
originated from the five successive ages of humanity in the legend of Hesoid.20 The first age was 
the period of innocence and felicity.  Fénelon developed his idea of the age of gold in books three, 
seven, and ten of Telemachus. Respectively, they emphasize the economic, moral, and political 
components of an ideal civic society. “[N]othing is as amiable as this life of the first men.  Men 
who cultivate reason and love virtue can compare the vain and ruinous luxury, which in our day 
plagues our customs and disgraces our nation, with the happiness and elegant simplicity which the 
ancients lay before our eyes.”21  
Fenelon’s hypothetical argument regarding whether those who love God at the moment 
                                                            
18 Fénelon, Demonstration of the Existence, Wisdom and Omnipotence of God, Drawn from the Knowledge of 
Nature, Particularly of Man, and Fitted to the Meanest Capacity, ed. A. Boyer, 1st. ed. (London: W. Taylor and J. Baker, 
1713), 163. 
 
19 On the ideas of perfectibility, reform, and social improvement in Rousseau’s thought, see: Matthew 
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20 Hésoide, Trauvaux et jours, as cited in Fénelon Télémaque, vol. 1 (1920), 82, footnote 3. 
 
21 Fénelon, Letter to the Academy, 107. 
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of death can be dammed provides powerful distinction between objects and motives. 
Indifference to salvation removed the concept of duty from eschatological concerns, such 
as the motivation to act virtuously out of the fear of damnation or the hope of salvation. The self 
became responsible for itself.  In Fénelon’s system, personal responsibility is ultimate regard, not 
only for what is beyond oneself but for what is most infinite. Personal responsibility becomes the 
basis of civic virtue. 
Each individual owes incomparably more to the human race, which is the great 
fatherland, than to the particular country in which he was born. As a family is to 
the nation, so is the nation to the universal commonweal; wherefore it is infinitely 
more harmful for nation to wrong nation, than for family to wrong family. To 
abandon the sentiment of humanity is not merely to renounce civilization and to 
relapse into barbarism, it is to share in the blindness of the most brutish brigands 
and savages; it is to be a man no longer, but a cannibal.22  
In his Chronologie universelle, Rousseau cites Fénelon almost verbatim.23  
According to Fénelon, the infinite is not indefinite.24 The experience of doubt leaves 
reason radically contingent in the end.   Reason leads to infinite, but cannot define it. Only 
metaphysical certainty of self as part of infinitity can lead to the definition of infinite, Ultimate 
Being, or Goodness.   Defining the self ontologically instead of epistemologically has an 
important metaphysical implication in Fénelon’s thought. "I am who is" is the definition of all 
existence, the parts and the whole.  Sortir de soi is the exodus of the confines of selfishness and 
the place where participation in Infinite Goodness begins. Disinterestedness is not a statement of 
human depravity or a lack of individual worth. To the contrary, it places the individual as the 
                                                            
 
22 Fénelon, "Socrate et Alcibiade,” Dialogues des morts (1718), as translated in Paul Hazard, The European 
Mind, 1680-1715 (1967), 282–83. 
 
23 Rousseau, Chronologie Universelle, Œuvres, vol. 5 (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 488. 
 
24 Fénelon, Augustine and Descartes, Fable; Fénelon, Demonstration of the Existence.  
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primary key to civic virtue and the flourishing vitality of a community.  Individual significance 
and relating according to Fénelon are inextricable.  The ultimate assent to community is the 
disinterested demonstration of amour pur. It is the individual’s intentional and ultimate 
commitment to a good beyond le moi. 
Fénelon supports his concept of disinterested virtue with exemplars of disinterested 
leadership throughout history. It is not a statement of depravity to exclaim, as Moses did, 
“Either forgive them this sin, or erase me from Your book.”25 The same claim is applicable to 
Jesus of Nazareth. “He humbled himself and became obedient to death – even death on a 
cross!”26 It is also not a statement of depravity to exclaim, as the Apostle Paul did in Romans 
9:30, “I wished…that I was anathema to Christ for my brethren.”  Paul lived a disinterested life 
actively traveling and teaching until he was martyred for the sake of what he believed was 
Infinite Goodness. Paul lived according to Augustine’s maxim, credo ut intelligum. In Paul’s 
case, his belief in unselfishness led him to understand human fulfillment accordingly. 
Fénelon also referred to the ancients to demonstrate that disinterested virtue friendship 
and virtue are imprinted in the hearts of men.27 The heroes of Homer were prompted by love to 
die for one another, and Alceste died so that his wife might live.28 Fénelon cites the words of 
Socrates at his trial that there is no fear of death because life and death are one and the same if 
one lives in infinite truth.29 It is also possible to jump forward in time to demonstrate the 
constancy of disinterestedness, especially as it impacts personal and social reform.  Fénelon’s 
                                                            
25 Exodus 32:32. 
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28 Ibid., 669. 
 
29 Ibid., 667. 
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idea of disinterestedness remained influential into eighteenth-century revolutionary France along 
with Rousseau’s understanding of it. At the height of the Terror, Robespierre declared his 
willingness to surrender his life for the good of the people: “Happy is he who was born among 
you! Happy is he who can die for your well being!” This call was then heeded by the 
revolutionaries who emulated the martyrs, Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau and Marat, in committing 
“a total abnegation of themselves.”30 The pure love of God was transformed into the pure love 
of the patrie.31 The connection in these examples is the bearing of disinterested action for the 
sake of a good other than the self. It is clear why Fénelon and Rousseau are represented together 
on the façade of the Panthéon.  
This dissertation fills that gap in Keohane’s study of Philosophy and the State in France 
by providing a philosophical and theological background in late seventeenth century France for 
understanding the concepts of individualism, virtue, and interest.32 It supports Van Kley’s claim 
in The Religious Origins of the French Revolution that religious thought, although it was 
condemned by eighteenth-century French philosophes and revolutionaries, was integrated into 
the bases of the French Revolution.33 It opens wider the door that Riley entered with his claim 
that the heritage of Rousseau stems from the background of late seventeenth century thought. 
This study of Fénelon expands this background along with Riley’s contributions on Fénelon, 
Bossuet, Malebranche, and Leibniz. Both Fénelon and Rousseau were reformers whose ideas 
addressed the ideas of the individual and community, the relationship between independency and 
                                                            
 
30 Charly Coleman, “The Value of Dispossession: Rethinking Discourses Of Selfhood In Eighteenth-Century 
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31 Ibid., 326. 
 
32 Schaefer, “Review of Philosophy and the State in France,” 463; cf. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in 
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33 Dale Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1996). 
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dependency, human motivation, the impact of amour propre, and remedies for that impact, 
including disinterested civic virtue and education. This dissertation provides a path for further 
study of these issues and especially of comparisons of the ways in which Fénelon and Rousseau 
consider them. Fénelon’s position is that the very viability of a civic society is dependent 
upon the manifestation of disinterested virtue by its leadership and members to provide a 
benchmark for evaluating civic society in any era and in any society. Twentieth-century 
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It is said that Fenelon wrote most of Les aventures de Télémaque in this tiny, tall dwelling: 
 
 
 
 
